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of these two phenomena, many prominent security experts in b~th 
government and private industry have rung an alarm b~ll regardi~g 
the potential for acts of cyber-terrorism. However,. there is .no precise 
definition of cyber-terrorism under U.S. law or m prac~ice ai:ion.g 
cyber-security academicians. The lac~ of a co~on startmg pomt lS 
one of the reasons existing law fails to dlrectly address cyber-
terrorism. . . 
This Article furnishes a lexicon of cyber-related mahc10us 
activities and argues for a common working definition of cyber-
terrorism. This definition can be both incorporated into current 
counter-terror legislation and used by government agencies to com~at 
cyber-terrorism. This paper arrives at ~hat definition by ana~yzmg 
the various definitions proposed by security experts and those m use 
by governmental organizations. This Article builds on these 
definitions to arrive at a new definition that is at once broad eno_ugh 
to cover the potentially unique effects of a weapon of cyber-terronsm, 
while narrow enough to exclude computer network attacks that are 
relatively minor in nature. Second, analyzing several recent cyber-
attacks this Article finds that, while we have not yet faced a "cy~er 
9/11," ~omputer network attacks for politic~l purp?ses a~e on the nse 
and becoming increasingly complex. Thlrd, this .Artic~e ~nalyzes 
current law related to both cyber-crimes and terronsm, fmdmg th~t 
while these laws are applicable in many instances, they fall short. m 
adequately focusing on the most important factor when address~ng 
cyber-terrorism: prevention. This Article concludes ?Y recommen~mg 
that cyber-terrorism, as defined in this paper, be mc?rporated mto 
some of our most frequently used laws to combat terronsm. 
INTRODUCTION 
"If I had an hour to save the world I would spend 59 minutes defining the 
problem and one minute finding solutions. m 
On January 5, 2012, an Eastern District of Virginia gran~ j.ury 
indicted seven individuals and two corporations, Megaupload Limited 
and Vestor Limited, with "racketeering conspiracy, con~piring to 
commit copyright infringement, conspiring to . c?mmit m~ney 
laundering and two substantive counts of cnmrnal copyright 
infringement. "2 The government based the indictme~ts on the alle~ed 
conspirators' business of profiting from users illegally sharmg 
1. 
2. 
Albert Einstein. 
See Justice Department Charges Leaders of Megaupload with 
Widespread Online Copyright Infringement, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 
(Jan. 19 2012) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm-
074.html' [hereinafter DOJ MegauploadJ (identifying the seven 
individuals' and two corporations' charges). 
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copyrighted music and video files on their website, Megaupload.com.3 
The w:bsite was one of the most popular on the Internet with 
approximately 150 million registered users, 50 million hits daily, and 
endorsements from music superstars earning its founder Kim Dotcom 
("Dotcom"), $42 million in 2011.4 ' 
~n January 19, 2012, New Zealand police arrived at Dotcom's 
mans10n to arrest him. 5 Dotcom retreated into a "safe room" where 
he had stored weapons, including a sawed-off shotgun.6 The police 
eventua~y cut their .way into the room and arrested him. 7 Following 
Dot com s arrest, police arrested three other indicted co-conspirators in 
Auckland, New Zealand at the United States' request. 8 Additionally 
police executed more than twenty search warrants in the U nitetl 
States a~d eight o;her countries and seized approximately fifty million 
dollar~ m assets. The action was "among the largest criminal 
copyri.ght cases ever .brought by the United States and directly targets 
the misuse of a public content storage and distribution site to commit 
and facilitate intellectual property crime. "10 
. In the imm~diate aftermath of the arrests, one segment of the 
onlme community responded with what the International Herald 
:ri?une called ,::;ugital Molotov c?ckt~ils," 1•1 and what CNET called 
go mg nuclear. In apparent dissatisfact10n with the Megaupload 
arrests, the hacker group Anonymous launched cyber-attacks against 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Id. ("[F]or more than five years the conspiracy has operated websites 
that unlawfully reproduce and distribute infringing copies of copyrighted 
works ... on a massive scale."). 
See Nick Perry, Popular file-sharing website Megaupload shut down 
USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ ' 
tech/~e~s/story /2012-01-19/megaupload-feds-shutdown/52678528/1 
(explammg Megaupload's size and profits). 
~ee Kevin J. O'Brien et al., Flashy Promoter of File-Sharing Captured 
in Ne·w· Zealand Raid, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 2012, at 1 
(explammg how Dotcom was arrested). 
Id. 
Id. 
See DOJ Megaupload, supra note 2 ("Dotcom, Batato, Ortmann, and 
van der Kolk ~~re arrested today in Auckland, New Zealand, by New 
Zealand authonties, who executed provisional arrest warrants requested 
by the United States."). 
Id. (explaining the additional searches and seizures resulting from the 
Megaupload conspiracy). 
Id. 
0 'Brien et al., supra note 5. 
Molly Wood, Anonymous goes nuclear; everybody loses?, CNET (Jan. 
19, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31322 3-57362437-
256 /anonymous-goes-nuclear-everybody-loses/. -
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the websites of the White House, the U.S. Department of ~ustice 
("DoJ"), the U.S. Copyright Office, and several entertamment 
companies and trade groups.13 Across the globe, similar ~etwork 
attacks were up twenty-four percent immediately followmg the 
arrests.14 These actions were crimes, but neither money nor othe~ 
traditional criminal motives motivated the perpetrators. Anonymous 
cyber-attacks were likely politically motivated and geared towards 
influencing both government and civilian opinion. Should the 
motivations of such an attack affect how it is classified under the law? 
Was this a cyber-crime that the law should treat like an~ ot~er? Was 
it an act of civil disobedience? Or, did its political motivat10ns make 
it a unique form of terrorism? . . 
Cyber-crime is now a part of everyday life, and m 2009, caused 
estimated losses of up to one trillion dollars globally.
15 Gi~e11: the 
potential criminal rewards, law enforcement is as unlikely to ehmmate 
cyber-crimes as they are traditional crimes. Lawmakers have 
attempted to keep pace by enacting statutes such as the Co~puter 
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), which has been contm:ially_ 
updated.16 Such statutes criminalize offenses that ar.e collilll~ted 
through computers or other information systems loc~ted m the Y mted 
States.17 However, the Internet's inher.ent anon:~11mty make~8 it eas! 
for criminals to act in cyberspace without bemg caught. This 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
See id. (arguing that the FBI may have go.aded Anonymous into 
attacking their website with the arrests followmg deb~tes about new 
legislation on Internet piracy in an attempt to turn pubhc support away 
from Anonymous and similar hacking groups). 
Id. (identifying the effects of the Megaupload conspiracy). 
See Elinor Mills, Study: Cybercrime cost firms $1 trillion globally, 
CNET (Jan. 28, 2009, 9:01 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-
10152246-83.html ("Data theft and breaches from cy.bercrime. may have 
cost businesses as much as $1 trillion globally m lost mtellect~al 
property and expenditures for repairing the damage last year, accordmg 
to a new study from McAfee. "); see generally INTERNET CRIMES 
COMPLAINT CTR, 2010 INTERNET CRIME REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.ic3.gov/media/ annualreport/2010_IC3Report. pdf 
(reporting the internet crime complaints in 2010). 
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (CFAA has been amended six times since it 
became law, specifically in 1988, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008). 
See, e.g., id. 
See, e.g., Thomas Crampton, Nigeria to battle Internet scams that taint 
its image, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.c~m/ 
2004/01/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-t16_0.html (reportmg on the 
infamous Nigerian Internet fraud schemes); accord Somini Sengupta & 
Jenna Wortham, U.S. Charges 1 in Online Ad Fraud Scheme, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at Bl (describing a rece:r:t Internet fr~ud scheme 
that diverted marketing revenue to fraudulent sites by replacmg real ads 
with fraudulent ones). 
278 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Cyber-Terrorism: Finding a Common Starting Point 
anonymity, combined with society's increasing reliance on computers 
a~d c~mputer networks, has also made a new type of cyber-crime 
with d~~erent motivations possible: cyber-terrorism. There is growing 
recogmt10n of the threa~ of. cyber-terrorism, and an ever-increasing 
amount of proposed legislat10n and academic thought is being put 
towards it.s prevention.19 A well thought-out strategy, however, needs 
to start with a common working definition of cyber-terrorism. 
T~is Article proposes a common working definition of cyber-
terronsm that legislators and government agencies can work from to 
ensure that ~he ~o~u~ions developed address the most pressing 
problems. This defmit10n can be neither too broad nor too narrow or 
els~ i.t . risk~ being irrelevant and/ or useless. However, this proposed 
defimt1on is. broad enough to cover the potentially unique effects of 
cyber-terronsm as a weapon, while sufficiently narrow to exclude 
relatively minor computer network attacks. 
This Article also shows how existing counter-terrorism statutes 
such as statutes prohibiting material support to terrorism 20 th~ 
F.oreign Int~lligenc~ ~urveillance Act ("FISA"),21 conspiracy to kill, 
kidnap, maim, or mJure persons or damage property in a foreign 
country,22 and statutes addressing weapons of mass destruction 
("WMD"),23 could be amended to incorporate the proposed definition 
of cyber-terrorism. By incorporating cyber-terrorism into these 
statutes, an already effect~ve counterterrorism legal regime would also 
apply to the cyber-realm. The author does not suggest that these 
changes, even if enacted wholesale, would eliminate cyber-terrorism as 
a threat. However, a common definition of cyber-terrorism can be 
used as a pie.ce in ~he ?uzzle towards the most important goal of 
counter-terrorism legislat10n: prevention. 
Section ~ examines the current state of cyber-threats and why 
current law madequately deals with cyber-terrorism. Section II aims 
at p:ovi~ing a definition of cyber-terrorism by including an 
exammat10n of each element of the definition a lexicon of definitions 
used within the definition, an examination ~f other types of cyber-
attacks, and a comparison with current definitions of cyber-terrorism 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
See generally Susan W. Brenner, "At Light Speed": Attribution and 
Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Brenner] (describing why 
current laws do not ~dequately address the issue of attack attribution); 
see also, generally Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are we Legally Ready?, 
9 J. INTL Bus. & L. 1 (2010) (arguing for new international conventions 
to govern cyber-terrorism). 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-B (2006); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006). 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2006). 
18 u.s.ci. § 956 (2006). 
18 U.S.C. § 2332A. 
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suggested by academics or in _use by ::~~::~n~:g~~~;,:;i,!e~~~~~ 
examines several recent, maJor cyb . S t"on IV is an 
they fit this suggested definition of cybe_r-terronsm. ~c i . nd 
overview of current domestic laws relati:ig to botl~ ct~ er-ci·nn~:gsh~ng 
d" · f the maJor comp ica 10n 
terrorism, and a · is~uss~on ° F" 11 Section v of this Article cyber-terrorism: attribution. ma y, . · 1 current 
discusses incorporation of cyber-terronsm ~nto severa 
counter-terrorism statutes that could be effectively used to prevent 
cyber-terrorism. 
SECTION I: THE CURRENT SITUATION 
"The very technologies that empower us to lead and c~,~:te also empower 
those who would disrupt and destroy. 
Attacks on information systemds a;;d n:w~;~ h~v; do':::"! 
. d · the last two deca es. · · 
mcrease m . f d that the Department of Defense 
Accounting Office report oun k . 1995.26 
("DOD") faced 250,000 attempted attacks on its _networ shm b' 
. the number had risen to 6 million,21 and m 2008 t ~ num er 
m 2006 th 300 million.2s These numbers become staggerm~ ~hen 
was more an t to other cyber-attacks victims. 
1 ki g beyond the governmen . . f oo n . . le in the United States were victims o Seventy~four . mill10n peopult" . an estimated thirty-two billion 
cyber-cnme_ m ~010, r2~s i~g m . xamines the current threats 
dollars in fmancial loss. This Sect10n e h t proach will be 
to information system~ and e~lores bhow t~ e kc~::e Dnited States. 
inadequate in preventmg a maJor cy er-a ac 
A. The Current Threat 
President Barack Obama has labeled computer ~etw_orkk attafcks 
· d ational security ns s we ace 
"one of the most serious economic an n 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
R ks by the President on Securing Our 
President Barack Obama, emar 731 (' M 29 2009) 
Nation's Cyber Infrastructure, 1 PUB. PAPERS ay ' . . 
. Off" GAO/AIMD-96-84 Informat10n US Gov't. Accountability ice, f D f Pose 
. . . C t Attacks at Department o e ense 
Secunt:y: R~SmKpSu2 e(r1996) (noting the number of attacks on computer 
Increasing i ,, 
systems are "doubling each year(.] ). 
Id. at 3. 
Th k ARMED FORCES J. Nov. Scott Hamilton, Industry pulse: e _un nown, u't and 
2009 at 33 (describing the growing awareness ~f ~o~er~m) 
priv~te companies in developing a robust cyber-secunty m us ry . 
Id. . rt 2011 SYMANTEC (2011), 
Norton Cybercrime Repo / / /h~me homeoffice/html/cybe http://www.symante~.comh/contbent ~n ~~ 201,1 ;nd the overall financial 
rcrimereport/ (reportmg t e cy ercnme i 
los~es). 
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as a nation,"30 and stated, "America's economic prosperity in the 21st 
century will depend on cybersecurity. "31 The gravity expressed in 
these statements, although serious, is mild compared to the fears of 
cyber-security experts. The leading force among cyber-security 
experts has been the former chief cyber-security adviser on the 
National Security Council, Richard Clarke.32 In his book Cyber War, 
Clarke describes the potential for "a massive cyberattack on civilian 
infrastructure that downs power grids for weeks, halts trains, grounds 
aircraft, explodes pipelines, and sets fire to refineries. "33 Former 
Director of National Intelligence and Director of the National Security 
Agency Mike McConnell stated, "[t]he warnings are over. It could 
happen tomorrow[.]"34 McConnell described the potential for such an 
attack as impacting the global economy on "an order of magnitude 
surpassing" the 9/11 attacks.35 
Whether cyber-attacks have the potential to rise to the level just 
described is certainly debatable.36 However, cyber-attacks motivated 
by reasons other tp.an money37 are becoming more and more 
30. Obama, supra note 24. 
31. Id. 
32. Profile: Richard Clarke, BBC (Mar. 22, 2004, 7:52 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3559087.stm. 
33. Richard A. Clarke & Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat 
to National Security and What to Do About It 260 (2010). 
34. Max Fisher, Fmr. Intelligence Director: New Cyberattack May Be 
Worse Than 9/11, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/frnr-intelligence-
director-new-cyberattack-may-be-worse-than-9-11/63849/. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., Joshua Green, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, WASH. MONTHLY 
(Nov. 2002), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/ 
2001/0211.green.html (arguing the threat of cyber-terrorism is over-
hyped and focusing too heavily on cyber-security will have a negative 
effect on the information technology industry); see also Derek E. 
Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 604, 621 (2011) 
[hereinafter Bambauer] (arguing that scenes of "cyber-apocalypse" are 
overblown, but cyber threats are real and that information, not systems 
should be the focus of cyber-security); but see Richard Clarke, Threats 
to U.S. National Security: Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards 
Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 33, 36-38 
(1999-2000) (arguing that large scale cyber-attacks are a distinct 
possibility and that the best way to respond to cyber-threats is through 
the development of public-private partnerships). 
37. See Lily Kuo, Cyber attacks grow increasingly 'reckless,' says top 
official, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/07 /us-usa-cybersecurity-nsa-idUSBRE8861CY20120907 
(noting that accusations of hacking for espionage and other motives). 
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as a nation,"30 and stated, "America's economic prosperity in the 21st 
century will depend on cybersecurity. "31 The gravity expressed in 
these statements, although serious, is mild compared to the fears of 
cyber-security experts. The leading force among cyber-security 
experts has been the former chief cyber-security adviser on the 
National' Security Council, Richard Clarke.32 In his book Cyber War, 
Clarke describes the potential for "a massive cyberattack on civilian 
infrastructure that downs power grids for weeks, halts trains, grounds 
aircraft, explodes pipelines, and sets fire to refineries. "33 Former 
Director of National Intelligence and Director of the National Security 
Agency Mike McConnell stated, "[t]he warnings are over. It could 
happen tomorrow[.]"34 McConnell described the potential for such an 
attack as impacting the global economy on "an order of magnitude 
surpassing" the 9/11 attacks.35 
Whether cyber-attacks have the potential to rise to the level just 
described is certainly debatable.36 However, cyber-attacks motivated 
by reasons other than money37 are becoming more and more 
30. Obama, supra note 24. 
31. Id. 
32. Profile: Richard Clarke, BBC (Mar. 22, 2004, 7:52 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3559087.stm. 
33. Richard A. Clarke & Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat 
to National Security and What to Do About It 260 (2010). 
34. Max Fisher, Fmr. Intelligence Director: New Cyberattack May Be 
Worse Than 9/11, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/fmr-intelligence-
director-new-cyberattack-may-be-worse-than-9-11/63849/. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., Joshua Green, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, WASH. MONTHLY 
(Nov. 2002), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/ 
2001/0211.green.html (arguing the threat of cyber-terrorism is over-
hyped and focusing too heavily on cyber-security will have a negative 
effect on the information technology industry); see also Derek E. 
Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 604, 621 (2011) 
[hereinafter Bambauer] (arguing that scenes of "cyber-apocalypse" are 
overblown, but cyber threats are real and that information, not systems 
should be the focus of cyber-security); but see Richard Clarke, Threats 
to U.S. National Security: Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards 
Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 33, 36-38 
(1999-2000) (arguing that large scale cyber-attacks are a distinct 
possibility and that the best way to respond to cyber-threats is through 
the development of public-private partnerships). 
37. See Lily Kuo, Cyber attacks grow increasingly 'reckless,' says top 
official, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/09/07 /us-usa-cybersecurity-nsa-idUSBRE8861CY20120907 
(noting that accusations of hacking for espionage and other motives). 
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prevalent. The years 2006 to 2010 saw a 650% increase in cyber-
attacks on federal agencies.38 The rise in politically-active hacking 
groups, such as Anonymous, demonstrates that. the Inter:iet is 
increasingly a platform for dissenters, both domestic and foreign, to 
express their disagreement with the government.39 Espionage on 
. .dl . . 11 40 E " . d"41 information systems is rapi y nsrng as we . ven au-gappe 
classified networks are not immune, as the DOD's classified network 
was compromised in 2008 by an attack using flash drives.42 
Politically-motivated cyber-attacks are not limited to government 
websites.43 Hacking groups have increasingly attacked corporations 
that have policies with which the groups disagree. Examples of such 
corporate attacks include a "highly sophisticated" attack on Google in 
2010 that originated from China,44 and numerous coordinated attacks 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-463T, CONTINUED 
ATTENTION NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR NATION'S CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2011) (stating 
that from 5,503 incidents reported in FY 2006 to 41,776 reported in FY 
2010). 
See, e.g., Kukil Bora, Anonymous Timeline 2011: The Rise of the 
Hactivist INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012, 8:58 AM), 
http:// w'-ww .ibtimes .com/ articles/ 303449/20120223 /anonymous-hacking-
hactivist-acta-protest-ddos-blackout .htm (charting the increasing rate of 
hacking by Anonymous). 
Ellen Nakashima, In a world of cybertheft, U.S. names China, Russia as 
main culprits, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security /us-cyber-
espionage-report-names-china-and-russia-as-main-
culprits / 20ll/11/02 / gI QAF 5fRiM_story .html (repo:ting . on. an 
intelligence report to Congress naming China and Russia as the pnmary 
culprits of cyber-espionage). 
"Air gapped" networks are those physically, electrically, and 
electromagnetically isolated from other networks such as t~e Interne~. 
See Oliver Rist, Hack Tales: Air-gap networking for the price of a pair 
of sneakers, INFOWORLD (May 29, 2006, 2:00 A:-'-1), 
http://www.infoworld.com/d/networking/hack-tales-air-gap-networkmg-
price-pair-sneakers-610 (describing how an "air gap" network works and 
why certain companies choose to utilize them). 
William J. Lynn III, Essay, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's 
Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2010), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-
iii/defending-a-new-domain (describing defense initiatives put in place to 
defend the United States from cyber threats). 
See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google, Citing Attack, 
Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13beijing.html. 
44. Id. (discussing Google's reaction to network attacks it says were aimed 
at curbing free speech in China). 
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against the music and motion picture industries due to the industry's 
support of anti-copyright infringement legislation.45 Other attacks 
have had widespread effects on foreign states, such as the 2007 attack 
on Estonia, allegedly conducted by Russian hacking groups "that 
crippled dozens of government and corporate sites[,]"46 and the 2009 
cyber-attacks against South Korea, which targeted several leading 
web pages.47 
Every day, new components of U.S. infrastructure are connected 
to computer networks, which allows for more efficient operation, but 
also opens these components to network attacks.48 The development 
of smart grid technology49 is such an example. By placing controls of 
the power grid on interconnected information systems, power can be 
efficiently controlled and distributed. 50 The security of these systems 
should be made a national priority.51 However, no amount of security 
spending will completely eliminate vulnerabilities, and those 
vulnerabilities will eventually be exploited. 52 
45. See, e.g., Attacks target recording industry websites, BBC NEWS (last 
updated Sept. 20, 2010, 7:56 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/technology-11371315. 
46. A look at Estonia's cyber attack in 2007, NBC NEWS (last updated July 
,8, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246/ 
ns/technology _and_science-security /t /look-estonias-cyber-attack/ (the 
cyber-attack on Estonia 2007, discussed in Part III(E) of this Article, 
was a three week assault on Estonia's "e-government" following the 
removal of a Russian memorial in Estonia's capital). 
47. South Korea hit by cyber attacks, BBC NEWS (last updated Mar. 4, 
2011, 5:40 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12646052 (these 
attacks were blamed by the South Korean Government on North Korea 
but definitive links were never established). These attacks are described 
infra Section III. 
48. Cf. Norman Announces New SCADA Security System to Protect 
Industrial Infrast~cture, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswlie.com/ news-releases/ norman-announces-new-
scada-security-systein-to-protect-ind ustrial-infrastructure-
139278053 .html (announcing release of updated security measures for 
pipeline SCADA systems, which is designed to counter cyber-attacks). 
49. See Matthew L. Wald, Making Electricity Distribution Smarter, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2009, 11:32 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009 /04/21/making-electricity-distribution-smarter / (discussing the 
spread of smart grid technology that increases efficiency in electrical 
power operations by monitoring and controlling electricity distribution). 
50. Id. 
51. See generally Clarke, supra note 36. 
52. See Bambauer, supra note 36 at 621 (arguing that cyber-security should 
focus on protecting information rather than infrastructure). 
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Politically-motivated cyber-attacks are not limited to government 
websites.43 Hacking groups have increasingly attacked corporations 
that have policies with which the groups disagree. Examples of such 
corporate attacks include a "highly sophisticated" attack on Google in 
2010 that originated from China,44 and numerous coordinated attacks 
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INFRASTRUCTURE AND FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2011) (stating 
that from 5,503 incidents reported in FY 2006 to 41,776 reported in FY 
2010). 
See, e.g., Kukil Bora, Anonymous Timeline 2011: The Rise of the 
Hactivist INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012, 8:58 AM), 
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culprits / 20ll/11/02 / gI QAF 5fRiM_story .html (repo:~ting . on. an 
intelligence report to Congress naming China and Russia as the pnmary 
culprits of cyber-espionage). 
"Air gapped" networks are those physically, electrically, and 
electromagnetically isolated from other networks such as the Internet. 
See Oliver Rist, Hack Tales: Air-gap networking for the price of a pair 
of sneakers, INFOWORLD (May 29, 2006, 2:00 A:'-1), 
http:/ /www.infoworld.com/d/networking/hack-tales-air-gap-networkmg-
price-pair-sneakers-610 (describing how an "air gap" network works and 
why certain companies choose to utilize them). 
William J. Lynn III, Essay, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's 
Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2010), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-
iii/ defending-a-new-domain (describing defense initiatives put in place to 
defend the United States from cyber threats). 
See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google, Citing Attack, 
Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13beijing.html. 
44. Id. (discussing Google's reaction to network attacks it says were aimed 
at curbing free speech in China). 
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against the music and motion picture industries due to the industry's 
support of anti-copyright infringement legislation.45 Other attacks 
have had widespread effects on foreign states, such as the 2007 attack 
on Estonia, allegedly conducted by Russian hacking groups "that 
crippled dozens of government and corporate sites[,]"46 and the 2009 
cyber-attacks against South Korea, which targeted several leading 
web pages.47 
Every day, new components of U.S. infrastructure are connected 
to computer networks, which allows for more efficient operation, but 
also opens these components to network attacks.48 The development 
of smart grid technology49 is such an example. By placing controls of 
the power grid on interconnected information systems, power can be 
efficiently controlled and distributed. 50 The security of these systems 
should be made a national priority.51 However, no amount of security 
spending will completely eliminate vulnerabilities, and those 
vulnerabilities will eventually be exploited.52 
45. See, e.g., Attacks target recording industry websites, BBC NEWS (last 
updated Sept. 20, 2010, 7:56 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/technology-11371315. 
46. A look at Estonia's cyber attack in 2007, NBC NEWS (last updated July 
8, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31801246/ 
ns /technology _and_science-security /t /look-estonias-cyber-attack/ (the 
cyber-attack on Estonia 2007, discussed in Part III(E) of this Article, 
was a three week assault on Estonia's "e-government" following the 
removal of a Russian memorial in Estonia's capital). 
47. South Korea hit by cyber attacks, BBC NEWS (last updated Mar. 4, 
2011, 5:40 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12646052 (these 
attacks were blamed by the South Korean Government on North Korea 
but definitive links were never established). These attacks are describecl 
infra Section III. 
48. Cf. Norman Announces New SCADA Security System to Protect 
Industrial Infrastru_cture, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/norman-announces-new-
scada-security-systein-to-protect-ind ustrial-infrastructure-
139278053 .html (announcing release of updated security measures for 
pipeline SCAD A systems, which is designed to counter cyber-attacks). 
49. See Matthew L. Wald, Making Electricity Distribution Smarter, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2009, 11:32 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009 /04/21/making-electricity-distribution-smarter / (discussing the 
spread of smart grid technology that increases efficiency in electrical 
power operations by monitoring and controlling electricity distribution). 
50. Id. 
51. See generally Clarke, supra note 36. 
52. See Bambauer, supra note 36 at 621 (arguing that cyber-security should 
focus on protecting information rather than infrastructure). 
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The dramatic rise in both attacks and vulnerabilities has led 
governments to recognize the enormity of the ~ssue, res~ting in a 
push for increasing mandated cyber-secunty . covermg both 
government and private networks. At a 2011 hearmg, U.~. House . 
Representative Dan Lungren, Chairman of the ~ubcomrmttee . on 
Infrastructure Protection, Cybersecurity and Security Technologies, 
stated that one of the top concerns for American lawmakers, 
intelligence officials, and military leaders is the rapidly growing cyber-
threat.53 He cited the belief that "a successful cyber attack on [the 
Nation's] power grid or O communications networks could cripple [the] 
economy and threaten national security. "54 The President has 
established multiple task forces to evaluate and make 
recommendations for the future of cyber-security.55 British Foreign 
Secretary William Hague convened a conference on cyber-at~acks after 
receiving criticisms for failing to take cyber-threats to his country 
seriously.56 Secretary Hague stated a "global coordinated response" is 
required to combat cyber-threats.57 In 2005, the European Com~cil 
adopted the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protect~on 
to focus on strengthening information systems and enhancmg 
k " "t" 1 . fr t t "58 preparedness for attac s on en ica m as rue ure. 
If, as suggested by these experts, cyber-attacks that equat~ to 
terrorism are possible, then there are multiple reasons to believe 
terrorist groups will use information systems as weapons of terror. 
The Internet and other information systems have attributes that 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing 
Effectiveness Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Infrastructure Prat., Cybersecurity and Sec. Techs., 112th Cong._ 2 
(2011) (opening statement of Rep. Dan Lungren at the markup hearmg 
of H.R: 3674). 
Id. 
See generally Bill Lane, Tech Topic 20: Gybes Security and 
Communications, FED. COMMC'NS CoMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/ 
techtopics/techtopics20.html (cataloging executive branch task forces 
focused on cyber-security). 
GCHQ chief reports 'disturbing' cyber-attacks on UK, BBC NEWS (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2011, 12:14 ET), http:/ /www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
15516959 (describing how following several attacks on U .K. Governm~nt 
and technology firm computers, the U .K. convened a conference with 
world leaders and cyber-security experts to discuss a coordinated global 
response to cyber-attacks). 
Id. 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EUROPA: 
SUMMARIES EU LEGIS. (last updated Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security /fight 
_against_terrorism/133260_en.htm. 
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terrorists might appropriate to achieve their goals. 59 The Internet is 
global, anonymous, and allows collaboration by people around the 
worl~ on a single _project.6° Cyber-terrorism may be the next logical 
step m the evolut10n of terrorism. Given that possibility, preventive 
laws should be implemented as soon as possible, not after the first 
major attack. As Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, he stated his belief that "time is not on 
our side," and that the Nation should "act to prevent a cyber 9/11 
before it happens. "5i Senator Lieberman went on to describe how he 
saw the threat in greater detail, stating: 
Every day rival nations, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates 
and individual hackers probe the weaknesses in our most critical 
computer networks, seeking to steal government and industrial 
secrets or to plant cyber agents in the cyber systems that 
control our most critical infrastructure and would enable an 
enemy to seize control of a city's electric grid or water supply 
system with the touch of a key from a world away.62 
What if cyber-terrorists were currently planning a major attack? 
What laws could be used to combat this threat? Certainly there are 
existing laws, such as the CF AA, under which an attack could be 
prosecuted, 63 but these laws may be of little consequence in 
attempting to prevent such an attack. 
B. The Inadequacy of the Current Approach 
This Article does not suggest that a cyber-apocalypse is just. 
around the corner; the author will leave that judgment to intelligence 
and industrial security experts. If possible, however, the author 
suggests it would be wise to develop a preventive approach. Recently, 
the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
introduced a major piece of legislation, entitled the Cybersecurity Act 
of 2012. 64 The bill seeks to regulate critical industry cyber-security 
and promote information sharing between private parties and 
59. See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REP. 
116, How MODERN TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET, 5-11 (2004) available 
a~ http://www.usi~.org/files/resources/sr116.pdf (identifying eight 
different ways terrorists use the Internet to advance their cause). 
60. Id. at 3. 
61. Securing America's Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. o~ Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 
112th Cong. (2012) (openmg statement of Sen. Lieberman, Chairman). 
62. Id. 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). See discussion infra Part IV. 
64. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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The dramatic rise in both attacks and vulnerabilities has led 
governments to recognize the enormity of the ~ssue, res~ting in a 
push for increasing mandated cyber-secunty . covermg both 
government and private networks. At a 2011 hearmg, U -~· House . 
Representative Dan Lungren, Chairman of the ~ubcomrmttee . on 
Infrastructure Protection, Cybersecurity and Security Technologies, 
stated that one of the top concerns for American lawmakers, 
intelligence officials, and military leaders is the rapidly growing cyber-
threat. 53 He cited the belief that "a successful cyber attack on [the 
Nation's] power grid or O communications networks could cripple [the] 
economy and threaten national security. "54 The President has 
established multiple task forces to evaluate and make 
recommendations for the future of cyber-security.55 British Foreign 
Secretary William Hague convened a conference on cyber-attacks after 
receiving criticisms for failing to take cyber-threats to his country 
seriously.56 Secretary Hague stated a "global coordinated response" i.s 
required to combat cyber-threats.57 In 2005, the European Cou~c1l 
adopted the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protect~on 
to focus on strengthening information systems and enhancmg 
preparedness for attacks on "critical infrastructure. "58 
If, as suggested by these experts, cyber-attacks that equat~ to 
terrorism are possible, then there are multiple reasons to believe 
terrorist groups will use information systems as weapons of terror. 
The Internet and other information systems have attributes that 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
Promoting and Enhancing Cybersecurity and Information Sharing 
Effectiveness Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Infrastructure Prat., Cybersecurity and Sec. Techs., 112th Cong .. 2 
(2011) (opening statement of Rep. Dan Lungren at the markup hearmg 
of H.R: 3674). 
Id. 
See generally Bill Lane, Tech Topic 20: Cyber Security and 
Communications, FED. CoMMC'NS COMM'N, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/ 
techtopics/techtopics20.html (cataloging executive branch task forces 
focused on cyber-security). 
GCHQ chief reports 'disturbing' cyber-attacks on UK, BBC NEWS (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2011, 12:14 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
15516959 (describing how following several attacks on U.K. Governm~nt 
and technology firm computers, the U .K. convened a conference with 
world leaders and cyber-security experts to discuss a coordinated global 
response to cyber-attacks). 
Id. 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, EUROPA: 
SUMMARIES EU LEGIS. (last updated Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries / justice_freedom_security /fight 
_against_terrorism/133260_en.htm. 
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terrorists might appropriate to achieve their goals. 59 The Internet is 
global, anonymous, and allows collaboration by people around the 
worl~ on a single .project.6° Cyber-terrorism may be the next logical 
step m the evolut10n of terrorism. Given that possibility, preventive 
laws should be implemented as soon as possible, not after the first 
major attack. As Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, he stated his belief that "time is not on 
our side," and that the Nation should "act to prevent a cyber 9/11 
before it happens. "61 Senator Lieberman went on to describe how he 
saw the threat in greater detail, stating: 
Every day rival nations, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates 
and individual hackers probe the weaknesses in our most critical 
computer networks, seeking to steal government and industrial 
secrets or to plant cyber agents in the cyber systems that 
control our most critical infrastructure and would enable an 
enemy to seize control of a city's electric grid or water supply 
system with the touch of a key from a world away.62 
What if cyber-terrorists were currently planning a major attack? 
What laws could be used to combat this threat? Certainly there are 
existing laws, such as the CFAA, under which an attack could be 
prosecuted,63 but these laws may be of little consequence in 
attempting to prevent such an attack. 
B. The Inadequacy of the Current Approach 
This Article does not suggest that a cyber-apocalypse is just. 
around the corner; the author will leave that judgment to intelligence 
and industrial security experts. If possible, however, the author 
suggests it would be wise to develop a preventive approach. Recently, 
the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
introduced a major piece of legislation, entitled the Cybersecurity Act 
of 2012.64 The bill seeks to regulate critical industry cyber-security 
and promote information sharing between private parties and 
59. See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REP. 
116, How MODERN TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET, 5-11 (2004) available 
a~ http://www.usi~.org/files/resources/sr116.pdf (identifying eight 
different ways terrorists use the Internet to advance their cause). 
60. Id. at 3. 
61. Securing America's Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. o:i Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 
112th Cong. (2012) (opemng statement of Sen. Lieberman, Chairman). 
62. Id. 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). See discussion infra Part IV. 
64. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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government agencies.65 On August 2, 2012, the Senate voted ~own 
the bill.66 However, there have been talks of "resurrecting" the bill. 
67 
Elements essential to prevent cyber-attacks include regulato~y 
oversight, information sharing, and significant financial investment m 
cyber-security for the components of the U.S. infrastructure that :un 
on information networks. These components include power gnds, 
pipelines, and systems containing economic data.68 The ?over~m~nt 
should develop legal tools to prevent acts of cyber-terronsm, slillllar 
to those developed to combat terrorism. 
This is not to say that the traditional law enforcement model h~s 
no role to play in catching and prosecuting thos~ who comrmt 
politically-motivated cyber-crimes. Not all who coi:nmit these types of 
cyber-attacks have escaped punishment. Mitchell Frost ~as 
sentenced to thirty months in prison following a 2007 attack agam~t 
conservative political websites belonging to Ann Coulter and Bill 
O'Reilly.69 A college student who hacked Sarah Palin's email account 
during the 2008 presidential campaign was sentenced to a year and a 
day in a halfway house. 70 In a successful prosec~tion of an early 
cyber-attack on physical infrastructure, an Australian man was s~nt 
to jail for hacking into a waste-management system and dumpmg 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Id. 
Gerry Smith, Cyber Security Law Fails To Pass Senate Before Month-
Long Break, THE HUFF. POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 1:15 PM, updated Aug. 3, 
2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ .. 
2012/08/02/cyber-security-law_n_1733751.html (descnbmg how the 
Bill fell eight votes shy of the sixty needed to pass). 
Chris Finan, Five reasons why Congress should pass C~bersecurity Act 
of 2012, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2012, 4:00 PM), htt?://theh1ll.com/ 
blogs /congress-blog/homeland-security/ 26 7945-five-r~a~ons-w hy-
congress-should-pass-cy bersecurity-act-of-2012 ( descnbmg Senator Harty 
Reid's intentions to reintroduce the Bill for another vote). 
See William J. Lynn III, U.S. Deputy Sec. of Def., Defending a New 
Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 
2010), available at http://www.foreignaf!airs.com/~rticles/6655~/. . . 
william-j-lynn-iii/ defending-a-new-domam ( descnbmg defense m1tmt1ves 
put in place to defend the U.S. from cyber threats). 
Robert McMillan, Bill O'Reilly hacker gets 30 mont~s, CS? (Nov. 8, 
201 o), http://www.csoonline.com/ article/ 634363 /b1ll-o-re1lly-hacker-
gets-30-months. 
Bill Poovey Palin e-mail hacker sentenced to 1 year, 1 day, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 12, 2010, 7:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40152249/ ns/politics-more_politics/t/palin-e-mail-hacker-sentence~-year~d~y / . 
(stating the defendant had hoped to find information m ~alms onlme 
accounts that could derail her campaign, but found nothmg helpful to 
that effect). 
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millions of liters of raw sewage into parks, rivers, and other 
properties. 71 
Perhaps the best example of the use of traditional law 
enforcement methods was the capture of five Anonymous members in 
2012.72 Following his 2008 arrest, New York based hacker Hector 
Monsegur assisted the FBI in tracking other Anonymous members in 
exchange for sentencing leniency.73 His cooperation led to the arrests 
of five prominent Anonymous members, prompting one cyber-security 
expert to state, "[t]his is the most important roll-up of hackers ever. "74 
Traditional law enforcement work certainly has its place in 
combating cyber-terrorism. However, the overwhelming majority of 
cyber-related crimes evade detection and prosecution. There are a 
number of reasons for this. First, many large corporations are 
reluctant to report the astounding· number of attacks they receive 
given shareholder concerns over cybersecurity and loss of intellectual 
property.75 Additionally, cyber-crimes continue to receive lower 
priority than traditional crimes.76 However, the primary reason is 
71. Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks, REGISTER (Oct. 
31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/ 
hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (the perpetrator worked for the 
company that installed the waste management controlling software and 
had been recently rejected for employment by the local city council). 
72. Ellen Nakashima, Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, 5 members of Anonymous 
hacking group charged, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/ 5-members-of-
anonymous-hacking-group-charged/2012/03/06 / gIQAJ70Fv R_ 
story.html?hpid=z4 (explaining the investigation into the hackers group 
Anonymous). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See Ellen Nakashima & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC: Firms must report 
cyberattacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2011, at AlO (describing new 
Securities and Exchange Commission guidelines for reporting losses due 
to computer network attacks to corporation shareholders); see also Gus 
Coldebella, Cyber Security Act of 2012 requires a liability protection bug 
fix, THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/ technology/ 212049-cy ber-security-act-of-2012-requires-a-liability-
protection-bug-fix (arguing that the information procedures in the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 do not go far enough and open corporations 
to potential liability); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Information Sharing 
and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2012, 6:43 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012 /02 /information-sharing-and-the-
cybersecurity-act-of-2012 / (discussing information sharing procedures in 
the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2012 designed to overcome corporate 
hesitancy to share information about CNA). 
76. See Ron Condon, Catching Cyber Criminals Yourself, COMPUTER CRIME 
RESEARCH CTR (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.crime-research.org/ 
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govermnent agencies.65 On August 2, 2012, the Senate voted ~own 
the bill.66 However, there have been talks of "resurrecting" the bill. 
67 
Elements essential to prevent cyber-attacks include regulato~y 
oversight, information sharing, and significant financial investment m 
cyber-security for the components of the U.S. infrastructure that :un 
on information networks. These components include power gnds, 
pipelines, and systems containing economic data.68 The ~over~~nt 
should develop legal tools to prevent acts of cyber-terronsm, sirmlar 
to those developed to combat terrorism. 
This is not to say that the traditional law enforcement model h~s 
no role to play in catching and prosecuting thos~ who comrmt 
politically-motivated cyber-crimes. Not all who coi:nmit these types of 
cyber-attacks have escaped punishment.. Mitchell Frost :vas 
sentenced to thirty months in prison followmg a 2007 attack agam~t 
conservative political websites belonging to Ann Coulter and Bill 
O'Reilly.69 A college student who hacked Sarah Palin's email account 
during the 2008 presidential campaign was sentenced to a year and a 
day in a halfway house.70 In a successful prosec~tion of an early 
cyber-attack on physical infrastructure, an Australian man was s~nt 
to jail for hacking into a waste-management system and dumpmg 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Id. 
Gerry Smith, Cyber Security Law Fails To Pass Senate Before Month-
Long Break, THE HUFF. POST (Aug. 2, 2012, 1:15 PM, updated Aug. 3, 
2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ .. 
2012/08/02/cyber-security-law_n_1733751.html (descnbmg how the 
Bill fell eight votes shy of the sixty needed to pass). 
Chris Finan, Five reasons why Congress should pass C~bersecurity Act 
of 2012, THE HILL (Nov. 14, 2012, 4:.00 PM), htt?://theh1ll.com/ 
blogs /congress-blog/homeland-security/ 26 7945-five-r~a~ons-w hy-
congress-should-pass-cy bersecurity-act-of-2012 ( descnbmg Senator Harty 
Reid's intentions to reintroduce the Bill for another vote). 
See William J. Lynn III, U.S. Deputy Sec. of Def., Defending a New 
Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 
2010), available at http://www.foreignaf~airs.com/~rticles/6655~/. . . 
william-j-lynn-iii/ defending-a-new-domam ( descnbmg defense m1tiat1ves 
put in place to defend the U.S. from cyber threats). 
Robert McMillan, Bill O'Reilly hacker gets 30 mont~s, CS? (Nov. 8, 
2010), http://www.csoonline.com/ article/ 634363 /b1ll-o-re1lly-hacker-
gets-30-months. 
Bill Poovey Palin e-mail hacker sentenced to 1 year, 1 day, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 12, 2010, 7:39 PM), http:_//www:msnbc.msn.com/id/40152249/ ns/politics-more_politics/t/palm-e-mail-hacker-sent~nce~-year:d~y / . 
(stating the defendant had hoped to find informat10n m ~alms onlme 
accounts that could derail her campaign, but found nothmg helpful to 
that effect). 
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millions of liters of raw sewage into parks, rivers, and other 
properties. 71 
Perhaps the best example of the use of traditional law 
enforcement methods was the capture of five Anonymous members in 
2012.72 Following his 2008 arrest, New York based hacker Hector 
Monsegur assisted the FBI in tracking other Anonymous members in 
exchange for sentencing leniency.73 His cooperation led to the arrests 
of five prominent Anonymous members, prompting one cyber-security 
expert to state, "[t]his is the most important roll-up of hackers ever."74 
Traditional law enforcement work certainly has its place in 
combating cyber-terrorism. However, the overwhelming majority of 
cyber-related crimes evade detection and prosecution. There are a 
number of reasons for this. First, many large corporations are 
reluctant to report the astounding number of attacks they receive 
given shareholder concerns over cybersecurity and loss of intellectual 
property.75 Additionally, cyber-crimes continue to receive lower 
priority than traditional crimes. 76 However, the primary reason is 
71. Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks, REGISTER (Oct. 
31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/ 
hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (the perpetrator worked for the 
company that installed the waste management controlling software and 
had been recently rejected for employment by the local city council). 
72. Ellen Nakashima, Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, 5 members of Anonymous 
hacking group charged, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security /5-members-of-
anonymous-hacking-group-charged/2012/03/06/gIQAJ70FvR_ 
story.html?hpid=z4 (explaining the investigation into the hackers group 
Anonymous). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See Ellen Nakashima & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC: Firms must report 
cyberattacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2011, at AlO (describing new 
Securities and Exchange Commission guidelines for reporting losses due 
to computer network attacks to corporation shareholders); see also Gus 
Coldebella, Cyber Security Act of 2012 requires a liability protection bug 
fix, THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/ technology/ 212049-cy ber-security-act-of-2012-requires-a-liability-
protection-bug-fix (arguing that the information procedures in the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 do not go far enough and open corporations 
to potential liability); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Information Sharing 
and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2012, 6:43 PM), 
http:/ /www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/information-sharing-and-the-
cybersecurity-act-of-2012/ (discussing information sharing procedures in 
the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2012 designed to overcome corporate 
hesitancy to share information about CNA). 
76. See Ron Condon, Catching Cyber Criminals Yourself, COMPUTER CRIME 
RESEARCH CTR (Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.crime-research.org/ 
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that cyber-crimes are extraordinarily difficult to attribute to a 
particular culprit.77 
Current cyber-crime laws, when applied to potential acts of cyber-
terrorism also suffer from another aspect of traditional criminal law: 
relying o~ prosecution for deterrence and prevention. 78 Traditional 
criminal law seeks to prevent future crimes primarily through 
successful arrest and prosecution.79 When responding to senatorial 
nomination questions for the position of Commander of the U.S. 
Cyber Command, (then) Lieutenant General Keith Alexand~r 
explained, "The bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is 
to work to catch perpetrators and take strong and public action when 
we do. "80 However, when making the leap from traditional cyber-
crime to cyber-terrorism, the stakes become higher and prevention 
becomes the most important factor. 
Overall, the current focus on cyber-terrorism can be compared to 
pre-9/llterrorism. The 9/11 Commission Report Executive Surnrnary 
noted the FBI was "case-specific, decentralized, and geared towards 
prosecution. "81 The report went on to note that "[s]ignificant F:SI 
resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of maJor 
terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions. "82 The FBI was 
very good at doing what it had always done: investigate crimes, make 
arrests and then hand over the perpetrators to the U.S. Attorney's 
' . . Office for prosecution. However, after-the-fact prosecution is 
ineffective as a deterrent to terrorists. Other methods of prevention 
are required to prevent terrorist acts, and future laws should reflect 
this. But before a problem can be prevented, it must be defined. 
SECTION II: DEFINING CYBER-TERRORISM 
"As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
news/24.04.2006/1962/ ("Law enforcement has much higher priorities, 
and its resources for chasing computer crime are limited."). 
See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 589. 
E.g., Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth 
Cong. 209, 219-220 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, USA 
Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to question 
regarding U.S. military strategy in cyberspace). 
E.g., id. 
Id. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISTS ATTACKS UPON THE UNlTED 
STATES, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13. 
Id. 
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know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know."83 
The first and often most difficult step with any great problem is 
prope:ly ~efinin~ it, and cyber-terrorism is no exception. Cyber-
terronsm is a logical sub-category of both terrorism and cyber-crime.84 
These categories are very different; one is based on a relatively new 
phenomena, cyber-crime, and the other encompasses a phenomena 
that has taken on new historical significance, terrorism.85 
The definitions of these categories continue to be unsettled.86 The 
definition of cyber-crime generally involves some violation of a 
criminal code through the use of computers or other information 
systems, 
87 
usually, but not necessarily, accomplished through the 
Internet. However, the U.S. Government offers multiple definitions 
of _te_r~orism,88 and internationally, there is even less clarity on a 
defimt10n of terrorism. 89 
. C?i:en the evolving definition of terrorism, it is no surprise that 
defi~i~ions of cyber-terrorism have been equally divergent.go 
Addit10nally, the United States has yet to see a cyber-attack on the 
level_ of a major terrorist attack.91 Without a major event to spark 
public debate, lawmakers have little incentive to define and address 
the issue. Nevertheless, to develop a legal framework that helps to 
~revent, deter, and defend against cyber-terrorism, the appropriate 
first step must be to develop a practical working definition that 
83. 
84. 
85. 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Def., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS 
BRIEFING (Feb. 12, 2002). 
See BRU?E HOFFM_AN, ~NSIDE TERRORISM 2-3 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006) 
( evaluatmg the h1stoncal development of terrorism and why it is so 
difficult to define). 
Id. 
86. Id. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Definitions of Terrorism: 
The P_r?blem of Too Many Gr~il~,- 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249-50 (2004) 
( exammmg twenty-two of the defimt1ons for terrorism in federal lexicon 
and arguing for a single definition). 
See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We 
:egretta?ly are no closer now than eighteen years ago to an 
mternat1onal consensus on the definition of terrorism or even its 
proscription."). ' 
See generally Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. 
~ARSHALL ~-. C?OMPUTER & INFO. L. 397 (2003-2004) (exploring the 
different defm1t10ns of cyber-terrorism that have been suggested). 
Id. (describing that the different definitions of cyber-terrorism are due 
to "no reported instances of cyberterrorism"). 
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that cyber-crimes are extraordinarily difficult to attribute to a 
particular culprit.77 
Current cyber-crime laws, when applied to potential acts of cyber-
terrorism also suffer from another aspect of traditional criminal law: 
relying o~ prosecution for deterrence and prevention. 78 Traditional 
criminal law seeks to prevent future crimes primarily through 
successful arrest and prosecution.79 When responding to senatorial 
nomination questions for the position of Commander of the U.S. 
Cyber Command, (then) Lieutenant General Keith Alexand~r 
explained "The bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is 
to work t~ catch perpetrators and take strong and public action when 
we do. "80 However, when making the leap from traditional cyber-
crime to cyber-terrorism, the stakes become higher and prevention 
becomes the most important factor. 
Overall the current focus on cyber-terrorism can be compared to 
pre-9/llter~orism. The 9/11 Commission Report Executive Summary 
noted the FBI was "case-specific, decentralized, and geared towards 
prosecution."81 The report went on to note that "[s]ignificant F~I 
resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of maJor 
terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions. "82 The FBI was 
very good at doing what it had always done: investigate crimes, make 
arrests and then hand over the perpetrators to the U.S. Attorney's 
Office ' for prosecution. However, after-the-fact prosecution . is 
ineffective as a deterrent to terrorists. Other methods of prevention 
are required to prevent terrorist acts, and future laws should reflect 
this. But before a problem can be prevented, it must be defined. 
SECTION II: DEFINING CYBER-TERRORISM 
"As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
news/24.04.2006/1962/ ('.'Law enforcem~nt has :r_rm_ch ~~gher priorities, 
and its resources for chasmg computer cnme are hm1ted. ) . 
See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 589. 
E.g., Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth 
Cong. 209, 219-220 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, U~A 
Nominee for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to quest10n 
regarding U.S. military strategy in cyberspace). 
E.g., id. 
Id. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISTS ATTACKS UPON THE UNiTED 
STATES, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13. 
Id. 
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know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know."83 
The first and often most difficult step with any great problem is 
prope:ly ~efinin~ it, and cyber-terrorism. is no exception. Cyber-
terronsm is a logical sub-category of both terrorism and cyber-crime.84 
These categories are very different; one is based on a relatively new 
phenomena, cyber-crime, and the other encompasses a phenomena 
that has taken on new historical significance, terrorism. 85 
The definitions of these categories continue to be unsettled. 86 The 
definition of cyber-crime generally involves some violation of a 
criminal code through the use of computers or other information 
systems, 
87 
usually, but not necessarily, accomplished through the 
Internet. However, the U.S. Government offers multiple definitions 
of _:te_r~orism,88 and internationally, there is even less clarity on a 
defrn1t10n of terrorism. 89 
. C?i:en the evolving definition of terrorism, it is no surprise that 
defi~1~1ons of cyber-terrorism have been equally divergent.90 
Add1t10nally, the United States has yet to see a cyber-attack on the 
level_ of a major terrorist attack.91 Without a major event to spark 
public debate, lawmakers have little incentive to define and address 
the issue. Nevertheless, to develop a legal framework that helps to 
~revent, deter, and defend against cyber-terrorism, the appropriate 
first step must be to develop a practical working definition that 
83. 
84. 
85. 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Def., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS 
BRIEFING (Feb. 12, 2002). 
See BRU?E HOFFM:rn, ~NSIDE TERRORISM 2-3 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006) 
( evaluatmg the historical development of terrorism and why it is so 
difficult to define). 
Id. 
86. Id. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Definitions of Terrorism: 
The P_r?blem of Too Many Gr~il~,. 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 249-50 (2004) 
( exammmg twenty-two of the defm1t1ons for terrorism in federal lexicon 
and arguing for a single definition). 
See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We 
~egretta?ly are no closer now than eighteen years ago to an 
mternat1onal consensus on the definition of terrorism or even its 
proscription."). ' 
See generally Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. 
~ARSHALL ~·. <?OMPUTER & INFO. L. 397 (2003-2004) (exploring the 
different defm1tions of cyber-terrorism that have been suggested). 
Id. (describing that the different definitions of cyber-terrorism are due 
to "no reported instances of cyberterrorism"). 
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precisely defines what type of attacks should be considered cyber-
terrorism. 
This Section begins by offering a cyber-terrorism definition that 
Congress and various governmental agencies can use as a common 
starting point. As this Section will demonstrate, the current 
definitions of cyber-terrorism are widely divergent in the scope of 
actions that fall under their definition. This divergence makes it 
difficult to develop common strategies and tactics to defeat cyber-
terrorism. This Article does not intend to suggest that all legislations 
and agency mission statements use the exact same definition of cyber-
terrorism. Nevertheless, these definitions should begin from a 
common starting point that may be altered to serve a particular 
legislative or administrative purpose. 
This Section will also examine a lexicon of terms that are 
generically used to describe different aspects of cyber-attacks. Using 
these definitions, this Section then categorizes the various types ~f 
cyber-attacks and explains how . they are dist_inguis~e~ fro1?- . t~1s 
Article's definition of cyber-terronsm. Next, thrn Articles defm1t10n 
of cyber-terrorism is analyzed in comparison to other definitions by 
discussing how they differ and why they should yield in favor of this 
Article's version. 
A. Proposed Definition of Cyber-Terrorism 
Following the 9 /11 attacks, terrorist organizations have faced a 
full-court press by the United States and other nations who recognize 
the threat posed to their national security. Terrorist organizations 
such as Al-Qaeda have responded, in part, by using the Internet for 
organizational and propaganda purposes, utilizing online publications 
such as Inspire.92 The last decade has also seen the rise in politically 
motivated hacking groups, both in the United States and abroad.93 
These groups have become increasingly daring and sophisticated in 
their attacks.94 It is logical to assume that both these types of 
organizations will eventually attempt to use the Internet and other 
information systems as an instrument of terror.95 Using the Internet 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
Marc Ambinder, Al Qaeda's First English Language Magazine ls Here, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/ . 
international/ archive/ 2010 / 06 / al-qaedas-first-english-language-
magazine-is-here / 59006 / (discussing "Inspire," Al Qaeda's English 
language magazine). 
See Joshua E. Keating, Shots Fired, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/24/shots_fired (listing 
instances of political hacking attacks). 
Id. (comparing the attacks from different sources). 
See, e.g., Clay Wilson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, COMPUTER 
ATTACK AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES 
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as a weapon of terror is inexpensive, anonymous, and global.96 At the 
same time, the United States is becoming more reliant on technology 
to control critical infrastructure, both physical and informational.97 
According to the DoD: 
Hackers and foreign governments are increasingly able to launch 
sophisticated intrusions into the networks and systems that 
control critical civilian infrastructure. Given the integrated 
nature of cyberspace, computer-induced failures of power grids 
transportati0n networks, or financial systems could caus~ 
massive physical damage and economic disruption. DoD 
operations-both at home and abroad-are dependent on this 
critical infrastructure. 98 
This quote hints at the existence of cyber-terrorism, but how 
exactly to define it? 
Experts base most definitions of cyber-terrorism on one of two 
general models: effects-based criteria and intent-based criteria.99 
Many current definitions focus on one criterion to the exclusion or 
minimization of the other, making the actions covered by the 
definition too broad or too narrow. 100 
This Article combines the effect- and intent-based approaches 
and adds a requirement that the attacker be a non-state actor. Th~ 
proposed definition for cyber-terrorism is as follows: 
Premeditated, politically motivated computer network attacks 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups, designed to cause fear or anxiety in a civilian populace 
either by: a) inflicting, falsely appearing to inflict, or 
FOR CONGRESS 5 (2005) (arguing that given the confluence of the United 
States' overwhelming military superiority, and its reliance on 
technology, future adversaries are likely to attempt acts of cyber-
terrorism) . 
96. Cf. id. at 2-5 (describing the characteristics of the various types of 
cyber-attacks). 
97. Kevin Coleman, The Increased Threat of Attacks on SCADA Systems ~EF. TECH (Sept. 26, 2011), http://defensetech.org/2011/09/26/the~ 
~creased-threat-of-attacks-on-scada-systems/ (reporting on the 
mcreased uses of SCADA control systems and the increasing numbers 
vulnerabilities found in those systems). · 
98. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN 
CYBERSPACE 4 (2011). 
99. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 7 (describing the intent-based definition 
as involving deliberate harm, and the effect-based definition as one that 
intended to cause destruction and disruptions). 
100. See, Perry, supra note 88, at 251 (describing how "definers disagree on 
what should be included in the definition"). 
291 
JouRNALOFLAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET · VoL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Cyber-Terrorism: Finding a Common Starting Point 
precisely defines what type of attacks should be considered cyber-
terrorism. This Section begins by offering a cyber-terrorism definition that 
Congress and various governmental agencies can use as a cornrnon 
starting point. As this Section will demonstrate, the current 
definitions of cyber-terrorism are widely divergent in the scope of 
actions that fall under their definition. This divergence makes it 
difficult to develop common strategies and tactics to defeat cyber-
terrorism. This Article does not intend to suggest that all legislations 
and agency mission statements use the exact same definition of cyber-
terrorism. Nevertheless, these definitions should begin from a 
common starting point that may be altered to serve a particular 
legislative or administrative purpose. 
This Section will also examine a lexicon of terms that are 
generically used to describe different aspects of cyber-attacks. Using 
these definitions, this Section then categorizes the various types of 
cyber-attacks and explains how they are distinguished from this 
Article's definition of cyber-terrorism. Next, this Article's definition 
of cyber-terrorism is analyzed in comparison to other definitions by 
discussing how they differ and why they should yield in favor of this 
Article's version. 
A. Proposed Definition of Cyber-Terrorism 
Following the 9 /11 attacks, terrorist organizations have faced a 
full-court press by the United States and other nations who recognize 
the threat posed to their national security. Terrorist organizations 
such as Al-Qaeda have responded, in part, by using the Internet for 
organizational and propaganda purposes, utilizing online publications 
such as Inspire.92 The last decade has also seen the rise in politically 
motivated hacking groups, both in the United States and abroad.
93 
These groups have become increasingly daring and sophisticated in 
their attacks.94 It is logical to assume that both these types of 
organizations will eventually attempt to use the Internet and other 
information systems as an instrument of terror.95 Using the Internet 
92. Marc Ambinder, Al Qaeda's First English Language Magazine Is Here, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2010/06/al-qaedas-first-english-language-
magazine-is-here/59006/ (discussing "Inspire," Al Qaeda's English 
language magazine). 
93. See Joshua E. Keating, Shots Fired, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http:/ /www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/24/shots_fired (listing 
instances of political hacking attacks). 
94. Id. (comparing the attacks from different sources). 
95. See, e.g., Clay Wilson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, COMPUTER 
ATTACK AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES 
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threatening to inflict, widespread damage to critical physical or 
informational infrastructure, national security related 
information systems, or critical economic systems; or b) causing, 
appearing to cause, or threatening to cause any type of severe 
physical damage or human casualties. 
The elements and requirements contained in this . definition, as 
well as an explanation of the technical terms, will be discussed in the 
Sections below. 
This definition intentionally mirrors the definition of terrorism set 
forth in 22 U.S.C. § 2656, which defines terrorism as "premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. "101 However, in 
adapting this definition to cyber-terrorism, it is_ necess~ry to replace 
the element of "violence" with a more complicated hst of effects. 
While this makes the definition more cumbersome, it necessarily 
ensures both that the definition of cyber-terrorism is not overly broad 
and addresses the unique ways in which cyber-attacks can affect a 
society. Should the legislature enact law that ~dentifies critical 
infrastructure and economic systems, they should mcorporate those 
definitions and evaluations into this definition wherever possible. The 
remainder of this Section will review the different terms and elements 
included in the above definition. 
B. General Lexicon of Terms 
The above-proposed definition includes several terms of art. 
These terms build upon legal definitions or as used by government 
agencies. 
1. Information System 
An information system is any machine, network, or electronic 
device that cont~ins stored information or is capable of processing 
data.102 This intentionally broad term covers hardware and software 
systems and the networks in which those systems operate.103 
Hardware systems, which are primarily composed of computers, are 
defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l), as: 
101. 
102. 
[A]n electronic, magnetic, optical, elec~rocherr_iical, o~ other_ high 
speed data processing device performmg logical, anthm~~1c, or 
storage functions, and includes any- data storage fac1~1ty or 
communications facility directly related to or operatmg in 
22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2006). This definition was chosen because it is 
commonly used definition in the U.S. Code. 
See Definition of Information System, DEP'T OF D~F. (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary /data/1/9699.html. 
103. See id. 
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conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an 
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
calculator, or other similar device. 104 
Cyberspace encompasses any type of network that hardware 
systems operate on and is defined by the DOD as the "global domain 
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures, including the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers. "105 The Internet is the network 
most commonly associated with cyberspace, most easily accessed by 
outside parties and is the predominant world-wide network today. 
But, the object of a cyber-terrorist attack does not need to use the 
Internet, or any other network. Many critical infrastructure 
components are intentionally not connected to the Internet as a 
security precaution, yet they remain vulnerable to attack.106 For 
example, the Agent.btz attack used thumb drives to attack the U.S. 
Government's classified networks. 107 
2. Computer Network Attack 
Computer network attack ("CNA") is a term meaning any 
unauthorized access, or exceeding of one's permitted access, to an 
information system that results in damage, enables potential future 
damage, or allows for future unauthorized access to information on 
' any information system.108 CNA is another intentionally broad term, 
drafted to cover the entire range of malicious activity that a 
perpetrator may take against an information system. The DoD 
defines CNA as "[a]ctions taken through the use of computer 
networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l) (2006). 
105. DEP'T OF DEF. Joint Publication 1-02, . DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS, 80 (updated Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/new _pubs/jpl_02.pdf. 
106. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, A cyberspy is halted, but not a debate, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at Al (describing security precautions that 
were intended to prevent infection of Government classified computer 
systems and how those measures were circumvented). 
107. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, The Return of the Worm That Ate the Pentagon, 
WIRED (Dec. 9, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/ 
2011/12/worm-pentagon/ (describing a virus that affected DoD 
computers that spread through the use of an infected thumb drive). 
108. § 1030(a) (providing for how a computer network attack may be 
perpetrated). 
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threatening to inflict, widespread damage to critical physical or 
informational infrastructure, national security related 
information systems, or critical economic systems; or b) causing, 
appearing to cause, or threatening to cause any type of severe 
physical damage or human casualties. 
The elements and requirements contained in this definition, as 
well as an explanation of the technical terms, will be discussed in the 
Sections below. 
This definition intentionally mirrors the definition of terrorism set 
forth in 22 U.S.C. § 2656, which defines terrorism as "premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. mm However, in 
adapting this definition to cyber-terrorism, it is. necess~ry to replace 
the element of "violence" with a more complicated hst of effects. 
While this makes the definition more cumbersome, it necessarily 
ensures both that the definition of cyber-terrorism is not overly broad 
and addresses the unique ways in which cyber-attacks can affect a 
society. Should the legislature enact law that ~dentifies critical 
infrastructure and economic systems, they should mcorporate those 
definitions and evaluations into this definition wherever possible. The 
remainder of this Section will review the different terms and elements 
included in the above definition. 
B. General Lexicon of Terms 
The above-proposed definition includes several terms of art. 
These terms build upon legal definitions or as used by government 
agencies. 
1. Information System 
An information system is any machine, network, or electro:iic 
device that contains stored information or is capable of processmg 
data.102 This intentionally broad term covers hardware and software 
systems and the networks in which those systems operate.103 
Hardware systems, which are primarily composed of computers, are 
defined broadly in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l), as: 
101. 
102. 
[A]n electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, o~ other. high 
speed data processing device performing logical, anthm:~1c, or 
storage functions, and includes any- data storage fac1~1ty or 
communications facility directly related to or operatmg in 
22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2006). This definition was chosen because it is 
commonly used definition in the U.S. Code. 
See Definition of Information System, DEP'T OF D~F. (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary /data/1/9699.html. 
103. See id. 
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conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an 
automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
calculator, or other similar device. 104 
Cyberspace encompasses any type of network that hardware 
systems operate on and is defined by the DOD as the "global domain 
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures, including the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers. "105 The Internet is the network 
most commonly associated with cyberspace, most easily accessed by 
outside parties and is the predominant world-wide network today. 
But, the object of a cyber-terrorist attack does not need to use the 
Internet, or any other network. Many critical infrastructure 
components are intentionally not connected to the Internet as a 
security precaution, yet they remain vulnerable to attack.106 For 
example, the Agent.btz attack used thumb drives to attack the U.S. 
Government's classified networks. 107 
2. Computer Network Attack 
Computer network attack ("CNA") is a term meaning any 
unauthorized access, or exceeding of one's permitted access, to an 
information system that results in damage, enables potential future 
damage, or allows for future unauthorized access to information on 
' any information system.108 CNA is another intentionally broad term, 
drafted to cover the entire range of malicious activity that a 
perpetrator may take against an information system. The DoD 
defines CNA as "[a]ctions taken through the use of computer 
networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(l) (2006). 
105. DEP'T OF DEF. Joint Publication 1-02, . DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS, 80 (updated Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf. 
106. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, A cyberspy is halted, but not a debate, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at Al (describing security precautions that 
were intended to prevent infection of Government classified computer 
systems and how those measures were circumvented). 
107. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, The Return of the Worm That Ate the Pentagon, 
WIRED (Dec. 9, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/ 
2011/12/worm-pentagon/ (describing a virus that affected DoD 
computers that spread through the use of an infected thumb drive). 
108. § 1030(a) (providing for how a computer network attack may be 
perpetrated). 
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themselves. "109 The definition excludes using information systems to 
collect intelligence, which the DoD defines as "Computer Network 
Exploitation ("CNE")."110 However, this Article will incorporate CNE 
into CNA to maintain a broad definition that includes all types of 
cyber-attack. 
3. Critical Infrastructure 
The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 defines critical 
infrastructure as, "systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health and safety, or any 
combination of those matters. "111 Although an imprecise definition, 112 
examples of critical infrastructure generally include the power grid, 
telecommunication lines and towers, air traffic control, port controls, 
and primary repositories of economic data.113 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1996 
version of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") recognized 
the potential for CNA on critical infrastructure: "[a]s the [National 
Information Infrastructure] and other network infrastructures 
continue to grow, computers will increasingly be used for access to 
critical services such as emergency response systems and air traffic 
control, and will be critical to other systems which we cannot yet 
anticipate. "114 As government and private companies seek to increase 
efficient operation of critical infrastructure, the operation of the 
components becomes increasingly dependent on computer and 
network control.115 The dependency on computer systems results in 
109. Definition of Computer Network Attack, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/10082.html. 
110. Definition of Computer Network Exploitation, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15, 
2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/ 
18166.html. 
111. 42 U.8.C. § 5195c(e) (2006); see generally JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: BACKGROUND, 
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2011) (defining critical infrastructure 
and describing the effect of destruction or incapacity). 
112. See generally HOMELAND SEC. PRES. DIRECTIVE 7: CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION, PRIORITIZATION, AND PROTECTION 
(2003) (noting that "[c]ritical infrastructure and key resources provide 
the essential services that underpin American society"). 
113. Cf. id. 
114. s. REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996). 
115. See James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber 
War and Other Cyber Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. 1 
(Dec. 2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/. 
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an increased vulnerability to CNA m R 1 through the Departm~nt of H. 1 ecdentSy, t~e U.S. Government, 
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systems.117 m astructure mformat10n 
4. Terrorism 
Generically, cyber-terrorism has b d f 
computers and the Internet to ~en e I~ed as the use of 
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the same moral plane. e esser acts that are not on 
The U.S. Code contains numer d fi .. 
this Article will examine those mostl ous e nnl1t10ns of terrorism, and 
Y commo Y used. In 22 U.S.C. § 
116. 
117. 
118. 
021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf [herein ft . 
attacks against critical infrastructur b a ~r Lewis] (~rguing that 
business concern and that th e Y cy er-weapons is primarily a 
overstated). ' e concern to national security is 
See id. (describing the "new vulner bTt" ,, 
Achilles' heel"). a 11 ies as "a massive electronic 
Janet Napolitano A Focused Et.r rt (June 18 2009) htt ·//. 'JJO 1 on Cybersecurity, LEADERSHIP J 
b ' ' p. Journa dhs gov/2009/06/£ d · cy ersecurity.html (describing DHS f£ · . ocuse -effort-on-
e orts m the area of cyber-security) 
See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 95 at 7 ( b. . . 
based terrorism aspects to est~blish com m1~g the ~t.e~t- and effect-
terrorism). a working defimt1on of cyber-
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
120. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law p . (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B ro~ct, ~30 S.Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) 
Terrorist Organizations was con t"t 't· atlenal Support to Designated 
as applied to plaintiff'~ activitis I ~ 10nak_and not impermissibly vague 
d . d es m see mg to provid . t es1gnate foreign terrorists organizations). e ass1s ance to 
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332B(c) (2006) C . 
on anyone who is convicted of t . imposmg consecutive sentences 
sentences). erronsm, and forbidding concurrent 
122. See, e.g., Alejandro M Sueldo Am . 
Prncess, INT'L POLICY ' D e'("l,can Terrorists Abrnad and Due 
htt ·// · · !GEST (Mar. 20 2012) p .. www.mternationalpolicydigest.org/2012/03/20/ . ' ' 
terrorists-abroad-and-due-process/ (d . . amencan-
issues when dealing with oversea t ~stcnbmg possible due process 
errons suspects). 
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themselves. "109 The definition excludes using information systems to 
collect intelligence, which the DoD defines as "Computer Network 
Exploitation ("CNE")."110 However, this Article will incorporate CNE 
into CNA to maintain a broad definition that includes all types of 
cyber-attack. 
3. Critical Infrastructure 
The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 defines critical 
infrastructure as, "systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health and safety, or any 
combination of those matters. "111 Although an imprecise definition, 112 
examples of critical infrastructure generally include the power grid, 
telecommunication lines and towers, air traffic control, port controls, 
and primary repositories of economic data.113 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1996 
version of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") recognized 
the potential for CNA on critical infrastructure: "[a]s. the [National 
Information Infrastructure] and other network mfrastructures 
continue to grow, computers will increasingly be used for ~ccess ~o 
critical services such as emergency response systems and aII traffic 
control and will be critical to other systems which we cannot yet 
anticip~te. "114 As government and private companies seek to increase 
efficient operation of critical infrastructure, the operation of the 
components becomes increasingly dependent on computer and 
network control.115 The dependency on computer systems results in 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
Definition of Computer Network Attack, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary /data/c/10082.html. 
Definition of Computer Network Exploitation, DEP'T OF DEF. (Nov. 15, 
2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/ 
18166.html. 
42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006); see generally JOHN D. MOTEFF, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30153, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: BACKGROUND, 
POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2011) (defining critical infrastructure 
and describing the effect of destruction or incapacity). 
See generally HOMELAND SEC. PRES. DIRECTIVE 7: CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION, PRIORITIZATION, AND PROTECTION 
(2003) (noting that "[c]ritical infrastructure and key resources provide 
the essential services that underpin American society"). 
113. Cf. id. 
114. s. REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996). 
115. See James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber 
War and Other Cyber Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. 1 
(Dec. 2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/. 
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an increased vulnerabili~y to CNA.116 Recently, the U.S. Government, 
through the Department of Homeland Security, has taken an 
increased role in protection of critical infrastructure information 
systems. 117 
4. Terrorism 
Generically, cyber-terrorism has been defined as the use of 
computers and the Internet to engage in terrorist activity. 118 This 
simple definition, however, begs the question: what is terrorism? In 
the last half-century, terrorism has become a loaded term with 
significant legal and moral overtones. Congress has enacted non-
traditional legislation, such as criminalizing providing material 
support to terrorism, 119 which the Supreme Court upheld as 
constitutional.120 The crime of terrorism generally holds extended 
sentences121 and may have due process implications. 122 Therefore 
incorporating the term "terrorism" into another crime should be don~ 
carefully as to not inadvertently include lesser acts that are not on 
the same moral plane. 
The U.S. Code contains numerous definitions of terrorism and 
this Article will examine those mostly commonly used. In 22 U.S.C. § 
021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf [hereinafter Lewis] (arguing that 
att~cks against critical infrastructure by cyber-weapons is primarily a 
busmess concern, and that the concern to national security is 
overstated). 
116. See id. (describing the "new vulnerabilities" as "a massive electronic 
Achilles' heel"). 
117. Janet Napolitano, A Focused Effort on Cybersecurity, LEADERSHIP J. 
(June 18, 2009), http://journal.dhs.gov/2009/06/focused-effort-on-
cybersecurity.html (describing DHS efforts in the area of cyber-security). 
118. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 95, at 7 (combining the intent- and effect-
based terrorism aspects to establish a working definition of cyber-
terrorism). 
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
120. See ~older v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) 
(holdn~g that ~8 y.s.c. § 2339B, Material Support to Designated 
Terrorist Orgamzat1ons, was constitutional and not impermissibly vague 
as applied to plaintiff's activities in seeking to provide assistance to 
designated foreign terrorists organizations). 
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332B(c) (2006) (imposing consecutive sentences 
on anyone who is convicted of terrorism, and forbidding concurrent 
sentences). 
122. See, e.g., Alejandro M. Sueldo, American Terrorists Abroad and Due 
Process, INT'L POLICY DIGEST (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http: !/www .internationalpolicydigest.org/2012 / 03 /20 / american-
terronsts-abroad-and-due-process / (describing possible due process 
issues when dealing with oversea terrorist suspects). 
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2656f terrorism is defined as "premeditated, politically moti~ate~ 
. le~ce er etrated against noncombatant targets by subnat101:1a 
vio p lp d t. agents[ ]"123 Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which groups or c an es me · d f 
defines criminal acts and regulates criminal procedure, e mes 
international terrorism as: 
[A]ctivities that ... involve violent acts or_ a?ts dangerous t~ 
human life that are a violation of the cnmmal laws ~f _th 1 
United States or of any State, or th~t :W~uld be a cnm~na 
violation if committed within the junsd1ct1o:n of the Urnted 
States or of any State; [and] appear to be mten~ed ... t~o 
intimidate or coerce a dvilian population; . . . t~ mfluence e 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or . . : to 
affect the conduct of a government ~y mass destr~cti~f' 
. t"on or kidnapping· and [which] occur pnman y 
assassma i , ' · s t 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Urnted ta es, . o~ 
transcend national boundaries in terms of the mea~s by wh1c 
they are accomplished, the persons they appe~r mtended to 
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators 
k 1 124 operate or see asy um. 
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulatio~s defines terrorism as "th~ 
unlawful use of force and violence agamst persons or ~roperty t 
t t h · vilian populat10n or any intimidate or coerce a governmen ' e ci . . . ',,125 
t thereof in furtherance of political or social obJectiv~s. . segm;~e basic elements comprising most definitions of ter~ons::n m use 
by the United States are the same. The commonah~y m thesde 
. . 1 t . 1) an act of violence· an definitions is a vanat10n on two e emen s. . . fl' 
2) the act must be political in nature, seeking to m. uence 
governmental decisions. In addition, some definitions also require the 
act be aimed at civilians or non-belligerents, or be conducted by non-
state actors.
126 d f. ·t· ft orism The first element which is common to all e im 10ns o err ' 
re uires the presence' of some act, violent in nature or dangerous to 
h q life 121 The definitions do not provide an exact formula to d~:;~ine ~hat level of violence qualifies, but t~e definitions ge~erally 
specify that the act be violent enough to intimidate the populat10n at 
123. 22 u.s.c. § 2656f(d) (2006). 
124. 18 u.s.c. § 2331(1) (2006). 
125. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2011). 
126. 
127. 
See, e.g., HOFFMAN, suprn note 84, at 34. 
ALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM: FANATICISM AND TSHe~ li;ds :F MASS DESTRUCTION 6 (1999) (evaluating over. a huntdre.d 
d f. d' th ·olence requrremen is definitions of terrorism an m mg e vi 
universal). 
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large, not just the subject of the attack. 128 This intimidation, and the 
resulting fear or anxiety, is at the heart of terrorism. 129 This 
intimidation and fear create the "terror" and present an important 
distinction when . examining which type of CN A has sufficiently 
affected the population to be considered an act of cyber-terrorism. 
The second element typically required is that the attack be 
political in nature, such as seeking to influence a government through 
violent actions. 130 The political element distinguishes terrorism from 
other violent crimes with similar results, like murder .131 Terrorist 
organizations typically have clear motivations and explicit end-goa.ls; 
for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army desired to oust 
the British government from Northern Ireland, 132 and, Al-Qaeda 
advocates for the withdrawal of western nations from the Middle East 
and the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. 133 The terrorist 
creates "terror" through acts of large-scale violence, such as setting off 
bombs, using chemical or biological weapons, or perpetrating other 
violent attacks. 134 It is this fear and threat of further violence that is 
intended to motivate a nation to change its policy toward the 
intended aim of the terrorist organization.135 
The third element, which appears less frequently in terrorism 
definitions, requires non-belligerents, those outside the scope of a 
military conflict, to conduct the violence.136 The law generally does 
not consider as terro"rism violence aimed directly at military personnel 
128. See, e.g., § 2331(1). 
129. Cf. id. (listing intent to intimidate as a requisite behavior for terrorism). 
130. See, e.g., id.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (2006) (including a requirement the 
act intends (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) 
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping). 
131. Compare § 2331(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (defining murder 
generally as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought). 
132. See generally ED MOLONEY, A SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA 246 (2003). 
133. See CHRJSTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32759, AL 
QAEDA: STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY 3 (2007). 
134. See generally STEVE BOWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31332, 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE TERRORIST THREAT 1 (2002). 
135. See, e.g., Pippa Norris, Montague Kern & Marion Just, Framing 
Terrorism, in FRAMING TERRORJSM: THE NEWS MEDIA, THE 
GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 3, 8 (Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, & 
Marion Just eds., 2003) (generally discussing news coverage of terrorism 
and how it frames public discussion of terrorism). 
136. See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31191, TERRORISM AND 
THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORJSTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1 (2011). 
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2656f terrorism is defined as "premeditated, politically moti~ate~ 
viole~ce perpetrated against nonco~batant ;ar~et~ ~y ~u~:a:~~:h 
groups or clandestine agents(.] ,,123 Title 1~ ~ ~ e . .d o 'defines 
defines criminal acts and regulates cnmma proce ure, 
international terrorism as: 
(A]ctivities that ... involve violent acts o~ a~ts dangerous ~~ 
h man life that are a violation of the cnmmal laws ~f _t U~ted States or of any State, or that would be a cnm~nal 
violation if committed within the jurisdictio?- of the Umted 
States or of any State; (and] appear to be mten_defld ... thto 
·. .1. latioll" to m uence e intimidate or coerce a c1v1 mn popu ' . . . . 
policy of a government by intimidation or coerc10n; or . . : to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass destr~ct1~n, 
. t" n or kidnapping· and (which] occur pnmanly 
assassma 10 , . .' . · S t or 
outside the territorial junsd1ct10n of the Umted ta es, . h 
transcend national boundaries in terms of the mea~s by wh1c 
they are accomplished, the persons they appe~r mtended to 
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which theII perpetrators 
k 1 124 operate or see asy um. 
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as "the 
1 ful use of force and violence against persons or ~roperty to un aw h · ·1· ulat10n or any 
. t" "d te or coerce a government, t e c1VI ian pop ' 
Ill Ifill a . l b" t · "125 
t thereof in furtherance of political or socia o JeC iv~s. . segm;~e basic elements comprising most definitions of ter~ons~ m use 
b the United States are the same. The commonah~y m these 
d:finitions is a variation on two elements: 1) an ac~ of VIole:i~; and 
2) the act must be political in nature, seeking to m. uence 
overnmental decisions. In addition, some definitions also requIIe the ~ct be aimed at civilians or non-belligerents, or be conducted by non-
state actors.126 • . • · 
Th first element which is common to all defm1t10ns of terronsm, 
re uire: the presence' of some act, violent in nature or dangerous to 
h q l"fe 121 The definitions do not provide an exact formula to uman I . d f "t" rally d t mine what level of violence qualifies, but the e m1 mns ge~e s;e~:fy that the act be violent enough to intimidate the populat10n at 
123. 22 u.s.c. § 2656f(d) (2006). 
124. 18 u.s.c. § 2331(1) (2006). 
125. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2011). 
126. 
127. 
See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 84, at 34. 
ALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM: FANATICISM AND TSHe~ ~i;ds ~F MASS DESTRUCTION 6 (1999) (evaluating over. a huntdre_d 
f. d" th · olence requrremen 1s definitions of terrorism and m mg e v1 
universal). 
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large, not just the subject of the attack.128 This intimidation, and the 
resulting fear or anxiety, is at the heart of terrorism. 129 This 
intimidation and fear create the "terror" and present an important 
distinction when examining which type of CNA has sufficiently 
affected the population to be considered an act of cyber-terrorism. 
The second element typically required is that the attack be 
political in nature, such as seeking to influence a government through 
violent actions. 130 The political element distinguishes terrorism from 
other violent crimes with similar results, like murder. 131 Terrorist 
organizations typically have clear motivations and explicit end-goa.ls; 
for example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army desired to oust 
the British government from Northern Ireland, 132 and, Al-Qaeda 
advocates for the withdrawal of western nations from the Middle East 
and the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. 133 The terrorist 
creates "terror" through acts of large-scale violence, such as setting off 
bombs, using chemical or biological weapons, or perpetrating other 
violent attacks. 134 It is this fear and threat of further violence that is 
intended to motivate a nation to change its policy toward the 
intended aim of the terrorist organization. 135 
The third element, which appears less frequently in terrorism 
definitions, requires non-belligerents, those outside the scope of a 
military conflict, to conduct the violence.136 The law generally does 
not consider as terrorism violence aimed directly at military personnel 
128. See, e.g., § 2331(1). 
129. Cf. id. (listing intent to intimidate as a requisite behavior for terrorism). 
130. See, e.g., id.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (2006) (including a requirement the 
act intends (A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (C) 
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping). 
131. Compare § 2331(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006) (defining murder 
generally as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought). 
132. See generally ED MOLONEY, A SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA 246 (2003). 
133. See CHRJSTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32759, AL 
QAEDA: STATEMENTS AND EVOLVING IDEOLOGY 3 (2007). 
134. See generally STEVE BOWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31332, 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE TERRORJST THREAT 1 (2002). 
135. See, e.g., Pippa Norris, Montague Kern & Marion Just, Framing 
Terrorism, in FRAMING TERRORJSM: THE NEWS MEDIA, THE 
GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 3, 8 (Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, & 
Marion Just eds., 2003) (generally discussing news coverage of terrorism 
and how it frames public discussion of terrorism). 
136. See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31191, TERRORISM AND 
THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORJSTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS 1 (2011). 
297 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2. 2013 
Cyber-Terrorism: Finding a Common Starting Point 
by belligerents within the scope of a military co~~ict. 137 E:'~:an:ples of 
attacks on the military outside the scope of a military conflict mclude 
the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon138 and the 1996 ?ombing ~f. the 
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia.139 Acts agamst the military 
occurring within the scope of a military conflict and conducted by 
belligerents are typically considered acts of warfare under the l~w, 
even if these acts mimic terrorist attacks.140 Thus, the working 
definitio~ must consider the category of armed ·attacks in 
cyberspace, i41 which occur as part of the broa~er conflict. This 
category of CNA will be discussed in the next Sect10n. 
C. Definitional Elements 
This Section will examine the elements contained in the proposed 
definition of cyber-terrorism and discuss the reasons for inclusion. 
Like the traditional elements of terrorism discussed above, cyber-
terrorism should include an effects element, an element of intent, and 
a requirement that the cyber-terrorist be a non-state actor. 
1. The Effects Element: Fear and Anxiety 
The effects element of the cyber-terrorism definition should 
require that the CN A cause fear or anxiety in a civil.ian pop1:1-lace 
through widespread damage to critical physical or mformat10nal 
infrastructure national security related information systems, and/ or 
critical econo~c systems, or that the CNA attack result in severe 
physical damage or human casualties. This resu~t can occur in one of 
three ways: as. a causation of the effects, by causmg the appearance or 
belief in these effects, or threatening to cause these effects. Some 
definitions of cyber-terrorism focus solely or predominantly on the 
effects of the act and minimize the intent of the actor. For example, 
indicative of this approach is the informal, but commonly used, 
137. 
138. 
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006) (defining terrorism. as 
"premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated agamst 
noncombatant' targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents"). 
On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked American. ~irlines 
flight 77 and flew it into the west side of the Pen~agon, killing all 
aboard as well as over 100 people in the Pentagon. History: September 
11, 2001, PENTAGON, http://pentagon.osd.mil/septemberll.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
139. On June 25, 1996, a group of mostly Saudi nationals with ties ~o Iran 
and the Islamic Movement for Change exploded a car bomb outside the 
Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Airman. 
Rebecca Grant, Death in the Desert, AIR FORCE, June 2006, at 48. 
140. See ELSEA, supra note 136. 
141. Brenner, supra note 19, at 401. 
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definition of cyber-terrorism as "hacking with a body count. n142 The 
advantage of this definition is that the attacker's motivation need not 
be determined. The CNA need only be evaluated based on tangible 
outcomes, which provides a clear standard for determining when a 
CNA rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. If the result of the CAN is 
equivalent to the fear and anxiety caused by traditional terrorist 
actions, then it will be labeled an act of cyber-terrorism. 
. .Wh~n ~ocusing on the effects of a CNA, there is an advantage in 
distmgmshmg cyber-terrorists who are a serious threat to national 
security from online activists who conduct minor CNA without being 
a serious threat. 143 An online activist may seek to influence popular 
or government opinion by defacing a military or government 
website,144 but this does not make him a terrorist. Some commonly 
used definitions of cyber-terrorism fail to make this distinction. For 
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines cyber-
terrorism as "[t]he use of computing resources against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the .civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives. "145 This definition contains no indication of the 
severity a CNA would have to reach before it is defined as cyber-
terrorism. Such a definition runs the risk of making the term cyber-
terrorism so broad that it becomes inappropriately over-inclusive of 
misconduct that is not cyber-terrorism. 
Along with a tendency to be overbroad, the other problem with 
most effects elements is that they leave unanswered the question of 
how to deal with effects that not traditionally associated with 
terrorist attacks that can have equally devastating effects on society. 
For example, by corrupting large amounts of economic data, a CNA 
could inflict great economic damage on a nation without inflicting 
~ivilian casualties.146 Definitions of traditional terrorism historically 
mcorporate an element of physical damage or civilian casualties as the 
method of producing fear and anxiety in society. 147 However, to 
142. Amara D. Angelica, The New Face of War, TECHWEEK (Nov. 2, 1998), 
http:/ /www.transbay.net/~nessie/Pages/teds.html (quoting Barry 
Collin). 
143. Such groups are commonly referred to as "hacktivists" and are discussed 
in greater detail infra Section II(E)(4). 
144. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14, 
2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07 /64193. 
145. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INFRASTRUCTURE 
THREATS FROM CYBER-TERRORISTS 2 (Mar. 19, 1999), 1999 WL 137721 
(O.C.C.). 
146. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 8 (noting that some believe that "because 
of U.S. dependency on computer technology, such attacks have the 
potential to create economic damage on a large scale"). 
147. See supra Section II(C). 
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by belligerents within the scope of a military co:i~ict. 137 E~a~ples of 
attacks on the military outside the scope of a military conflict mclude 
the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon138 and the 1996 ?ombing ~f. the 
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia.139 Acts agamst the military 
occurring within the scope of a military conflict and conducted by 
belligerents are typically considered acts of warfare under the l~w, 
even if these acts mimic terrorist attacks. 140 Thus, the working 
definitio~ must consider the category of armed ·attacks i?-
cyberspace, 141 which occur as part of the broa~er conflict. This 
category of CNA will be discussed in the next Sect10n. 
C. Definitional Elements 
This Section will examine the elements contained in the proposed 
definition of cyber-terrorism and discuss the reasons for inclusion. 
Like the traditional elements of terrorism discussed above, cyber-
terrorism should include an effects element, an element of intent, and 
a requirement that the cyber-terrorist be a non-state actor. 
1. The Effects Element: Fear and Anxiety 
The effects element of the cyber-terrorism definition should 
require that the CNA cause fear or anxiety in a civi~an pop~lace 
through widespread damage to critical physical or mformat10nal 
infrastructure national security related information systems, and/ or 
critical econo~c systems, or that the CNA attack result in severe 
physical damage or human casualties. This resu~t can occur in one of 
three ways: as. a causation of the effects, by causmg the appearance or 
belief in these effects, or threatening to cause these effects. Some 
definitions of cyber-terrorism focus solely or predominantly on the 
effects of the act and minimize the intent of the actor. For example, 
indicative of this approach is the informal, but commonly used, 
137. 
138. 
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006) (defining terrorism. as 
"premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated agamst 
noncombatant' targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents"). 
On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked American. ~irlines 
flight 77 and flew it into the west side of the Pen~agon, killing all 
aboard as well as over 100 people in the Pentagon. History: September 
11, 2001, PENTAGON, http://pentagon.osd.mil/septemberll.html (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
139. On June 25, 1996, a group of mostly Saudi nationals with ties ~o Iran 
and the Islamic Movement for Change exploded a car bomb outs1~e the 
Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Airman. 
Rebecca Grant, Death in the Desert, AIR FORCE, June 2006, at 48. 
140. See ELSEA, supra note 136. 
141. Brenner, supra note 19, at 401. 
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definition of cyber-terrorism as "hacking with a body count."142 The 
advantage of this definition is that the attacker's motivation need not 
be determined. The CNA need only be evaluated based on tangible 
outcomes, which provides a clear standard for determining when a 
CNA rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. If the result of the CAN is 
equivalent to the fear and anxiety caused by traditional terrorist 
actions, then it will be labeled an act of cyber-terrorism. 
. .Wh~n ~ocusing on the effects of a CNA, there is an advantage in 
distmgmshing cyber-terrorists who are a serious threat to national 
security from online activists who conduct minor CNA without being 
a serious threat. 143 An online activist may seek to influence popular 
or government opinion by defacing a military or government 
website, 144 but this does not make him a terrorist. Some commonly 
used definitions of cyber-terrorism fail to make this distinction. For 
example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defines cyber-
terrorism as "[t]he use of computing resources against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the .civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives. "145 This definition contains no indication of the 
severity a CNA would have to reach before it is defined as cyber-
terrorism. Such a definition runs the risk of making the term cyber-
terrorism so broad that it becomes inappropriately over-inclusive of 
misconduct that is not cyber-terrorism. 
Along with a tendency to be overbroad, the other problem with 
most effects elements is that they leave unanswered the question of 
how to deal with effects that not traditionally associated with 
terrorist attacks that can have equally devastating effects on society. 
For example, by corrupting large amounts of economic data a CNA 
could inflict great economic damage on a nation without inflicting 
~ivilian casualties.146 Definitions of traditional terrorism historically 
mcorporate an element of physical damage or civilian casualties as the 
method of producing fear and anxiety in society.147 However, to 
142. Amara D. Angelica, The New Face of War, TECHWEEK (Nov. 2, 1998), 
http://www.transbay.net/~nessie/Pages/teds.html (quoting Barry 
Collin). 
143. Such groups are commonly referred to as "hacktivists" and are discussed 
in greater detail infra Section II(E)(4). 
144. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14, 
2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07 /64193. 
145. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INFRASTRUCTURE 
THREATS FROM CYBER-TERRORISTS 2 (Mar. 19, 1999), 1999 WL 137721 
(O.C.C.). 
146. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 8 (noting that some believe that "because 
of U.S. dependency on computer technology, such attacks have the 
potential to create economic damage on a large scale"). 
147. See supra Section II(C). 
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restrict cyber-terrorism to events where there are civilian casualti~s or 
large-scale physical destruction ignores a large :a~~e of hig~ly 
malicious CN A. Therefore, physical damage or civilian casualties 
should· solely determine the effects element; it should also focus on the 
psychological effect the CN A has on the target society. 
Under this Article's definition, the effects element of cyber-
terrorism requires that a CNA lead to either of the follo~ng. Fir_st, 
the CNA could lead to damage traditionally associated with 
terrorism, which includes death, injury, water contamination, or 
release of radiological material.148 Alternatively, the CNA could cause 
damage unique to a CN A with an equivalent psychological i1:1pact . on 
society such as pipeline bursts extended power outages, disrupt10n 
l . l • • d 149 
of air-traffic control systems, or maJor loss of econormc ata. 
However the intended effects of CNA can often be hard to predict 
and distinguish.150 Therefore, it is necessary to have an element of 
intent in a proper definition of cyber-terrorism. 
2. The Intent Element: Motivation 
The intent element of the cyber-terrorism definition requires that 
the CNA be premeditated and politically motivated. Similar to 
effects-based definitions, there are definitions currently in use that 
focus solely on the intent of the CN A.151 An example of a typi~al 
intent-based definition of cyber-terrorism is offered by Serge Krasavm, 
Ph.D., of the Computer Crime Research Center; he defines cyber-
terrorism as the "use of information technology and means by 
terrorist groups and agents. "152 • 
This definition offers a drastically different approach because it 
focuses on the actor ("terrorist groups and agents"), not the act ("use 
148. See Dorothy E. Denning, Is Cyber Terror Next?, Soc. Ser. RES. 
COUNCIL (Nov. 1, 2001), http:/ /essays.ssrc.org/septll/essays/ . 
denning.htm ("To assess the potential threat of cyber terrorism, two 
factors must be considered: first, whether there are targets that are 
vulnerable to attack that could lead to severe harm, and second, 
whether. there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry 
them out."). 
149. Id. 
150. See Martin C. Libicki, Cyberwar as a Confidence Game, STRATEGIC 
STUD. Q., 132-133 (Spring 2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/ 
2011/spring/libicki.pdf (noting that it is hard to predict the effects of a 
151. 
152. 
cyber-attack). 
See WILSON, supra note 95, at 6 (noting several intent-based definitions 
of cyber-terrorism). 
Serge Krasavin, Ph.D., What is Cyber-terrorism? COMPUTER: CRlME 
RES. CTR., http://www.crime-research.org/library /Cyber-terronsm.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
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of information technology" is extremely broad and unhelpful). 
Accordingly, as long as a terrorist is using the information system to 
forward his or her means, the result of that use does not matter. For 
example, the use of e-mail to communicate with other terrorists would 
be an act of cyber-terrorism. However, the Internet's widespread use 
likely means there is not a terrorist organization that does not use the 
Internet and computers for any number of reasons. 153 Thus, the 
category essentially becomes redundant when considering its 
application to terrorism. This definition is an excellent description of 
"terrorist use of the Internet," but is not helpful in distinguishing 
cyber-terrorism from other types of CNA. 
The advantage of an intent-based definition is that it covers the 
full range of attacks both unique to CN A, such as damaging economic 
data, and similar to traditional terrorism, such as releasing poison gas. 
However, an attack for political motivations can run the entire 
spectrum of CNA, from basic denial of service attacks and 
government website defacement to potentially major attacks, such as 
on Siemens supervisory control and data acquisition ("SCADA") 
controlled utilities. Intent-based definitions, like overly broad effects-
based definitions, run the risk of making the category of cyber-
terrorism so broad it becomes meaningless. We do not classify the 
graffiti artist who spray-paints "Out of Iraq" on a public wall as a 
terrorist, partly because the term would lose its meaning. The same 
should hold for acts of cyber-terrorism. 
The most useful approach is to add an element of motivation that 
requires the CNA be premeditated and politically-motivated, with the 
effects element discussed above. The term cyber-terrorism should 
recognize the purpose behind the attack: to undermine a government 
or motivate it to change its policies. It should only encompass CNA 
with specific effects: attacks that produce fear or anxiety in the 
populace. This combination will prevent the definition from being too 
narrow, allowing the inclusion of certain effects unique to CNA, while 
also avoiding being too broad-excluding those acts that are of a 
more trivial nature. 
3. The Non-State Actor Requirement 
Although not every definition includes a requirement that a non-
state actor commit the terrorist acts, most acts with similar effects 
that are attributed directly to a state are considered acts of armed 
aggression. 154 The reason is because governmental agencies would 
153. See infra, Section II(E)(5), for a discussion of terrorist use of the 
Internet. 
154. Cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (providing that the United States is 
prepared to assist other nations against instances of armed aggression 
from other countries). 
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restrict cyber-terrorism to events where there are civilian casualti~s or 
large-scale physical destruction ignores a large ~a~?e of hig~y 
malicious CNA. Therefore, physical damage or civilian casualties 
should· solely determine the effects element; it should also focus on the 
psychological effect the CNA has on the target society. 
Under this Article's definition, the effects element of cyber-
terrorism requires that a CNA lead to either of the following. First, 
the CN A could lead to damage traditionally associated with 
terrorism, which includes death, injury, water contamination, or 
release of radiological material.148 Alternatively, the CNA could cause 
damage unique to a CNA with an equivalent psychological i~pact _on 
society, such as pipeline bursts, exten~ed power outages, ~isrupti~~ 
of air-traffic control systems, or maJor loss of economic data. 
However, the intended effects of CNA can often be hard to predict 
and distinguish.150 Therefore, it is necessary to have an element of 
intent in a proper definition of cyber-terrorism. 
2. The Intent Element: Motivation 
The intent element of the cyber-terrorism definition requires that 
the CNA be premeditated and politically motivated. Similar to 
effects-based definitions, there are definitions currently in use that 
focus solely on the intent of the CN A.151 An example of a typi~al 
intent-based definition of cyber-terrorism is offered by Serge Krasavm, 
Ph.D., of the Computer Crime Research Center; he defines cyber-
terrorism as the "use of information technology and means by 
terrorist groups and agents. "152 . 
This definition offers a drastically different approach because it 
focuses on the actor ("terrorist groups and agents"), not the act ("use 
148. See Dorothy E. Denning, Is Cyber Terror Next?, Soc. Ser. RES. 
COUNCIL (Nov. 1, 2001), http://essays.ssrc.org/septll/essays/ . 
denning.htm ("To assess the potential threat of cyber terrorism, two 
factors must be considered: first, whether there are targets that are 
vulnerable to attack that could lead to severe harm, and second, 
whether. there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry 
them out."). 
149. Id. 
150. See Martin C. Libicki, Cyberwar as a Confidence Game, STRATEGIC 
STUD. Q., 132-133 (Spring 2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/ 
2011/spring/libicki.pdf (noting that it is hard to predict the effects of a 
151. 
152. 
cyber-attack). 
See WILSON, supra note 95, at 6 (noting several intent-based definitions 
of cyber-terrorism). 
Serge Krasavin, Ph.D., What is Cyber-terrorism? COMPUTE~ CRlME 
RES. CTR., http://www.crime-research.org/library /Cyber-terronsm.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2012). 
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of inf~rmation technology" is extremely broad and unhelpful). 
Accordmgly, as long as a terrorist is using the information system to 
forward his or her means, the result of that use does not matter. For 
example, the use of e-mail to cornrnunicate with other terrorists would 
be an act of cyber-terrorism. However, the Internet's widespread use 
likely means there is not a terrorist organization that does not use the 
Internet and computers for any number of reasons. 153 Thus, the 
category essentially becomes redundant when considering its 
application to terrorism. This definition is an excellent description of 
"terrorist use of the Internet," but is not helpful in distinguishing 
cyber-terrorism from other types of CNA. 
The advantage of an intent-based definition is that it covers the 
full range of attacks both unique to CN A, such as damaging economic 
data, and similar to traditional terrorism, such as releasing poison gas. 
However, an attack for political motivations can run the entire 
spectrum of CNA, from basic denial of service attacks and 
government website defacement to potentially major attacks such as 
on Siemens . s_u?ervisory control and data acquisition ("S,CADA") 
controlled utilities. Intent-based definitions, like overly broad effects-
based definitions, run the risk of making the category of cyber-
terrorism so broad it becomes meaningless. We do not classify the 
graffiti artist who spray-paints "Out of Iraq" on a public wall as a 
terrorist, partly because the term would lose its meaning. The same 
should hold for acts of cyber-terrorism. 
The most useful approach is to add an element of motivation that 
requires the CNA be premeditated and politically-motivated, with the 
effects element discussed above. The term cyber-terrorism should 
recognize the purpose behind the attack: to undermine a government 
or motivate it to change its policies. It should only encompass CNA 
with specific effects: attacks that produce fear or anxiety in the 
populace. This combination will prevent the definition from being too 
narrow, allowing the inclusion of certain effects unique to CNA while 
also avoiding being too broad-excluding those acts that ar~ of a 
more trivial nature. 
3. The Non-State Actor Requirement 
Although not every definition includes a requirement that a non-
state actor cornrnit the terrorist acts, most acts with similar effects 
that are attributed directly to a state are considered acts of armed 
· 154 Th . aggression. e reason is because governmental agencies would 
153. See infra, Section II(E)(5), for a discussion of terrorist use of the 
Internet. 
154. Cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (providing that the United States is 
prepared to assist other nations against instances of armed aggression 
from other countries). 
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address such an attack in a much different manner and the public 
would view it differently. For example, if the intelligence operative of 
a foreign nation was to set off a bomb in the United States, and it 
was known that the operative was acting under the control of that 
foreign nation, the U.S. Government would view it as an act of armed 
aggression. The same should be true for cyber-terrorism. The 
exclusion of this element is not fatal to the definition and may be 
eliminated for certain applications. 
One of the prime difficulties in cyber-terrorism is determining 
whether a state actor is responsible for the attack. Many experts 
believe that nations ·such as China and Russia, who have the 
capability to conduct extensive CNA, use hacking groups not officially 
related to the state in order to mask state involvement in CNA 
against foreign powers.155 This is not a new tactic; state sponsors of 
traditional terrorism, such as Iran, are common.156 However, the 
built-in anonymity of the Internet and the lack of physical 
infrastructure required to launch an attack make this tactic even more 
successful in cyberspace. Whether a CNA is ultimately attributed to 
a state will depend on the evidence particular to the case and the 
willingness of political leaders to place blame on state actors. 
However, because the response options will be entirely different 
against a state actor, it is more useful to categorize those attacks as 
something other than cyber-terrorism. 
D. Current Definitions of Cyber-Terrorism 
Having proposed a common working definition of cyber-terrorism, 
this Section analyzes the definitions that have either been offered by 
academics or are in use by the U.S. Government. To start, the 
original definition of cyber-terrorism came from Barry C. ~ollin, . a 
senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence m 
California in the 1980s.157 His vision of cyber-terrorism was one in 
which attacks conducted through computers mirrored the effects of 
traditional acts of terrorism: 
155. 
156. 
157. 
See Larry Wortzel, The Chinese Way of (Cyber) War, DEF. DOSSIER, 1 
(Aug. 2012), http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (describing :he 
Chinese government's use of cyber "operations"); see David J. Smith, 
How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare, DEF. DOSSIER, 7 (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (explaining Russia's approach 
to information operations). 
See, e.g., CIA, Iran, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, (last updated Feb. 5,. 
2012) https://www.cia.gov/library / publications/the-world-
fact book/ geos / ir .html (describing Iran's designation as a state sponsor 
of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere). 
Barry C. Collin, The Future of CyberTerrorism: ·Where the Physical and 
Virtual Worlds Converge, 11th Annual International Symposium on 
Criminal Justice Issues, CRlME & JUST. INT'L J., 15-18 (1997), available 
at http://afgen.com/terrbrisml.html. 
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Like conventional terrorists, CyberTerrorists are out for blood. 
They try to do things like break into subway computer systems 
to cause a collision or use computers to tamper with power grids 
or food processing. However, unlike suicide bombers and roof-
top snipers, CyberTerrorists attack from the comfort of home 
and can be in more than one place at a time through 
cyberspace .... CyberTerrorism can be far more damaging, and 
far more violent, than a 55-gallon drum of fuel and fertilizer. .. 
. CyberTerrorists' isolation from the results of their actions and 
the ·consequent lack of personal risk, make them particularly 
dangerous .... [T]he ease and low cost of CyberTerrorism 
combine to offer an attractive tool for once-conventional 
sociopaths. 158 
There has been no shortage of cyber-terrorism definitions offered 
in response to this statement. Many contain similar elements and 
themes, but the broad divergence in the scope of these definitions 
signals the need for a definition that can be used as a common 
starting point. This Section examines these definitions. 
1. United States Government Definitions 
Though not explicitly defined as cyber-terrorism, a form of cyber-
terrorism is contained in the U.S. Code Section 2332b(g) (5) defines 
the "federal crime of terrorism" and includes as predicate offenses two 
CF AA provisions: one relating to cyber-espionage and one related to 
computer damage.159 If one of those two CF AA provisions is violated, 
and if that CF AA violation "is calculated to influence or affect the 
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate 
against government conduct," then it meets this definition of 
terrorism. 160 The implications of this provision will be covered in 
greater depth later, but it is important to recognize that Congress has 
thought fit to include CNA in one definition of terrorism under the 
U.S. Code. 
In the example in the Introduction, where Anonymous attacked a 
FBI website in retaliation for its arrest of Dotcom and others 
' Anonymous's actions meet the definition of the federal crime of 
terrorism, despite the fact it does not meet traditional concepts of 
terrorism. This is because the federal definition fails to sufficiently 
158. Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 397, 403 (2004) (quoting Barry Collin). 
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(l) (2012) (relating 
to cyber-espionage); § 1030(a)(5)(A) (resulting in damage as defined in 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) through (VI) (requiring damage to 
national security related computers or if the damage involves 10 or more 
computers)). 
160. § 2332b(g)(5). 
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address such an attack in a much different manner and the public 
would view it differently. For example, if the intelligence operative of 
a foreign nation was to set off a bomb in the United States, and it 
was known that the operative was acting under the control of that 
foreign nation, the U.S. Government would view it as an act of armed 
aggression. The same should be true for cyber-terrorism. The 
exclusion of this element is not fatal to the definition and may be 
eliminated for certain applications. 
One of the prime difficulties in cyber-terrorism is determining 
whether a state actor is responsible for the attack. Many experts 
believe that nations ·such as China and Russia, who have the 
capability to conduct extensive CNA, use hacking groups not officially 
related to the state in order to mask state involvement in CNA 
against foreign powers.155 This is not a new tactic; state sponsors of 
traditional terrorism, such as Iran, are common. 156 However, the 
built-in anonymity of the Internet and the lack of physical 
infrastructure required to launch an attack make this tactic even more 
successful in cyberspace. Whether a CNA is ultimately attributed to 
a state will depend on the evidence particular to the case and the 
willingness of political leaders to place blame on state actors. 
However, because the response options will be entirely different 
against a state actor, it is more useful to categorize those attacks as 
something other than cyber-terrorism. 
D. Current Definitions of Cyber-Terrorism 
Having proposed a common working definition of cyber-terrorism, 
this Section analyzes the definitions that have either been offered by 
academics or are in use by the U.S. Government. To start, the 
original definition of cyber-terrorism came from Barry C. Collin, a 
senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in 
California in the 1980s.157 His vision of cyber-terrorism was one in 
which attacks conducted through computers mirrored the effects of 
traditional acts of terrorism: 
155. 
156. 
157. 
See Larry Wortzel, The Chinese Way of (Cyber} War, DEF. DOSSIER, 1 
(Aug. 2012), http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (describing ~he 
Chinese government's use of cyber "operations"); see David J. Smith, 
How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare, DEF. DOSSIER, 7 (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf (explaining Russia's approach 
to information operations). 
See, e.g., CIA, Iran, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, (last updated Feb. 5,. 
2012) https://www.cia.gov/library /publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html (describing Iran's designation as a state sponsor 
of terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere). 
Barry C. Collin, The Future of CyberTerrorism: ·Where the Physical and 
Virtual Worlds Converge, 11th Annual International Symposium on 
Criminal Justice Issues, CRIME & JUST. INT'L J., 15-18 (1997), available 
at http://afgen.com/terrbrisml.html. 
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Like conventional terrorists, CyberTerrorists are out for blood. 
They try to do things like break into subway computer systems 
to cause a collision or use computers to tamper with power grids 
or food processing. However, unlike suicide bombers and roof-
top snipers, CyberTerrorists attack from the comfort of home 
and can be in more than one place at a time through 
cyberspace .... CyberTerrorism can be far more damaging, and 
far more violent, than a 55-gallon drum of fuel and fertilizer. .. 
. CyberTerrorists' isolation from the results of their actions and 
the ··consequent lack of personal risk, make them particularly 
dangerous .... [T]he ease and low cost of CyberTerrorism 
combine to offer an attractive tool for once-conventional 
sociopaths.158 
There has been no shortage of cyber-terrorism definitions offered 
in response to this statement. Many contain similar elements and 
themes, but the broad divergence in the scope of these definitions 
signals the need for a definition that can be used as a common 
starting point. This Section examines these definitions. 
1. United States Government Definitions 
Though not explicitly defined as cyber-terrorism, a form of cyber-
terrorism is contained in the U.S. Code Section 2332b(g)(5) defines 
the "federal crime of terrorism" and includes as predicate offenses two 
CF AA provisions: one relating to cyber-espionage and one related to 
computer damage. 159 If one of those two CF AA provisions is violated, 
and if that CF AA violation "is calculated to influence or affect the 
conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate 
against government conduct," then it meets this definition of 
terrorism. 160 The implications of this provision will be covered in 
greater depth later, but it is important to recognize that Congress has 
thought fit to include CNA in one definition of terrorism under the 
U.S. Code. 
In the example in the Introduction, where Anonymous attacked a 
FBI website in retaliation for its arrest of Dotcom and others 
' Anonymous's actions meet the definition of the federal crime of 
terrorism, despite the fact it does not meet traditional concepts of 
terrorism. This is because the federal definition fails to sufficiently 
158. Mohammad Iqbal, Defining Cyberterrorism, 22 J. MARSHALL J; 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 397, 403 (2004) (quoting Barry Collin). 
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(l) (2012) (relating 
to cyber-espionage); § 1030(a)(5)(A) (resulting in damage as defined in 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) through (VI) (requiring damage to 
national security related computers or if the damage involves 10 or more 
computers)). 
160. § 2332b(g)(5). 
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define the scope of the attack's effects. Almost any denial of service 
attack against a national security website will fall under the predicate 
CF AA offenses. Although denial of service attacks are serious and 
should be investigated, they do not cause fear or anxiety in the 
populace. Despite the inclusion of cyber-terrorism in the criminal 
code most government agencies have developed their own cyber-
terr~rism definitions. These definitions contain some important 
differences and an attempt should be made to make them more 
consistent. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") has 
defined cyber-terrorism as "unlawful attacks and threats of attack 
against computers, netwprks, and the information stored therein when 
done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance 
of political or social objectives. "161 This definition incorporates an 
adequate intent element that appears in most definitions of terrorism 
and cyber-terrorism alike. It requires the attacker's objective to be 
political or social coercion against a government or its people.162 
However the weakness of this definition is in the effects element, 
which h~s no requirement for the scale of attack. Under this 
definition, the lone wolf who hacks a webpage to post a political 
message such as "Stop the War in Iraq," or who temporarily. takes 
down a DoJ public website to protest an arrest, would be gmlty of 
cyber-terrorism. Thus, as the requirement that a CNA "intimidate or 
coerce" must require a more substantive attack, this is too vague to 
be an effective definition. 
The National Infrastructure Protection Center defines cyber-
terrorism as "a criminal act perpetrated through computers resulting 
in violence, death and/or destruction, and creating terror for the 
purpose of coercing a government to change its policies. "163 Unlike 
the other over-broad definitions, this definition focuses more on the 
effects of a test, with the result that it is extremely narrow. The 
·definition excludes all attacks not "resulting in violence, death and/ or 
destruction, "164 which excludes some of the most devastating 
possibilities of CN A. An argument could be made that this definition 
is unhelpful because everything it incorporates is already covered by 
definitions of terrorism. To be useful, a definition of cyber-terrorism 
161. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS, 
CYBERCRIME AND CYBERTERRORJSM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 4 (2008) (quoting from the FEMA toolkit for 
terrorism responses). 
162. Id. 
163. See Scott Berinato, The Truth About Cyberterrorism, CIO (Apr. 8, 
2002, 9:30), http://www.cio.com.au/article/26124/truth_about_ 
cyberterrorism/ (quoting Ron Dick, then Director of the NIPC). 
164. Id. 
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must include effects such as a takedown of economic systems or 
corruption of massive amounts of national security data, as this is 
where the unique capabilities of cyber-terrorism lie. 
William L. Tafoya, Ph.D., writing in the FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, defines cyber-terrorism as "the intimidation of civilian 
enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political, 
religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or 
deleting critical infrastructure data or information. "165 Tafoya clarifies 
this definition by providing the example of wiping out the data of the 
Library of Congress as compared to wiping out a single academic 
paper .166 The former would be seen as devastating and certainly 
affect the public's quality of life, whereas the latter would have a 
limited effect on the public's lives. 167 This definition identifies 
"disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information" as 
the required effect. It is the opposite of the FEMA definition, 168 
which required an element of violence. Instead, it does not account 
for physical harms, and focuses solely on data. Recognizing this 
unique effect of CNA is important, but the definition should not be 
completely exclusive of all other types of harms. Nonetheless, any 
definition of cyber-terrorism should similarly include attacks on 
critical data systems. 
Any government definition of cyber-terrorism will need to be 
altered somewhat to fit with the goals of that agency, and this Article 
does not suggest that all agencies must use the proposed definition. 
But, as demonstrated above, the currently used definitions are so 
divergent that they impede the establishment of a common, 
government-wide strategy to defeat cyber-terrorism. At minimum, 
there should be consistency among the three basic elements of cyber-
terrorism and particularity about the type of effects included. 
2. United Nations Definition of Cyber-Terrorism 
An internationally consistent definition should also be sought. 
Although not the focus of this Article, it is useful to examine how the 
United Nations (U.N.) has defined cyber-terrorism. The UN Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force ("CTITF"), although not 
explicitly using the term cyber-terrorism, recognizes that one of the 
ways a terrorist organization may make "[u]se of the Internet to 
perform terrorist attacks [is] by remotely altering information on 
165. William L. Tafoya, Cyber Terror, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Nov. 
2011, at 2. 
166. Id. at 2-3. 
167. Id. 
168. See Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian: Cybersecurity 
and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465, 476 (2011). 
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define the scope of the attack's effects. Almost any denial of service 
attack against a national security website will fall under the predicate 
CF AA offenses. Although denial of service attacks are serious and 
should be investigated, they do not cause fear or anxiety in the 
populace. Despite the inclusion of cyber-terrorism in the criminal 
code, most government agencies have developed their 0':11 cyber-
terrorism definitions. These definitions contain some important 
differences and an attempt should be made to make them more 
consistent. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") has 
defined cyber-terrorism as "unlawful attacks and threats of attack 
against computers, netwprks, and the information stored therein when 
done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in fu_rtherance 
of political or social objectives. "161 This definition incorporates an 
adequate intent element that appears in most definitions of terrorism 
and cyber-terrorism alike. It requires the attacker's objective to be 
political or social coercion against a government or its people.162 
However the weakness of this definition is in the effects element, 
which h~s no requirement for the scale of attack. Under this 
definition, the lone wolf who hacks a webpage to post a political 
message such as "Stop the War in Iraq," or who temporarily. takes 
down a DoJ public website to protest an arrest, would be gmlty of 
cyber-terrorism. Thus, as the requirement that a CNA "intimidate or 
coerce" must require a more substantive attack, this is too vague to 
be an effective definition. 
The National Infrastructure Protection Center defines cyber-
terrorism as "a criminal act perpetrated through computers resulting 
in violence, death and/ or destruction, and creating terror for the 
purpose of coercing a government to change its policies. "163 Unlike 
the other over-broad definitions, this definition focuses more on the 
effects of a test, with the result that it is extremely narrow. The 
·definition excludes all attacks not "resulting in violence, death and/ or 
destruction, "164 which excludes some of the most devastating 
possibilities of CNA. An argument could be made that this definition 
is unhelpful because everything it incorporates is already covered by 
definitions of terrorism. To be useful, a definition of cyber-terrorism 
161. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH 8ERV., RL32114, BOTNETS, 
CYBERCRIME AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 4 (2008) (quoting from the FEMA toolkit for 
terrorism responses) . 
162. Id. 
163. See Scott Berinato, The Truth About Cyberterrorism, CIO (Apr. 8, 
2002, 9:30), http://www.cio.com.au/article/26124/truth_about_ 
cyberterrorism/ (quoting Ron Dick, then Director of the NIPC). 
164. Id. 
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must include effects such as a takedown of economic systems or 
corruption of massive amounts of national security data, as this is 
where the unique capabilities of cyber-terrorism lie. 
William L. Tafoya, Ph.D., writing in the FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, defines cyber-terrorism as "the intimidation of civilian 
enterprise through the use of high technology to bring about political, 
religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or 
deleting critical infrastructure data or information. "165 Tafoya clarifies 
this definition by providing the example of wiping out the data of the 
Library of Congress as compared to wiping out a single academic 
paper .166 The former would be seen as devastating and certainly 
affect the public's quality of life, whereas the latter would have a 
limited effect on the public's lives. 167 This definition identifies 
"disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information" as 
the required effect. It is the opposite of the FEMA definition, 168 
which required an element of violence. Instead, it does not account 
for physical harms, and focuses solely on data. Recognizing this 
unique effect of CNA is important, but the definition should not be 
completely exclusive of all other types of harms. Nonetheless, any 
definition of cyber-terrorism should similarly include attacks on 
critical data systems. 
Any government definition of cyber-terrorism will need to be 
altered somewhat to fit with the goals of that agency, and this Article 
does not suggest that all agencies must use the proposed definition. 
But, as demonstrated above, the currently used definitions are so 
divergent that they impede the establishment of a common 
' government-wide strategy to defeat cyber-terrorism. At minimum, 
there should be consistency among the three basic elements of cyber-
terrorism and particularity about the type of effects included. 
2. United Nations Definition of Cyber-Terrorism 
An internationally consistent definition should also be sought. 
Although not the focus of this Article, it is useful to examine how the 
United Nations (U.N.) has defined cyber-terrorism. The UN Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force ("CTITF"), although not 
explicitly using the term cyber-terrorism, recognizes that one of the 
ways a terrorist organization may make "[u]se of the Internet to 
perform terrorist attacks [is] by remotely altering information on 
165. William L. Tafoya, Cyber Terror, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Nov. 
2011, at 2. 
166. Id. at 2-3. 
167. Id. 
168. See Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian: Cybersecurity 
and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465, 476 (2011). 
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computer systems or disrupting the flow of data between computer 
systems. "169 The CTITF goes on to explain: 
[A]ny cyber attack qualifying as 'terrorist' would ultimately still 
have to cause damage in the 'real world': for example, by 
interfering with a critical infrastructure system to the extent of 
causing loss of life or severe property damage. However, as 
dependence on online data and services increases, an attack that 
resulted only in widespread interruption of the Internet could, 
in future, cause sufficient devastation to qualify as a terrorist 
attack. However, categorizing such attacks as terrorist remains 
controversial. The damage resulting from such attacks, while 
potentially economically significant, to date their impact has 
been more on the level of a serious annoyanceY0 
This definition, while a bit unwieldy, does an excellent job of 
including both violent attacks and attacks on data that are serious 
enough to rise to the level of terrorism. This definition, however, fails 
to address the element of intent and does not include a non-state 
actor requirement. 
3. Academic Definitions 
Most academic interest in large-scale CNA tends to focus on 
cyber-warfare and the involvement of state actors. This is logical 
given the greater size and resources of governments such as China, 
Russia and the United States. Some prominent cyber-security 
e~pert~, however, have focused on cyber-terrorism: the possibility of 
large scale CNA by non-state actors. One of the earliest and most 
widely cited academic descriptions of cyber-terrorism comes from 
security-expert Dorothy Denning: 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. 
It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats 
of attack against computers, networks, and the information 
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government 
or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough 
harm to ·generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily 
injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe 
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against 
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, 
169. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, CTITF 
Working Group Report: Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist 
Purposes 8 (Feb. 2009). 
170. Id. at 9. 
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dep~nding on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential 
services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not. m 
~lt~ough it primarily . focuses on violent acts, Denning's 
descnpt10n does include attacks that cause severe economic loss.112 
She excludes at~ac~~ that are minor in nature, steering the definition 
towards more sigmficant attacks. 173 Non-violent attacks may also be 
cove~7~ by ~h~ P~~se "or at least cause enough harm to generate 
fear, . but it is difficult to draw clear guidelines from this statement. 
Dennmg also did not include whether the attacker must be a non-
state actor. Nevertheless, it is an excellent foundation from which to 
formulate a precise definition that meets the criteria of being broad 
enough to include unique CNA, such as attacks on data only, and 
narrow enough to exclude minor activist attacks. 
T~e Cen~,er for Strategic and International Studies defines cyber-
terr.onsm. as the use of computer network tools to shut down critical 
nat10n~l mfrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government 
operat10ns) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian 
pop_ulation. "175 This definition is both precise ("shut down critical 
national infrastructures") and vague ("coerce or intimidate 
gover_nment or civilian populace"). It fails to define what level of 
coerc10n or intimidation is required before the act goes from being a 
p~otest to an act of terrorism. Although the definition suggests a 
hi?her level of attac~ by explicitly including critical infrastructure, it 
fails to he more precise beyond that particular category. 
~n her article, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet 
Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a 
Deterren~, Kelly Gable provides a similar definition, including "efforts 
by terron~ts to u_se the_ Inte~net to hijack computer systems, bring 
do':n the mternat10nal financial system, or commit analogous terrorist 
act10ns in cyberspace. "176 Gable focuses on the international finance 
171. Cyberterrorism: Testimony before Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism 
Comm. on Armed Servs. Before U.S. H.R., (2000) (statement of 
Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown Univ.) available at 
http:(/www.cs.geo~g~t?wn.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html 
( arg_umg that a defm1t1on of cyber-terrorism should involve a component 
of v10lence or har~ing of critical infrastructure, and that, at the time, it 
was mostly theoretical but could arise in the future). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
Lewis, supra note 115. 175.' 
176. Kelly A. G~ble, Cyber-~pocaly'f!se Now: Securing the Internet Against 
Cyberterrorzsm and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent 43 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 62 (2010). ' 
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computer systems or disrupting the flow of data between computer 
systems. "169 The CTITF goes on to explain: 
[A]ny cyber attack qualifying as 'terrorist' would ultimately still 
have to cause damage in the 'real world': for example, by 
interfering with a critical infrastructure system to the extent of 
causing loss of life or severe property damage. However, as 
dependence on online data and services increases, an attack that 
resulted only in widespread interruption of the Internet could, 
in future, cause sufficient devastation to qualify as a terrorist 
attack. However, categorizing such attacks as terrorist remains 
controversial. The damage resulting from such attacks, while 
potentially economically significant, to date their impact has 
been more on the level of a serious annoyance.11° 
This definition, while a bit unwieldy, does an excellent job of 
including both violent attacks and attacks on data that are serious 
enough to rise to the level of terrorism. This definition, however, fails 
to address the element of intent and does not include a non-state 
actor requirement. 
3. Academic Definitions 
Most academic interest in large-scale CNA tends to focus on 
cyber-warfare and the involvement of state actors. This is logical 
given the greater size and resources of governments such as China, 
Russia and the United States. Some prominent cyber-security 
. ' experts, however, have focused on cyber-terrorism: the possibility of 
large scale CNA by non-state actors. One of the earliest and most 
widely cited academic descriptions of cyber-terrorism comes from 
security-expert Dorothy Denning: 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. 
It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats 
of attack against computers, networks, and the information 
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government 
or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough 
harm to · generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily 
injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe 
economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against 
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, 
169. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, CTITF 
Working Group Report: Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist 
Purposes 8 (Feb. 2009). 
170. Id. at 9. 
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dep~nding on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential 
services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not. m 
J~.lt~ough it . primarily . focuses on violent acts, Denning's 
description does mclude attacks that cause severe economic loss.172 
She excludes at~ac~~ that are minor in nature, steering the definition 
towards more sigmficant attacks. 173 Non-violent attacks may also be 
cove7,~~ by ~h~ p~~se "or at least cause enough harm to generate 
fear, . but it i~ difficult to draw clear guidelines from this statement. 
Dennmg also did not include whether the attacker must be a non-
state actor. Nevertheless, it is an excellent foundation from which to 
formulate a precise definition that meets the criteria of being broad 
enough to include unique CNA, such as attacks on data only, and 
narrow enough to exclude minor activist attacks. 
T~e Cen~,er for Strategic and International Studies defines cyber-
terronsm as the use of computer network tools to shut do ·t· 1 t· 1 · fr wn en ica 
na ion~ m astructures (such as energy, transportation, government 
operati~ns) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian 
pop_ulation._"175 This definition is both precise ("shut down critical 
national mfrastructures") and vague ("coerce or intimidate 
gover_nment or civilian populace"). It fails to define what level of 
coercion or intimidation is required before the act goes from being a 
p~otest to an act of terrorism. Although the definition suggests a 
hi?her level of attac~ by explicitly including critical infrastructure, it 
fails to be more. precise beyond that particular category. 
~n her article, ?yber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet 
Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a 
Deterren~, Kelly Gable provides a similar definition, including "efforts 
by terron~ts to u_se the Internet to hijack computer systems, bring 
do':n th_e mternational financial system, or comlnit analogous terrorist 
actions m cyberspace. "176 Gable focuses on the international finance 
171. 
172. 
173. 
Cyberterrorism: Testimony before Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism 
Comm. on Armed Servs. Before U.S. H.R., (2000) (statement of 
Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown Univ.) available at 
http:(/www.cs.geo~g~t?wn.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror.html 
(arg_iimg that a defi:i1t1on o~ ~yber-terrorism should involve a component 
of v10lence or harmmg of cnt1cal infrastructure and that at th t· ·t 
tl th 
· I ' , e rme, i 
was mos y eoret1ca but could arise in the future). 
Id. 
Id. 
174. Id. 
175. · Lewis, supra note 115. 
176. Kelly A. G~ble, Cyber-~pocaly'f!se Now: Securing the Internet Against 
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent 43 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 62 (2010). ' 
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system, as opposed to critical infrastructure, but also includes 
"analogous terrorist actions,"177 which suggests violent acts. This 
definition is useful because it identifies the need to include CNA, 
which causes drastic effects on financial systems in any definition. 
Susan Brenner, another noted cyber-security expert, posits a b~sic 
definition of cyber-terrorism, stating: "(g]enerically, cyberterronsm 
consists of using computer technology to engage in terrorist 
activity. "178 Recognizing the broad nature of this definition, Brenner 
expands on the definition in several important ways. Brenner 
excludes attacks that originate through the Internet, but have the 
result of large-scale destruction, which she terms as a "Weapon of 
Mass Destruction" attack.179 As an example, she provides a scenario 
of a cyber-terrorist hacking into a nuclear power plant an~ ca~~ing a 
Chernobyl-style meltdown.180 Although it seems counter-rntmt1ve to 
exclude this action from cyber-terrorism, Brenner argues that such an 
attack would primarily be remembered as a nuclear terrorist attack, 
not a cyber-attack, and therefore should not be considered an act of 
cyber-terrorism.181 Brenner argues that we do not define an att.ack 
that uses a car to deliver bombs to target cites as automot1ve-
terrorism. The logical follow on question is why define an attack that 
b . ?182 has a cyber-element as cy er-terronsm. 
While Brenner makes a good point that a CNA that produces 
violence is a "terrorist" attack in the traditional sense, there is still 
good reason to further classify it as a cyber-terrorist atta~k, 
particularly if government agencies will use this as a common work~ng 
definition. The definition needs a separate classification to gear policy 
makers and law enforcement towards appropriate methods of 
prevention and response. . 
Prevention of a traditional terrorist attack on a nuclear plant lS 
vastly different from a CN A, and will require different thought 
processes, security measures, and, as this Article later argues, c~anges 
to the law. Traditional attack prevention involves protect10n of 
physical security on the grounds surrounding the plant, whereas CNA 
prevention involves protection of the plant's infor~~tion systerr:s. 
Similarly, a law enforcement investigation of a trad1t10na~ terronst 
attack would require vastly different techniques and expertise than a 
CNA on that same plant~ In the automotive analogy, law 
177. Id. 
178. Brenner, supra note 19, at 386 (categorizing cyber-threats and focusing 
on attribution as the key ele.ment to be solved in battling those threats). 
179. Id. at 390-91. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 391. 
182. Id. 
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enforcement would use substantially the same techniques to 
investigate a physical bombing of a power station whether the bomber 
used a vehicle or a suicide vest to attack the station. However, the 
same could not be said if the attack was conducted through 
information systems. 
Brenner proposes a second category of cyber-terrorism, which she 
labels "Weapon of Mass Distraction. "183 This type of CNA would not 
result in violent, physical effects, but psychological effects that could 
undermine faith in government. 184 Brenner provides the example of a 
hacked news website that leads people to believe that there was a 
suitcase nuclear device on a city bus, leading to mass panic and 
possibly death. 185 This may be a more realistic scenario than the 
attack on the nuclear plant, given the lower level of sophistication 
required to complete such an attack. For example, in retaliation for 
airing a WikiLeaks documentary, the hacker group Lulzsec posted a 
news story on PBS that rapper Tupac Shakur was found alive several 
years after his actual death. 186 As seen above, cyber-terrorists can 
accomplish this type of attack completely through the Internet, unlike 
CNA against a nuclear plant, which would probably require 
introducing the attack from the inside.187 
Because of the lower level of sophistication required, Brenner 
views this type of attack as more than a theoretical possibility. As an 
increasing amount of information is relayed through Internet news 
outlets, Facebook, Twitter, instant messaging, and other Internet-
based sources, the potential panic that would likely result from a 
"weapons of mass distraction" attack is high. Any definition of cyber-
terrorism should include the major threat of causing the appearance 
of a terrorist attack through CNA. 
Brenner's final cyber-terrorism category is a "Weapon of Mass 
D. t· " 188 Th. f rnrup 10n. lS type o attack uses CNA against infrastructure 
components, such as an electrical grid or gas supply. 189 The cyber-
terrorist's goal would likely be to undermine the populace's faith in 
183. Id. at 391-93. 
184. Id. at 391. 
185. Id. at 392. 
186. See Kevin Poulsen, Hacktivists Scorch PBS in Retaliation for WikiLeaks 
Documentary, WIRED (May 30, 2011, 3:29 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/lulzsec/. 
187. See Plant Security, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/ 
keyiss~e~/safetyandsecurity /plantsecurity / (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) 
( descnbrng nuclear plant operations as isolated from the Internet and 
other networks). 
188. Brenner, supra note 19, at 393-95. 
189. Id. 
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system, as opposed to critical infrastructure, ?ut also includ~s 
"analogous terrorist actions, "177 which suggests v10lent acts. This 
definition is useful because it identifies the need to include CNA, 
which causes drastic effects on financial systems in any definition. 
Susan Brenner another noted cyber-security expert, posits a basic 
' . definition of cyber-terrorism, stating: "[g]enerically, cyberterronsm 
consists of using computer technology to engage in terrorist 
activity. "178 Recognizing the broad nature of this definition, Brenner 
expands on the definition in several important ways. Brenner 
excludes attacks that originate through the Internet, but have the 
result of large-scale destruction, which she terms as a "Weapon of 
Mass Destruction" attack. 179 As an example, she provides a scenario 
of a cyber-terrorist hacking into a nuclear power plant an~ ca~~ing a 
Chernobyl-style meltdown.180 Although it seems counter-mtmtive to 
exclude this action from cyber-terrorism, Brenner argues that such an 
attack would primarily be remembered as a nuclear terrorist attack, 
not a cyber-attack, and therefore should not be considered an act of 
cyber-terrorism.181 Brenner argues that we do not define an att.ack 
that uses a car to deliver bombs to target cites as automotive-
terrorism. The logical follow on question is why define an attack that 
b . ?182 has a cyber-element as cy er-terronsm. 
While Brenner makes a good point that a CNA that produces 
violence is a "terrorist" attack in the traditional sense, there is still 
good reason to further classify it as a cyber-terrorist atta~k, 
particularly if government agencies will use this as a common wor~ng 
definition. The definition needs a separate classification to gear policy 
makers and law enforcement towards appropriate methods of 
prevention and response. . 
Prevention of a traditional terrorist attack on a nuclear plant is 
vastly different from a CNA, and will require different thought 
processes, security measures, and, as this Article later argues, c~anges 
to the law. Traditional attack prevention involves protection of 
physical security on the grounds surrounding the plant, whereas CNA 
prevention involves protection of the plant's inforn:~tion systen;s. 
Similarly, a law enforcement investigation of a traditiona~ terronst 
attack would require vastly different techniques and expertise than a 
CNA on that same plant~ In the automotive analogy, law 
177. Id. 
178. Brenner, supra note 19, at 386 (categorizing cyber-threats and focusing 
on attribution as the key ele.ment to be solved in battling those threats). 
179. Id. at 390-91. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 391. 
182. Id. 
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enforcement would use substantially the same techniques to 
investigate a physical bombing of a power station whether the bomber 
used a vehicle or a suicide vest to attack the station. However, the 
same could not be said if the attack was conducted through 
information systems. 
Brenner proposes a second category of cyber-terrorism, which she 
labels "Weapon of Mass Distraction. "183 This type of CNA would not 
result in violent, physical effects, but psychological effects that could 
undermine faith in government. 184 Brenner provides the example of a 
hacked news website that leads people to believe that there was a 
suitcase nuclear device on a city bus, leading to mass panic and 
possibly death. 185 This may be a more realistic scenario than the 
attack on the nuclear plant, given the lower level of sophistication 
required to complete such an attack. For example, in retaliation for 
airing a WikiLeaks documentary, the hacker group Lulzsec posted a 
news story on PBS that rapper Tupac Shakur was found alive several 
years after his actual death. 186 As seen above, cyber-terrorists can 
accomplish this type of attack completely through the Internet, unlike 
CNA against a nuclear plant, which would probably require 
introducing the attack from the inside. 187 
Because of the lower level of sophistication required, Brenner 
views this type of attack as more than a theoretical possibility. As an 
increasing amount of information is relayed through Internet news 
outlets, Facebook, Twitter, instant messaging, and other Internet-
based sources, the potential panic that would likely result from a 
"weapons of mass distraction" attack is high. Any definition of cyber-
terrorism should include the major threat of causing the appearance 
of a terrorist attack through CNA. 
Brenner's final cyber-terrorism category is a "Weapon of Mass 
D. t· " 188 Th. f ISrup 10n. is type o attack uses CNA against infrastructure 
components, such as an electrical grid or gas supply. 189 The cyber-
terrorist 's goal would likely be to undermine the populace's faith in 
183. Id. at 391-93. 
184. Id. at 391. 
185. Id. at 392. 
186. See Kevin Poulsen, Hacktivists Scorch PBS in Retaliation for WikiLeaks 
Documentary, WIRED (May 30, 2011, 3:29 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/lulzsec/. 
187. See Plant Security, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/ 
keyiss~e~/safetyandsecurity /plantsecurity / (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) 
( descnbmg nuclear plant operations as isolated from the Internet and 
other networks). 
188. Brenner, supra note 19, at 393-95. 
189. Id. 
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government by interrupting essential services.190 Brenner sees this as 
a more realistic possibility than an attack that solely produces violent, 
catastrophic effects. 191 These types of attacks have been attempted 
with limited success, though they have yet to cause widespread fear or 
panic.192 However, this type of attack seems a different scale from the 
type of attack included in the "Weapon of Mass Destruction" 
category. If a hacker could shut down the gas supply, then certainly 
that same hacker could overload the gas supply and cause an 
explosion. 
Overall, Brenner's point was that cyber-terrorism should not be 
treated as war, for the greatest potential harms from cyber-terrorism 
were either too theoretical or straightforward terrorism, but should 
instead be treated as crime. 193 This framework changed following the 
9 /11 attacks, as terrorist attacks have become a legal category unto 
themselves, and the response has included participation by 
intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the military. The threats 
posed by terrorism have prompted the passage of new laws and the 
development of new law enforcement techniques in cyber-space.194 If 
it is possible that a cyber-terrorist attack could seriously undermine a 
citizenry's faith in government, as Brenner suggests, then policy 
makers should identify cyber-terrorism as unique from cyber-crime, 
and devote serious attention to prevention and response. 
E. Categories of Computer Network Attack 
If cyber-terrorism is to be recognized as a unique type of CNA, it 
is important to distinguish it from other types of CNA. CNA has 
several sub-categories that this Article will distinguish by using three 
factors: damage done to the target information system, motivation of 
the attack, and identity of the attacker. The attack can be 
categorized and response options determined by identifying each of 
the three factors in a particular attack. 
190. Id. at 393-94 (describing how generally terrorists' goal is not to destroy 
but to demoralize). 
191. Id. at 394 (stating that urbanized societies are more vulnerable to 
terrorism aimed at demoralization). 
192. See, e.g., Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks, 
REGISTER. (Oct. 31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (describing a cyber-
attack that caused annoyance, and stink, but caused little fear or serious 
damage). 
193. Brenner, supra note 19, at 398. 
194. See Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(2011), http://www.dhs.gov/safeguarding-and-securing-cyberspace 
(citing the progress made by the U.S. to defend and mitigate attacks 
since the 9/llattacks). 
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1. Cyber-crime 
This Article defines a cyber-crime as any level of CNA, conducted 
by any party, for any purpose that is considered illegal under 
domestic or international law. This sub-category is the broadest 
within CNA and includes every type of CNA outside those that occur 
in an armed conflict and do not violate the laws of war. Under U.S. 
domestic law, it is essentially any act that violates the CF AA. 
Cy?e:-.crirr:es need not have an information system as a target, as 
the defm1t10n mcludes those attacks simply using information systems 
as a tool. A current definition in use by the Computer Crime 
Research Center defines cyber-crime as "crimes committed on the 
Internet using the computer as either a tool or a targeted victim. "195 
Although this Article argues a CNA does not have to be conducted 
through use of the Internet, this definition accurately reflects that 
information systems can be used to effectuate an attack and not just 
serve as the target. Those perpetrating CNAs frequently use means 
other than the Internet to access information systems. 196 The Stuxnet 
virus, for ex~mple, is thought to have spread to information systems 
through an mfected removable drive, as the target system was not 
connected to the Internet. 197 This is important for a discussion of 
cyber-terrorism because many critical infrastructure components are 
not connected to outside networks as a security measure and must be 
accessed through another means. 
2. Cyber-espionage 
Cyber-espionage is a type of CNA by a state actor or government 
contractor, with the purpose of collecting intelligence against another 
state, which causes minimal damage or disruption to the information 
system. This definition does not incorporate non-national security 
rel~te~ corporate espionage, as that is a more traditional cyber-crime. 
This IS not to say that corporate espionage does not have national 
security implications. According to the DoD: 
Every year, an amount of intellectual property larger than that 
contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks 
maintained by U.S. businesses, .universities, and government 
departments and agencies. As military strength ultimately 
depends on economic vitality, sustained intellectual property 
195. Aghatise E. Joseph, Cybercrime Definition, COMPUTER. CRIME RES. CTR.. 
(June 28, 2006), http://www.crime-research.org/articles/joseph06. 
196. See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 107. 
197. See id.; see also William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, 
Israel Tests Called Crucial In Iran Nuclear Setback, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2011, at Al (describing how Stuxnet spread and was solved). 
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government by interrupting essential services.190 Brenner sees ~his as 
a more realistic possibility than an attack that solely produces v10lent, 
catastrophic effects. 191 These types of attacks have been attempted 
with limited success, though they have yet to cause widespread fear or 
panic.192 However, this type of attack seems a different scale from_ th~ 
type of attack included in the "Weapon of Mass Destruct10n 
category. If a hacker could shut down the gas supply, then certainly 
that same hacker could overload the gas supply and cause an 
explosion. . 
Overall, Brenner's point was that cyber-terronsm should not_ be 
treated as war, for the greatest potential harms from cyber-terronsm 
were either too theoretical or straightforward terrorism, but should 
instead be .treated as crime.193 This framework changed following the 
9/11 attacks, as terrorist attacks have become a legal ~a~ego_ry unto 
themselves, and the response has included partic1pat10n by 
intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the military. The threats 
posed by terrorism have prompted the passage of new laws and the 
development of new law enforcement techniques i~ cyber-space. 1~4 If 
it is possible that a cyber-terrorist attack could senously undermm~ a 
citizenry's faith in government, as Brenner suggests, then p~hcy 
makers should identify cyber-terrorism as unique from cyber-cnme, 
and devote serious attention to prevention and response. 
E. Categories of Computer Network Attack 
If cyber-terrorism is to be recognized as a unique type of CNA, it 
is important to distinguish it from other types of CNA. ?NA has 
several sub-categories that this Article will distinguish by u~mg. three 
factors: damage done to the target information system, mot1vat10n of 
the attack and identity of the attacker. The attack can be 
categorized' and response options determined by identifying each of 
the three factors in a particular attack. 
190. 
191. 
192. 
193. 
194. 
Id. at 393-94 (describing how generally terrorists' goal is not to destroy 
but to demoralize). 
Id. at 394 (stating that urbanized societies are more vulnerable to 
terrorism aimed at demoralization). _ 
See, e.g., Tony Smith, Hacker jailed for revenge sewage attacks, 
REGISTER (Oct. 31, 2001, 3:55 PM), http://www.theregis~e~.co.uk/ 
2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage/ (descnbmg a cy?er-
attack that caused annoyance, and stink, but caused little fear or serious 
damage). 
Brenner, supra note 19, at 398. 
See Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(2011), http://www.dhs.gov/safeguarding-and-secur~~g-cyberspace 
(citing the progress made by the U.S. to defend and mitigate attacks 
since the 9/llattacks). 
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196. 
197. 
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losses erode both U.S. military effectiveness and national 
competitiveness in the global economy. 198 
However, the tools for dealing with traditional criminal actions, 
such as corporate espionage, diverge sharply from counter-intelligence. 
Cyber-espionage also does not incorporate a CNA by a state ac~or 
that causes more than minor damage or degradation to a foreign 
network as this would be classified as an armed attack in cyberspace. 
Whethe; or not an armed attack in cyberspace rises to the level of an 
act of war is a complicated calculus that has received considerable 
analysis from government sources and academics alike. 199 However, 
foreign governments routinely deny that they participate in armed 
attacks in cyberspace, as it is generally condemned as an unacceptable 
practice. 20° Cyber-espionage, on the other hand, is a generally 
internationally acceptable as a form of espionage, and presents a 
rising national security concern. 201 Cyber-espionage is neither clearly 
condoned nor explicitly allowed by interna~ional law,202 but could be 
considered a covert action, which is generally prohibited by a state's 
national law.203 States criminalize spying under domestic laws and 
198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 
203. 
Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, DEP'T OF 
DEF. 4 (2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf. 
See, e.g., Jorge Benitez, When is a cyberattack an act of war? ATLANTIC 
COUNCIL (Nov. 6, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.acus.org/natosource/ 
when-cyberattack-act-war ("If the physical consequences of a 
cyberattack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a ?omb or 
firing a missile would, that cyberattack should equally be considered a 
use of force." If an attack reaches those levels, then a nation has a right 
to act in self-defense."). 
See, e.g., Estonia hit by 'Moscow cyber war', BBC (May 17, 2~07, 3.:21 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm . (discussmg 
Russian denial of involvement in CN As, despite the belief of many 
experts that the Russian Government does partake in CNAs). 
See Chinese step up computer espionage against United States, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/~008/11/20/ . 
world/americas/20iht-spy.4.18006075.html (reportmg on a congressi?~al 
committee looking into the dramatic rise in online theft of sensitive 
information by the Chinese Government). 
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at t~e 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law m 
Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012) (stating the U.S. Government's position is 
that international law applies to cyber-space, but that "this view has 
not been universal in the international community"). 
U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign 
Intelligence, Part 5: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 94th Cong. 1730 (1975) (defining a covert action as "any 
clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, 
organizations or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy, conducted in 
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apply it to any individual spies they catch. 204 However, in the case of 
cyber-espionage, the chances of apprehension are remote because 
states can engage in it without physically locating agents in a foreign 
nation. 
One of the best examples of cyber-espionage was the cyber-
esp.ionage ring known as "Titan Rain. "205 Discovered in 2003, 
websites in China targeted unclassified networks in the DoD and 
other federal agencies. 206 The attacks were eventually traced to the 
province of Guangdong, but never definitively traced to the Chinese 
government.207 Included in the information stolen were schematics for 
NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, a huge collection of files from 
Redstone Arsenal, which is home to the Army A viatiou and Missile 
Command, and Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by 
the Army and Air Force.208 Alan Faller, the director of the SANS 
Institute, an education and research organization focusing on cyber-
security, stated that, based upon the techniques used, the cyber-spies 
were working for the Chinese military.209 These attacks, however, 
were not aimed at disrupting the operation of U.S. Government 
networks; they were simply aimed at obtaining information.210 Had 
they disrupted the networks to a large degree, their actions would be 
categorized as an armed attack in cyberspace. 
such manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not 
apparent"). 
204. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 792 (2006). 
205. See Keating, supra note 93 (describing Titan Rain as one of the ten 
worst cyber-attacks). 
206. See Bradley Graham, Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al (describing how Chinese websites have 
"successfully breached hundreds of unclassified networks"). 
207. See Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies, TIME 
(Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.time.com/time/printout/ 
0,8816,1098961,00.html (reporting that a civilian, Shawn Carpenter, was 
able to track the spies to Guangdong while working as a computer 
security analyst for Sandia National Laboratories). 
208. Id. 
209. Anthony Townsend, Hacker Attacks in US Linked to Chinese Military, 
BREITBART (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.mail-
archive.com/ telecom-cities@forums.nyu.edu/ msg00357 .html (arguing 
that the attacks "have been traced to the Chinese province of 
Guangdong" and due to the techniques used it is "unlikely to come from 
any other source other than the military"). 
210. Cf. id. (describing the information that was probed, but not noting any 
disruption of operations). 
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information by the Chinese Government). 
202. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in 
Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 2012) (stating the U.S. Government's position is 
that international law applies to cyber-space, but that "this view has 
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203. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign 
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apply it to any individual spies they catch. 204 However, in the case of 
cyber-espionage, the chances of apprehension are remote because 
states can engage in it without physically locating agents in a foreign 
nation. 
. One of the best examples of cyber-espionage was the cyber-
espionage ring known as "Titan Rain. "205 Discovered in 2003, 
websites in China targeted unclassified networks in the DoD and 
other federal agencies.206 The attacks were eventually traced to the 
province of Guangdong, but never definitively traced to the Chinese 
government.207 Included in the information stolen were schematics for 
NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, a huge collection of files from 
Redstone Arsenal, which is home to the Army A viatiou and Missile 
Command, and Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by 
the Army and Air Force.208 Alan Paller, the director of the SANS 
Institute, an education and research organization focusing on cyber-
security, stated that, based upon the techniques used, the cyber-spies 
were working for the Chinese military.209 These attacks, however, 
were not aimed at disrupting the operation of U.S. Government 
networks; they were simply aimed at obtaining information.210 Had 
they disrupted the networks to a large degree, their actions would be 
categorized as an armed attack in cyberspace. 
such manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not 
apparent"). 
204. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 792 (2006). 
205. See Keating, supra note 93 (describing Titan Rain as one of the ten 
worst cyber-attacks). 
206. See Bradley Graham, Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al (describing how Chinese websites have 
"successfully breached hundreds of unclassified networks"). 
207. See Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies, TIME 
(Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.time.com/time/printout/ 
0,8816,1098961,00.html (reporting that a civilian, Shawn Carpenter, was 
able to track the spies to Guangdong while working as a computer 
security analyst for Sandia National Laboratories). 
208. Id. 
209. Anthony Townsend, Hacker Attacks in US Linked to Chinese Military, 
BREITBART (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.mail-
archive.com/ telecom-cities@forums.nyu.edu/ msg00357 .html (arguing 
that the attacks "have been traced to the Chinese province of 
Guangdong" and due to the techniques used it is "unlikely to come from 
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210. Cf. id. (describing the information that was probed, but not noting any 
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3. Armed Attack in Cyberspace 
An armed attack in cyberspace is a CNA by or at the direction of 
a state actor that causes more than minor destruction, damage, or 
degradation to an information system itself, or anything outside the 
information system as a result of the CN A through the use of an 
information system.211 This term is often equated with cyber-warfare 
and is defined by Susan Brenner as follows: 
Cyberwarfare is the conduct of military operations by vir~ual 
means. It consists of nation-states' using cyberspace to achieve 
the same ends that they pursue through the use of conventional 
military force: achieving advantages over a competing nation-
state or preventing a competing nation-state from achieving 
advantages over them. 212 
This close alliance with warfare has led to questioning of what 
kind of CNA would rise to the level of "use _of force" and trigger law 
of war considerations.213 The DoD provides a vague standard, "[a]s in 
the physical world, a determination of what ·is a 'threat or use of 
force' in cyberspace must be made in the context in which the activity 
occurs, and it. involves an analysis by the affected states of the effect 
and purpose of the actions in question. "214 Charles Dunlap, former 
Deputy Staff Judge Advocate of the Air Force and .currei:t law 
Professor argues that a CNA resulting in violent effects is eqmvalent 
' f f 215 A to an armed attack and therefore constitutes a use o orce. s 
such CNA that results.in violent effects should, according to Dunlap, 
be ~overned by the conduct of state actors just as in traditional 
warfare under the laws of war. 216 However, rarely have states 
acknowledged any role in cyber-warfare outside of actions taken 
211. See Brenner, supra note 19, at 401 (stating how. cyber-warf~re ~s l~ke 
traditional warfare in that it consists of nation-states ach1evmg 
advantages over a competing nation-state"). 
212. Id. 
213. See generally Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Perspectives for Cyber Strategists 
on Law for Cyberwar, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, at ~1-:-99 
(arguing that the laws comprising the Law of Armed Conflict as ex1stmg 
are adequate to deal with the new development of cyber-warfare). 
214. DEP'T OF DEF., CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 
PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2011, SECTION 934, 9 (Nov. 2011). 
215. Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL 
ST. J., May 31, 2011, at Al (arguing that cyber attacks "that have a 
violent effect are the legal equivalent of armed attacks"). 
216. Id. 
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during a declared conflict,217 because most actions that are taken by 
governments in this area are more precisely defined as covert actions. 
A classic example of a covert action in cyberspace is the infiltration of 
the Stuxnet computer virus against Iran; assuming that, as most 
analysts suspect, it was launched by a nation state. 218 This Article 
identifies these. types of cyber-attacks as armed attacks in cyberspace. 
A good example of armed attack in cyberspace is the 2008 conflict 
between Russia and Georgia. 219 The conflict was over a province of 
Georgia, South Ossetia, which sought independence. 220 The Russian 
government backed the separatists, and on August 8, 2008, the two 
sides clashed militarily. 221 The Georgians were pushed out of South 
Ossetia on August 10, after two days of fighting. 222 As the physical 
military conflict was taking place, a shadow conflict was taking place 
on the Internet. According to Georgian officials, Russian state-
sponsored hackers launched an extensive CNA campaign against 
Georgian Government websites.223 The websites of Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakashvili, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Defense were all forced offline as part of the attack.224 
This CNA was unique in that it occurred in conjunction with a 
larger military campaign. Although the CNA did not appear to 
affect the military operations, it did suppress the Georgian 
government's ability to spread information to both its people and 
those abroad. 225 This event likely foretells the increasingly large role 
that cyber-warfare will play in future military conflicts. 
217. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT 
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 47-48, 69 
(2010) (Reprint ed. 2011) (describing the use of armed attack in 
cyberspace by the U.S. Air Force in the Iraq War). 
218. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (discussing why the virus 
is likely of Israeli origin. 
219. Peter Finn, A Two-Sided Descent Into Full-Scale War, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 17, 2008, at Al. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Asher Moses, Georgian Websites Forced Offline in "Cyber War," 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/ 
news /technology/ georgian-websites-forced-·offline-in-cy ber-
war /2008/08/12/1218306848654.html (discussing how the central 
government site was and the President's site had been moved to U.S. 
servers). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
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affect the military operations, it did suppress the Georgian 
government's ability to spread information to both its people and 
those abroad. 225 This event likely foretells the increasingly large role 
that cyber-warfare will play in future military conflicts. 
217. See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT 
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 47-48, 69 
(2010) (Reprint ed. 2011) (describing the use of armed attack in 
cyberspace by the U.S. Air Force in the Iraq War). 
218. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (discussing why the virus 
is likely of Israeli origin. 
219. Peter Finn, A Two-Sided Descent Into Full-Scale War, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 17, 2008, at Al. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Asher Moses, Georgian Websites Forced Offline in "Cyber War," 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/ 
news /technology/ georgian-websites-forced-·offline-in-cyber-
war /2008/08/12 /1218306848654.html (discussing how the central 
government site was and the President's site had been moved to U.S. 
servers). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
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4. Hacktivism 
If these attacks had been conducted by civilians and had occurred 
completely outside a military conflict, how should the perpetrators be 
categorized? The answer would likely be as "hacktivists." 
"Hacktivism" is often confused with cyber-terrorism, given that what 
distinguishes the two is, in some ways, only a matter of degree.226 
The term was coined by a group of hackers called the Cult of the 
Dead Cow, who wished to use computer hacking to foster human 
rights and free expression.227 These groups are non-state actors who 
conduct politically motivated CNAs.228 However, the level of these 
attacks is relatively minor, and do not cause effects traditionally 
associated with terrorism, such as fear or panic in the civilian 
populace, affect national security, or damage to critical 
infrastructure.229 Although these groups do commit crimes, hacktivist 
· groups are primarily distinguished from most cyber-criminals by their 
motivations.230 They are motivated by a desire to change a policy, 
practice or mode of thinking, as opposed to monetary gain or other 
traditional criminal motivation.231 Hacktivists have participated in 
numerous CNAs, opposing, or favoring, various groups or causes, such 
as attacks on Visa and MasterCard,232 and supporting WikiLeaks.233 
226. See Jay Dioxy Riboz, The Difference Between Hacktivism and Cyber 
Terrorism, INFOBARREL TECH. (Dec. 18, 2009), 
http://www.infobarrel.com/The_Difference_Between_Hacktivism_and 
_ Cyberterrorism (explaining that hacktivism is a "fusion of hacking and 
activism; politics and technology .... Cyber terrorism, on the other 
hand, is a computer-based attack or threat of attack"). 
227. See Michelle Delio, Hacktivism and How It Got Here, WIRED (July 14, 
2004), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2004/07 /64193. 
228. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-10-230T, CYBERSECURITY: 
CONTINUED EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
FR.OM EVOLVING THREATS 4 (2009), (statement . of Gregory C. 
Wilshusen, Dir. Info. Sec. Issues and David A. Powner, Dir. Info. Mgmt. 
Issues) [hereinafter GAO CYBER.SECUR.ITY STATEMENT]. 
229. See generally Karson K. Thompson, Note, Not Like an Egyptian: 
Cybersecurity and the Internet Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX L. REV. 465, 
476 (2011) (defining and providing examples of hacktivism). 
230. Id. 
231. See GAO CYBER.SECUR.ITY, supra note 228, at 4. 
232. Anonymous hacktivists say Wikileaks war to continue, BBC NEWS (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2010, 4:10 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11935539 (reporting that Visa 
and MasterCard were hit with denial of service attacks after they 
withdrew their services from Wikileaks). 
233. Peter Ludlow, WikiLeaks and Hacktivist Culture, THE NATION, Oct. 4, 
2010, at 25 (discussing the prominence of Wikileaks in the hacktivist 
sub-culture). 
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Hacktivism is certainly a growing phenomenon, 234 but given the 
limited nature of the attacks as defined, it is probably not a major 
threa~ ~o national security.235 However, if the damage caused by 
hacktiv1sts were to substantially increase and pose a threat to 
national security, then hacktivism would rise to the level of cyber-
terrorism. 236 
One of the largest hacktivist operations seen to date was termed 
the "50 days of Lulz. "237 In 2011, a group of hackers going by the 
name of Lulz, or Lulzsec, engaged in a concentrated number of 
CNA.238 For example, in May 2011, the popular PBS news show 
"Frontline" aired a show on Wikileaks that Lulz disagreed with.239 In 
response, Lulz hacked into the PBS website and posted a fake news 
story about Tupac Shakur being alive in New Zealand. 240 
Addi~ionally, the group took down the Central Intelligence Agency's 
website and released the personal information of millions of Sony 
PlayStation users.241 At least one leader of Lulz, known as Topiary, 
was arrested in the Shetland Islands.242 The CNA conducted by Lulz 
was certainly serious, particularly the release of the Sony PlayStation 
user data. However, in the age of Face book, it is a stretch to argue 
that publicly releasing personal data constitutes terrorism. Just as 
definitions of terrorism require that the act's effects rise to a certain 
level, so should a definition of cyber-terrorism in excluding these acts 
of hacktivism. 
5. Terrorist Use of the Internet 
When most people think of terrorist use of the Internet, they do 
not think of taking down the electric grid through a cyber-attack; 
234. John P. Mello, Jr., Hacktivism Trumps Money as Motivation for Denial-
of-Service Attacks, PCWOR.LD (Feb. 7, 2012, 8:50 AM), 
http:/ (w~.pcworld.com/article/249442/hacktivism_trumps_money_a 
s_mot1vat1on_for_denialofservice_attacks.html (stating that 
hacktivism is the most widespread motivation for Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks on the Internet). 
235. See Lewis, supra note 115. 
236. See Riboz, supra note 226. 
237. See Keating, supra note 93. 
238. Id. 
239. See Poulsen, supra note 186. 
240. Id. 
241. See Keating, supra note 93. 
242. Josh Halliday, Charles Arthur & James Ball LulzSec hacking suspect 
'Topiary' arreste~, THE GUARDIAN (July' 27, 2011, 5:02 PM), 
http:/ /www.guardian.co.uk/technology /2011/jul/27 /lulzsec-hacking-
suspect-topiary-arrested. 
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231. See GAO CYBERSECURITY, supra note 228, at 4. 
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PlayStation users. 241 At least one leader of Lulz, known as Topiary, 
was arrested in the Shetland Islands.242 The CNA conducted by Lulz 
was certainly serious, particularly the release of the Sony PlayStation 
user data. However, in the age of Face book, it is a stretch to argue 
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definitions of terrorism require that the act's effects rise to a certain 
level, so should a definition of cyber-terrorism in excluding these acts 
of hacktivism. 
5. Terrorist Use of the Internet 
When most people think of terrorist use of the Internet, they do 
not think of taking down the electric grid through a cyber-attack; 
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240. Id. 
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instead, they picture Al-Qaeda posting a video online or other 
promotion measures.243 Terrorist organization presence on the 
Internet has thus far been dominated by using the Internet for 
planning, coordination, propaganda, and recruitment, which is what 
this Article defines as "terrorist use of the Internet. "244 One of the 
earliest terrorist organizations to realize the potential of the Internet 
was Al-Qaeda, and it quickly became one of its most effective 
resources in becoming an international terrorist organization.245 
Former chief of the CIA unit that tracked Osama Bin Laden, Michael 
Scheuer, stated a terrorist organization's use of the Internet "erodes 
the ability of our security services to hit them when they're most 
vulnerable, when they're moving. "246 In a similar thought, State 
Department counter-terrorism expert Dennis Pluchinsky finds the 
global jihad movement has become a '"'[w]eb-directed" 
phenomenon. "247 
Cyberspace is an ideal platform upon which to communicate and 
coordinate activities. Its speed, simplicity, ease of access, and 
anonymity makes it difficult to monitor and control.248 There are also 
reports that terrorist organizations have turned to traditional cyber-
crimes such as theft and fraud to raise funds. 249 Some experts believe 
243. See Eben Kaplan, Terrorists and the Internet, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-
technology /terrorists-internet/p10005 (discussing the advantages the 
Internet offers terrorist organizations and how they use it). 
244. See GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET 25 (2006) (discussing 
how modern terrorist organizations exploit the Internet to raise funds, 
recruit members, plan and launch attacks, and publicize their results); 
see also Benjamin R. Davis, Note, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating 
Terrorist Exploitation of the Internet with the Rule of Law and 
Improved Tools for Cyb er Governance, 15 COMMLA W CONSPECTUS 119, 
129 (2006-2007) (arguing the U.S. and foreign governments, as well as 
international bodies like ICANN, have failed to adequately respond to 
the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations). 
245. Steve Coll & Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of 
Operations, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/ content/ article/2005 /08/05 / AR2005080501138.html (charting Al 
Qaeda's migration from operating primarily in real space to operating in 
cyberspace). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. See WEIMANN, supra note 244, at 25. 
249. Jon Swartz, Terrorists' use of Internet spreads, USA TODAY (Updated 
Feb. 21, 2005, 12:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/ 
industries /technology /2005-02-20-cyber-terror-usat_x.htm (citing 
examples of terrorists organizations using fraud on the internet to 
finance operations). 
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that such activities are the extent of many terrorist organization's 
capabilities without a state sponsor, or an influx of highly trained 
computer personnel.250 Others, including the FBI, believe Al-Qaeda 
may try some act of cyber-terrorism.251 Either way, international 
terrorist organizations have learned the power of the Internet and are 
willing to use it in creative ways to accomplish their objectives. 
However, using information systems as a tool to further an 
organization's objectives is distinctly different from using those 
information systems as a weapon of terror. Al-Qaeda does not need 
to write malicious code or manipulate SCADA systems to help 
organize and fund the organization or to spread propaganda. The two 
categories will certainly connect in some ways, but the tools needed to 
counter them are fundamentally different. 
Having defined cyber-terrorism, examined the elements of that 
definition, and distinguished it from other types of CNA, the next 
Section of this Article will examine examples of major acts of CNA to 
determine whether those attacks could be appropriately categorized as 
cyber-terrorism. 
SECTION Ill. RECENT EXAMPLES OF COMPUTER NETWORK 
ATTACK 
"CIA TANGO DOWN"252 
This Section examines several recent major examples of CNA to 
determine if they should be classified as cyber-terrorism. Specifically, 
this Section examines the effects, motives, and targets of the 
perpetrators of CNA, measuring them against the elements set out in 
the definition of cyber-terrorism. 
A. Anonymous 
Anonymous is a:ri affiliation of hackers who have conducted an 
increasingly large number of attacks since the group's origin around 
250. Mark Ward, Cyber terrorism 'overhyped', BBC (Mar. 14, 2003, 2:01 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology /2850541.stm. (stating the 
belief of several security experts that would-be online terrorists lack the 
technical expertise and resources to engage in cyber-terrorism). 
251. Cybersecurity: Preventing Terrorist Attacks and Protecting Privacy 
Rights in Cyberspace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and 
Homeland Sec. of the Sen. Comm. On the Judiciary, lllth Cong. 2 
(2009) (statement of Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Ass't. Dir., Cyber 
Division, Fed. Bureau of Investigation). 
252. Anonymous (YourAnonNews), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:25 
PM), https://twitter.com/YourAnonNews/status/168068014758039552. 
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243. 
244. 
245. 
See Eben Kaplan, Ter'rorists and the Internet, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-
technology /terrorists-internet/p10005 (discussing the advantages the 
Internet offers terrorist organizations and how they use it). 
See GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET 25 (2006) (discussing 
how modern terrorist organizations exploit the Internet to raise funds, 
recruit members, plan and launch attacks, and publicize their results); 
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the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations). 
Steve Coll & Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of 
Operations, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- . 
dyn/ content/ article/2005 /08/05 / AR2005080501138.html ( chartm? ~l 
Qaeda's migration from operating primarily in real space to operatmg m 
cyberspace). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. See WEIMANN, supra note 244, at 25. 
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that such activities are the extent of many terrorist organization's 
capabilities without a state sponsor, or an influx of highly trained 
computer personnel. 250 Others, including the FBI, believe Al-Qaeda 
may try some act of cyber-terrorism.251 Either way, international 
terrorist organizations have learned the power of the Internet and are 
willing to use it in creative ways to accomplish their objectives. 
However, using information systems as a tool to further an 
organization's objectives is distinctly different from using those 
information systems as a weapon of terror. Al-Qaeda does not need 
to w~ite malicious code or manipulate SCADA systems to help 
orgamze and fund the organization or to spread propaganda. The two 
categories will certainly connect in some ways, but the tools needed to 
counter them are fundamentally different. 
Having defined cyber-terrorism, examined the elements of that 
definition, and distinguished it from other types of CNA, the next 
Section of this Article will examine examples of major acts of CNA to 
determine whether those attacks could be appropriately categorized as 
cyber-terrorism. . 
SECTION Ill. RECENT EXAMPLES OF COMPUTER NETWORK 
ATTACK 
"CIA TANGO DOWN"252 
This Section examines several recent major examples of CNA to 
de~ermine_ if they should be classified as cyber-terrorism. Specifically, 
thrn Sect10n examines the effects, motives, and targets of the 
perpetrators of CNA, measuring them against the elements set out in · 
the definition of cyber-terrorism. 
A. Anonymous 
Anonymous is ari affiliation of hackers who have conducted an 
increasingly large number of attacks since the group's origin around 
250. Mark Ward, Cyber terrorism 'overhyped', BBC (Mar. 14, 2003, 2:01 
P:I\~), http://news.bb~.co.uk/2/hi/technology /2850541.stm. (stating the 
belief of several security experts that would-be online terrorists lack the 
technical expertise and resources to engage in cyber-terrorism). 
251. C~berse_curity: Preventing Ter'rorist Attacks and Protecting Privacy 
Rights in Cyberspace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism and 
Homeland Sec. of the Sen. Comm. On the Judiciary, lllth Cong. 2 
(2_0~9) (statement of Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Ass't. Dir., Cyber 
D1v1s1on, Fed. Bureau of Investigation). 
252. Anonymous (YourAnonNews), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:25 
PM), https://twitter.com/YourAnonNews/status/168068014758039552. 
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2003.253 The members of Anonymous are thought to be assoc~ated 
with Lulz.254 Some of the group's most notable targets include private 
f S . 1 255 d s 256 organizations such as the Church o ciento ogy an o~~' 
government organizations including the CIA,257 and the Tumsmn 
governments of Tunisia25s and Iran.259 Although many of their attacks 
have shown a high degree of coordination, t~e na~ure ~f the 
organization is somewhat informal.260 In a 2011 mterview with IT 
world reporter Dan Tynan, one Anonymous leader, known as 
Commander X stated there were approximately ten thousand 
Anonymous me~bers.261 Commander X stated that its targets are 
selected by considering several factors, including whether: 1) there are 
already protests in place against the target; 2) the protests are non-
253. 
254. 
255. 
256. 
257. 
258. 
259. 
260. 
See, e.g., Chris Landers, Serious Business, BALT. CITY PAPE~· (Apr. 2, 
2008), http://www2.citypaper.com/columns/story:asp.1d=15543 
(describing a 2008 dispute between the Church of Scient?logy an~ 
Anonymous that was a response in part to the Church of Scientology s 
claims of online copyright infringement). 
See supra Section II; see also Poulsen, supra note 186. 
See Landers, supra note 253. 
See Elinor Mills, Sony sites offline after Anonymous attack threats, 
CNET (Apr. 6, 2011 4:52 PM), http://news.cnet.com/83?1-27080--:-3-
20051482-245.html (discussing Anonymous's distrib~ted ~en~a~-of-serv1ce 
attacks against Sony in response to Sony's suit agamst md1v1duals who 
had "jailbroken" software for its popular gaming system). 
Nicole Perlroth, Anonymous Says It Knocked C.l.A. Site Offline, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BLOG (Feb. 10, 2012, 5:.14 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/ano~ymous-says-_it-knocked­
c-i-a-site-offline/ (suggesting that Anonymous s attack agamst the CIA 
website may have been tied to the FBI arrests of the owners 
Megaupload.com, a popular music downloading). 
Max Read, Anonymous Attacks Tunisian Government over Wikileaks 
Censorship, GAWKER (Jan. 3, 2011,. . 12:14 AM), 
http://gawker.com/5723104/anonymous-attacks-tum~ia~-governme:11t­
over-wikileaks-censorship (explaining Anonymous's d1stnbut.ed denial-~f­
service attacks against the Tunisian Government's websites were m 
response to the Government's blocking of its country's Internet users 
from accessing Wikileaks, or any news outlet that reported on the 
leaked cables regarding Tunisia, in December 2010). 
Kevin Fogarty, 'Anonymous' attacks Iran, calls for volunteers to help 
U.S. tornado victims, IT WORLD (May 2, 2011, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.itworld.com/security /161241/anonymous-attacks-Iran-calls-
volunteers-help-us-tornado-victims (blaming Anonymous for attacks 
launched against multiple Iranian Government websites). 
Dan Tynan, A conversation with Commander X, IT WORLD (Feb .. 18, 
2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.itworld.?om/int~rnet/1375~0/conversat10~~ 
commander-x ("'So is there some kmd of mformal hierarchy . · · · 
'That is correct."'). 
261. Id. 
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violent; 3) the protest has a likelihood of success; and 4) there is a 
clear moral imperative.262 Commander X does not define whose 
"moral imperative" guides their actions. 263 
Clearly, Anonymous sees its actions as civil disobedience, using 
the language of morality to justify its actions. An example of this 
moralistic language was the recent launch of a cyber-campaign against 
Israel. 264 Anonymous purportedly released a video that promised a 
"crusade" against Israel. 265 The stated aim of Anonymous was 
"systematically removing [Israel] from the internet."266 The video 
cited Israel's "Zionist bigotry" and population displacement as reasons 
for the promised attacks. 267 
In conjunction with the attack outlined at the beginning of this 
Article, these attacks raise the issue of whether Anonymous is a 
hacktivist organization or a cyber-terrorist organization. As already 
detailed, the group's attacks against justice and national security 
websites such as the FBI and DoJ, as well as the CIA attack, meet 
the definition of a federal crime of terrorism. Nevertheless, should the 
act of t~mporarily taking down a government website result in 
labeling a group as "terrorists"? 
Examining the elements presented in this Article's definition of 
cyber-terrorism clarifies the answer. First is the prong· of intent, 
which Anonymous clearly satisfies: Anonymous endeavors to 
undermine groups and organizations they disagree with, including 
governments. 268 It also meets the requirement of being a non-state 
group, as it contains no known ties to a state. The last question is 
whether the effects of the group's attacks are designed to cause fear or 
anxiety in a civilian populace. This can be done through effects that 
cause widespread damage to critical physical or informational 
infrastructure, national security related information systems, critical 
economic systems, or that result in severe physical damage or human 
casualties. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Given the nature of Anonymous' announcements, it would be easy for 
anyone to claim action in their name. However, the Author could find 
no statement repudiating the intended launch of a CN A against Israel 
by Anonymous. 
265. Donald Macintyre, Hacking group threatens 'crusade' against Israel, 
INDEPENDEN~ (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://www.mdependent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/hacking-group-
threatens-crusade-against-israel-6 720039 .html?. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Tynan, supra note 260 (reporting that Commander X stated that by 
victory, "[d]ictators on planes to Saudi Arabia works for us."). 
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255. 
256. 
257. 
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260. 
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2008), http://www2.citypaper.com/columns/story:asp.1d=15543 
(describing a 2008 dispute between the Church of Scient?logy an~ 
Anonymous that was a response in part to the Church of Scientology s 
claims of online copyright infringement). 
See supra Section II; see also Poulsen, supra note 186. 
See Landers, supra note 253. 
See Elinor Mills, Sony sites offline after Anonymous attack threats, 
CNET (Apr. 6, 2011 4:52 PM), http://news.cnet.com/83?1-27080--:-3-
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Nicole Perlroth, Anonymous Says It Knocked C.l.A. Site Offline, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BLOG (Feb. 10, 2012, 5:.14 PM), 
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Max Read, Anonymous Attacks Tunisian Government over Wikileaks 
Censorship, GAWKER (Jan. 3, 2011,. . 12:14 AM), 
http://gawker.com/5723104/anonymous-attacks-tum~ia~-governme:11t­
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Kevin Fogarty, 'Anonymous' attacks Iran, calls for volunteers to help 
U.S. tornado victims, IT WORLD (May 2, 2011, 4:07 PM), 
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Dan Tynan, A conversation with Commander X, IT WORLD (Feb .. 18, 
2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.itworld.?om/int~rnet/1375~0/conversat10~~ 
commander-x ("'So is there some kmd of mformal hierarchy . · · · 
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261. Id. 
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violent; 3) the protest has a likelihood of success; and 4) there is a 
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cyber-terrorism clarifies the answer. First is the prong· of intent, 
which Anonymous clearly satisfies: Anonymous endeavors to 
undermine groups and organizations they disagree with, including 
governments. 268 It also meets the requirement of being a non-state 
group, as it contains no known ties to a state. The last question is 
whether the effects of the group's attacks are designed to cause fear or 
anxiety in a civilian populace. This can be done through effects that 
cause widespread damage to critical physical or informational 
infrastructure, national security related information systems, critical 
economic systems, or that result in severe physical damage or human 
casualties. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Given the nature of Anonymous' announcements, it would be easy for 
anyone to claim action in their name. However, the Author could find 
no statement repudiating the intended launch of a CN A against Israel 
by Anonymous. 
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victory, "[d]ictators on planes to Saudi Arabia works for us."). 
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None of the attacks conducted by Anonymous or its affiliates 
have directly caused physical damage or human casualties, but the 
attacks have affected web operations for some national security 
related agencies through denial of service attacks.269 However, CNAs 
that have resulted in the temporary takedown of websites, such as 
those of the FBI, White House, or CIA, should not be considered 
widespread damage. The public web pages of these agencies, while 
important, are generally media outlets and general notices to the 
public.270 Additionally, the hacked websites are typically down only 
for a brief period. 271 Should these attacks occur during a public 
emergency with increased reliance on those sites for vital information, 
the effects would likely meet . the definitional element of cyber-
terrorism. 
Anonymous has also gone so far as to eavesdrop on the phone 
calls between the FBI and Scotland Yard. 272 In this CNA, 
Anonymous was able to listen in on a conference call discussing efforts 
against hacking groups, raising the question of how deeply the group 
had infiltrated various law enforcement agencies.273 This infiltration 
should be considered more severe than the take-down of a website, as 
it could affect operations and, potentially, national security. 
However, the public effects of such actions are limited and should not 
be considered cyber-terrorism. Anonymous has not limited itself to 
denial of service attacks and other types of CNA may be a bit 
different. 
In August 2011, the Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART") 
administration in San Francisco announced that they would cut cell 
phone service in tunnels as a response to protests over the shooting of 
a man by BART police.274 Following this announcement, Anonymous 
269. See Elinor Mills, Keeping up with the hackers (chart), CNET (Feb. 8, 
2012, 5:46 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20071830-
245/keeping-up-with-the-hackers-chart/ (providing a chart of computer 
attacks and the results of these attacks over the past year). 
270. See, e.g., CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ (last accessed Feb. 12, 2012). 
271. See, e.g., Christopher Williams, Anonymous attacks FBI website over 
Megaupload raids, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2012 10:44 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co. uk/technology /news/ 9027246 /Anonymous-
attacks-FBI-website-over-Megaupload-raids.html (describing the 
Anonymous attacks on the FBI website and stating the site was only 
down for a brief period, although the websites for the Motion Picture 
Association of America were down for a considerably longer period). 
272. Leo Kelion, Anonymous gain [sic} access to FBI and Scotland Yard 
hacking call, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012, 15:54 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16875921. 
273. Id. 
274. David Streitfeld, Bay Area Officials Cut Cell Coverage to Thwart 
Protestors, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:55 PM), 
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leaked the names, phone numbers, and passwords of BART riders.275 
Although Anonymous apologized to the riders for the release of their 
information, they blamed the release on BART for having lax security 
practices.276 The Oakland Police Chief responded by labeling the 
CNA an act of cyber-terrorism.277 
Loss of private data can be of great concern, and certainly affects 
these individuals' lives more than website disruption, but does it rise 
to the level of fear and anxiety necessary to fit the definition of cyber-
terrorism? As personal information placed on information systems 
becomes more prevalent, it also becomes more vulnerable to theft. 
An entire generation has become comfortable putting large amounts 
of personal information on the Internet. Although most people trust 
that this data is somewhat secure, an entire industry has grown up 
around information security and identity protection with companies 
such as Lifelock, Debix, and TrustedID, which advertise identity-theft 
protection. 278 There seems to be a constant flow of news stories about 
government agencies, banks, and other companies losing the private 
data of their clients or constituents. 279 Is the knowledge that so much 
of our personal data is located in the hands of third parties limiting 
the effect of a release such as that of Anonymous? The line is a 
difficult one to draw, but in the specific case of BART, in which the 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/bay-area-authorities-cut-cell-
coverage-to-thwart-protestors/ ("Officers were concerned that the 
protestors "would use mobile devices to coordinate their disruptive 
activities and communicate about the location and umber of BART 
police"). 
275. Joshua Brustein, Anonymous to BART: We Hack. We Organize, Too, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOGS (Aug. 15, 2011, 2:09 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/anonymous-to-bart-we-hack-
we-organize-too / (describing Anonymous' activities in response to 
BART's actions). 
276. Id. ("We apologize to any citizen that has his information published, 
but you should go to BART and ask them why your information wasn't 
secure with them," [Anonymous] wrote on the Web site where it posted 
the leaked information.") 
277. Matthew Artz, Oakland officials condemn release of personal 
information by Anonymous, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (updated Feb. 7, 
2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/occupy/ci_19910127. 
278. See Bruce Schneier, The Pros and Cons of LifeLock, WIRED (June 12, 
2008), http://www.wired.com/politics/security /commentary/ 
securitymatters / 2008 / 06 / securityma tters_ 0612? curren tP age= all. 
279. See generally Mark Sullivan, Protect Our Data! A Digital Consumer Bill 
of Rights, PCWORLD (Feb. 9, 2012, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249558/protect_our_data_a_digital_ 
consumer_bill_of_rights.html (discussing the various ways consumers 
store information and the ways that information can be protected and 
unkriowingly accessed). 
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None of the attacks conducted by Anonymous or its affiliates 
have directly caused physical damage or human casualties, but the 
attacks have affected web operations for some national security 
related agencies through denial of service attacks.269 However, CNAs 
that have resulted in the temporary takedown of websites, such as 
those of the FBI, White House, or CIA, should not be considered 
widespread damage. The public web pages of these agencies, while 
important, are generally media outlets and general notices to the 
public.270 Additionally, the hacked websites are typically down only 
for a brief period.271 Should these attacks occur during a public 
emergency with increased reliance on those sites for vital information, 
the effects would likely meet. the definitional element of cyber-
terrorism. 
Anonymous has also gone so far as to eavesdrop on the phone 
calls between the FBI and Scotland Yard. 272 In this CN A, 
Anonymous was able to listen in on a conference call discussing efforts 
against hacking groups, raising the question of how deeply the group 
had infiltrated various law enforcement agencies. 273 This infiltration 
should be considered more severe than the take-down of a website, as 
it could affect operations and, potentially, national security. 
However, the public effects of such actions are limited and should not 
be considered cyber-terrorism. Anonymous has not limited itself to 
denial of service attacks and other types of CNA may be a bit 
different. 
In August 2011, the Bay Area Rapid Transit ("BART") 
administration in San Francisco announced that they would cut cell 
phone service in tunnels as a response to protests over the shooting of 
a man by BART police.274 Following this announcement, Anonymous 
269. See Elinor Mills, Keeping up with the hackers (chart), CNET (Feb. 8, 
2012, 5:46 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20071830-
245/keeping-up-with-the-hackers-chart/ (providing a chart of computer 
attacks and the results of these attacks over the past year). 
270. See, e.g., CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ (last accessed Feb. 12, 2012). 
271. See, e.g., Christopher Williams, Anonymous attacks FBI website over 
Megaupload raids, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2012 10:44 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology /news/9027246/ Anonymous-
attacks-FBI-website-over-Megaupload-raids.html (describing the 
Anonymous attacks on the FBI website and stating the site was only 
down for a brief period, although the websites for the Motion Picture 
Association of America were down for a considerably longer period). 
272. Leo Kelion, Anonymous gain {sic} access to FBI and Scotland Yard 
hacking call, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012, 15:54 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16875921. 
273. Id. 
274. David Streitfeld, Bay Area Officials Cut Cell Coverage to Thwart 
Protestors, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 12, 2011, 8:55 PM), 
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leaked the names, phone numbers, and passwords of BART riders.275 
Although Anonymous apologized to the riders for the release of their 
information, they blamed the release on BART for having lax security 
practices.276 The Oakland Police Chief responded by labeling the 
CNA an act of cyber-terrorism.277 
Loss of private data can be of great concern, and certainly affects 
these individuals' lives more than website disruption, but does it rise 
to the level of fear and anxiety necessary to fit the definition of cyber-
terrorism? As personal information placed on information systems 
becomes more prevalent, it also becomes more vulnerable to theft. 
An entire generation has become comfortable putting large amounts 
of personal information on the Internet. Although most people trust 
that this data is somewhat secure, an entire industry has grown up 
around information security and identity protection with companies 
such as Lifelock, Debix, and TrustedID, which advertise identity-theft 
protection. 278 There seems to be a constant flow of news stories about 
government agencies, banks, and other companies losing the private 
data of their clients or constituents.279 Is the knowledge that so much 
of our personal data is located in the hands of third parties limiting 
the effect of a release such as that of Anonymous? The line is a 
difficult one to draw, but in the specific case of BART, in which the 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/bay-area-authorities-cut-cell-
coverage-to-thwart-protestors/ ("Officers were concerned that the 
protestors "would use mobile devices to coordinate their disruptive 
activities and communicate about the location and umber of BART 
police"). 
275. Joshua Brustein, Anonymous to BART: We Hack. We Organize, Too, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOGS (Aug. 15, 2011, 2:09 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/anonymous-to-bart-we-hack-
we-organize-too / (describing Anonymous' activities in response to 
BART's actions). 
276. Id. ("We apologize to any citizen that has his information published, 
but you should go to BART and ask them why your information wasn't 
secure with them," [Anonymous] wrote on the Web site where it posted 
the leaked information.") 
277. Matthew Artz, Oakland officials condemn release of personal 
information by Anonymous, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (updated Feb. 7, 
2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/occupy/ci_19910127. 
278. See Bruce Schneier, The Pros and Cons of LifeLock, WIRED (June 12, 
2008), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/ 
securityma tters / 2008 / 06 / securitymatters_ 0612? curren tP age=all. 
279. See generally Mark Sullivan, Protect Our Data! A Digital Consumer Bill 
of Rights, PCWORLD (Feb. 9, 2012, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249558/protect_our_data_a_digital_ 
consumer_bill_of_rights.html (discussing the various ways consumers 
store information and the ways that information can be protected and 
unknowingly accessed). 
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data release was limited to user names and passwords, the loss was 
not substantial enough to be considered cyber-terrorism. 
Thus, the actions of Anonymous, while troublesome to many,280 
do not yet rise to the level of cyber-terrorism. Its rhetoric may 
suggest radical or even occasionally violent aims, but its actions do 
not rise to that level. However, this does not mean that as 
Anonymous' capabilities increase the likelihood that the group will 
not attempt a CNA that rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. The 
National Security Agency ("NSA") has warned that by 2014, 
Anonymous could have the ability to bring down portions of the U.S. 
power grid, 281 which should be considered cyber-terrorism as a CNA 
on critical infrastructure. NSA had been silent regarding Anonymous 
to this point, making the statement particularly notable.282 
Additionally, Anonymous announced plans to "blackout" the Internet 
by attacking the Domain Name System to protest "our irresponsible 
leaders and the beloved bankers who are starving the world for their 
own selfish needs out of sheer sadistic fun. "283 Time will tell if 
280. See, e.g., Steven Musil, Interpol sweep nets 25 Anonymous suspects, 
CNET (Feb. 28, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009-=-3-
5 7387203-83 / interpol-sweep-nets-25-anonymous-suspects / (report mg 
that Interpol arrested twenty-five Anonymous members across Europe 
and South America in response to coordinated attacks by the group 
against websites in Colombia and Chile). 
281. Siobhan Gorman, Alert on Hacker Power Play, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204059804577229390105521090.html?mod=WSJ_hp_ 
MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird (discussing warnings issued by NSA 
Director General Keith Alexander, in meetings with the White House 
and lawmakers); see also Elizabeth Flock, Anonymous attacks WSJ page 
hours after story warning group is getting more powerful, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 22, 2012, 10:02 AM), 
http://www. washingtonpost .com/blogs /blogpost /post/ anonymous-
attacks-wsj-page-hours-after-story-warning-group-is-getting-more-
powerful/2012 /02/22 / gIQA 7Q1FTR_blog.html (describing several 
attacks on Wall Street Journal Facebook pages by a German faction of 
Anonymous after the Wall Street Journal reported on General 
Alexander's comments regarding Anonymous). 
282. Kevin Fogarty, NSA: Anonymous may take down U.S. power grid in 
two years, IT WORLD (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.itworld.com/security /251904/nsa-anonymous-may-take-
down-us-power-grid-two-years (stating that the NSA has treated 
Anonymous "much more even-handed" then other groups). 
283. Jeremy Kirk, Anonymous threatens to DDOS root Internet servers, IT 
WORLD (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:19 AM), http://www.itworld.com/ 
security /251450 / anonymous-threatens-ddos-root-internet-servers 
(suggesting Anonymous' announcement that it would launch an action 
on March 31, 2012 as part of "Operation Global Blackout" that would 
target the root Domain Name System (DNS) servers is unlikely to be 
successful). 
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Anonymous truly has the intention and capability to carry out such 
attacks. Given the nature of the organization and the manner in 
which it distributes its me~sages, it is difficult to determine whether 
these statements are legitimately from Anonymous. At this point, 
Anonymous is an example of a hacktivist group that has generally 
well-defined motivations, but whose attacks are more of nuisance than 
a true threat to national security.284 Sometime in the future, however, 
Anonymous may meet the definition of a cyber-terrorist organization. 
B. ILO VEYO U virus 
Opposite to Anonymous' actions are a variety of attacks that 
have resulted in large-scale damage but with less clearly-defined 
motivation. The ILOVEYOU virus and its variants are a prime 
example of this type of CNA. The ILOVEYOU virus was estimated 
to have infected forty-five million users and cost billions of dollars in 
damage. 285 The suspected creator, Onel de Guzman, was allegedly 
motivated by the rejection of his thesis on computer vulnerabilities.286 
If a physical bombing in the United States caused billions of dollars in 
damage but no injuries, and had political motivation, it would likely 
meet the definition of an act of terrorism. 287 However, although the 
ILOVEYOU virus did just that, a different analysis must be used 
when examining CNA. The effects of CNA are generally much more 
widespread and lack the shock of that results from a physical attack. 
Therefore, the working definition of cyber-terrorism should be 
analyzed to determine whether· an act of cyber-terrorism has truly 
taken place. 
The ILOVEYOU virus does not rise to the level of cyber-
terrorism under this Article's definition. First, there is insufficient 
evidence that the attack was politically-motivated.288 The attacks did 
not appear to target government or national security institutions. 289 
Additionally, no message declaring intent to undermine government 
284. See, e.g., David Goldman, Hacker group Anonymous is a nuisance, not 
a threat, CNN MONEY (Jan. 20, 2012, 3:01 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/20/technology /anonymous_hack/index. 
htm (calling Anonymous the "graffiti artists of the Internet"). 
285. I love you Virus, ORACLE THINKQUEST EDUC. FOUND., 
. http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct / 00460 /!Love You.html, 
(last accessed Feb. 14, 2012) (describing the effects of the virus). 
286. Mark Landler, A Filipino Linked to "Love Bug" Talks About His 
License to Hack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at Cl (reporting that Mr. 
Guzman dropped out of school after his thesis proposal on stealing 
passwords to gain free access to the Internet was rejected). 
287. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (U.S. Code definition of terrorism). 
288. See Landler, supra note 286. 
289. Id. 
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data release was limited to user names and passwords, the loss was 
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do not yet rise to the level of cyber-terrorism. Its rhetoric may 
suggest radical or even occasionally violent aims, but its actions do 
not rise to that level. However, this does not mean that as 
Anonymous' capabilities increase the likelihood that the group will 
not attempt a CNA that rises to the level of cyber-terrorism. The 
National Security Agency ("NSA") has warned that by 2014, 
Anonymous could have the ability to bring down portions of the U.S. 
power grid, 281 which should be considered cyber-terrorism as a CNA 
on critical infrastructure. NSA had been silent regarding Anonymous 
to this point, making the statement particularly notable.282 
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283. Jeremy Kirk, Anonymous threatens to DDOS root Internet servers, IT 
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(suggesting Anonymous' announcement that it would launch an action 
on March 31, 2012 as part of "Operation Global Blackout" that would 
target the root Domain Name System (DNS) servers is unlikely to be 
successful). 
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Anonymous truly has the intention and capability to carry out such 
attacks. Given the nature of the organization and the manner in 
which it distributes its mes;sages, it is difficult to determine whether 
these statements are legitimately from Anonymous. At this point, 
Anonymous is an example of a hacktivist group that has generally 
well-defined motivations, but whose attacks are more of nuisance than 
a true threat to national security.284 Sometime in the future, however, 
Anonymous may meet the definition of a cyber-terrorist organization. 
B. ILOVEYOU virus 
Opposite to Anonymous' actions are a variety of attacks that 
have resulted in large-scale damage but with less clearly-defined 
motivation. The ILOVEYOU virus and its variants are a prime 
example of this type of CNA. The ILOVEYOU virus was estimated 
to have infected forty-five million users and cost billions of dollars in 
damage.285 The suspected creator, Onel de Guzman, was allegedly 
motivated by the rejection of his thesis on computer vulnerabilities.286 
If a physical bombing in the United States caused billions of dollars in 
damage but no injuries, and had political motivation, it would likely 
meet the definition of an act of terrorism. 287 However, although the 
ILOVEYOU virus did just that, a different analysis must be used 
when examining CNA. The effects of CNA are generally much more 
widespread and lack the shock of that results from a physical attack. 
Therefore, the working definition of cyber-terrorism should be 
analyzed to determine whether· an act of cyber-terrorism has truly 
taken place. 
The ILOVEYOU virus does not rise to the level of cyber-
terrorism under this Article's definition. First, there is insufficient 
evidence that the attack was politically-motivated.288 The attacks did 
not appear to target government or national security institutions. 289 
Additionally, no message declaring intent to undermine government 
284. See, e.g., David Goldman, Hacker group Anonymous is a nuisance, not 
a threat, CNN MONEY (Jan. 20, 2012, 3:01 PM), 
http:// money. cnn. com/ 2012/01/20 /technology/ anonymous_hack /index. 
htm (calling Anonymous the "graffiti artists of the Internet"). 
285. I love you Virus, ORACLE THINKQUEST EDUC. FOUND., 
http://library.thinkquest.org/04oct/00460/ILoveYou.html, 
(last accessed Feb. 14, 2012) (describing the effects of the virus). 
286. Mark Landler, A Filipino Linked to "Love Bug" Talks About His 
License to Hack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at Cl (reporting that Mr. 
Guzman dropped out of school after his thesis proposal on stealing 
passwords to gain free access to the Internet was rejected). 
287. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (U.S. Code definition of terrorism). 
288. See Landler, supra note 286. 
289. Id. 
325 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2. 2013 
Cyber-Terrorism: Finding a Common Starting Point 
or influence policy was released in conjunction with the attack.290 
However under examination of the effects element, the answer is less 
clear. Although the attack was not aimed at national security 
systems or infrastructure, it had a significant effect on business291 and 
affected the networks of the CIA, Pentagon, and British 
Parliament.292 Given the scale of the damage, had these attacks been 
politically-motivated, they would likely have risen to the level of 
cyber-terrorism. However, because the attack fails the intent element, 
the ILOVEYOU should be categorized as a cyber-crime. 
C. U.S. Power Grid 
In April 2009, U.S. officials discovered hackers from Russia, 
China and other countries had gained access to the U.S. power grid 
' d t 1 W3 and left behind tools that could have destroye system con ro s. 
The intrusions could not be definitively traced to either state or non-
state actors.294 The motivations of the intrusions were not clearly 
understood as the attacks were never carried out. 295 Speculations 
include th~ belief that Russian and Chinese governments gained 
access so that in the event of a future conflict, the grid could be shut 
down or otherwise affected. 296 . 
The threat to the various power grids operating in the United 
States has prompted the Energy Department to launch an initiative 
into protecting the grid from CNA.297 Losing control over the power 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. John Markoff, An "I Love You" Virus Becomes Anything But, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2000, WK2 (reporting that the White House, Pentagon, 
Congress and the British House of Commons were among those affected 
by the ILOVEYOU virus). 
293. Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2009, at Al-A2 (reporting on the discovered intrusio1:1s 
upon the information systems controlling portions of the U.S. power gnd 
and the calls for the implementation of increased security measures); see 
also James A. Lewis, The Electrical Grid as a Target for Cyber Attack, 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES (Mar. 2010), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/100322_ElectricalGridAsATargetforCy 
berAttack.pdf [hereinafter Lewis II] (evaluating the risks of CNA on 
components of the electrical grid system). 
294. Gorman, supra note 293, at A2. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Stephen Lawton, Energy Department to analyze power grid cyber 
threats SC MAGAZINE (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.scmagazine.com/ 
energy ~department-to-analyze-power-grid-cyber-threats/ article/ 222399 / 
(reporting on the Electric Sector Cyber-security Risk Management 
Maturity project, a federal program headed by the Department of 
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grid could have cascading effects with disastrous consequences for 
hospitals, emergency responders, defense and law enforcement 
agencies, and the financial sector, among others. 298 In an armed 
conflict, the power grid is often among the first targets because it can 
debilitate a nation's command and control structure.299 Given the 
potential effect on society, a CNA that takes down a significant 
portion of a region's power grid for any extended period passes the 
effects test element of cyber-terrorism. If a non-state actor committed 
the 2009 intrusions into the power grid, then they should be 
considered an act in preparation for a cyber-terrorist attack and 
treated just as seriously as an attempted attack. 
D. Stuxnet 
Between June 2009 and May 2010, a type of computer virus 
known as a worm,300 was discovered to have damaged SCADA 
systems that controlled centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. 301 
The worm most likely infected the software using a portable drive, 
such as a thumb drive.302 Given the sophistication of the CNA, 
experts conclude it would have required the resources of a national 
government to engineer, and the most likely culprit was Israel.303 
Initially, Stuxnet spread indiscriminately, but the virus was designed 
to target only a very specific type of system, and to only affect 
intended targets.304 Although there were no reports of radiation 
Energy to find and contain gaps in the cyber · security defenses 
protecting the nation's electric grid). 
298. Lewis II, supra note 293, at 1. 
299. See Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., Strategic Attack of National Electrical 
Systems, Arn UNIV. PRESS. 1 (1994), http://www.comw.org/pda/ 
full text/ griffith. pdf (describing the history and purpose behind military 
attacks on electrical infrastructure). 
300. A worm is a type of CNA that replicates itself and sends those copies to 
other systems it comes in contact with. Worms can carry other 
computer viruses, or replicate and spread to use up bandwidth. See 
Definition of: Worm, PC MAG ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t33Dworm&i33D54 
874,00.asp (last accessed Feb. 19, 2013). 
301. John Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at 15. 
302. Id. 
303. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (reporting that some 
experts point to a secret facility in Israel's Negev desert where they 
claim Israel has a set of nuclear centrifuges similar to Iran's, where they 
tested Stuxnet). 
304. Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet virus targets and spread revealed, BBC (last 
updated Feb. 15, 2011, 8:51), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
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or influence policy was released in conjunction with the attack.290 
However under examination of the effects element, the answer is less 
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affected the networks of the CIA, Pentagon, and British 
Parliament.292 Given the scale of the damage, had these attacks been 
politically-motivated, they would likely have risen to the level of 
cyber-terrorism. However, because the attack fails the intent element, 
the ILOVEYOU should be categorized as a cyber-crime. 
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berAttack.pdf [hereinafter Lewis II] (evaluating the risks of CNA on 
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(reporting on the Electric Sector Cyber-security Risk Management 
Maturity project, a federal program headed by the Department of 
326 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Cyber-Terrorism: Finding a Common Starting Point 
grid could have cascading effects with disastrous consequences for 
hospitals, emergency responders, defense and law enforcement 
agencies, and the financial sector, among others. 298 In an armed 
conflict, the power grid is often among the first targets because it can 
debilitate a nation's command and control structure.299 Given the 
potential effect on society, a CNA that takes down a significant 
portion of a region's power grid for any extended period passes the 
effects test element of cyber-terrorism. If a non-state actor committed 
the 2009 intrusions into the power grid, then they should be 
considered an act in preparation for a cyber-terrorist attack and 
treated just as seriously as an attempted attack. 
D. Stuxnet 
Between June 2009 and May 2010, a type of computer virus 
known as a worm,300 was discovered to have damaged SCADA 
systems that controlled centrifuges for the Iranian nuclear program. 301 
The worm most likely infected the software using a portable drive, 
such as a thumb drive.302 Given the sophistication of the CNA, 
experts conclude it would have required the resources of a national 
government to engineer, and the most likely culprit was Israel.303 
Initially, Stuxnet spread indiscriminately, but the virus was designed 
to target only a very specific type of system, and to only affect 
intended targets.304 Although there were no reports of radiation 
Energy to find and contain gaps in the cyber · security defenses 
protecting the nation's electric grid). 
298. Lewis II, supra note 293, at 1. 
299. See Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., Strategic Attack of National Electrical 
Systems, Arn UNIV. PRESS. 1 (1994), http://www.comw.org/pda/ 
full text/ griffith. pdf (describing the history and purpose behind military 
attacks on electrical infrastructure). 
300. A worm is a type of CNA that replicates itself and sends those copies to 
other systems it comes in contact with. Worms can carry other 
computer viruses, or replicate and spread to use up bandwidth. See 
Definition of: Worm, PC MAG ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t33Dworm&i33D54 
874,00.asp (last accessed Feb. 19, 2013). 
301. John Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at 15. 
302. Id. 
303. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197 (reporting that some 
experts point to a secret facility in Israel's Negev desert where they 
claim Israel has a set of nuclear centrifuges similar to Iran's, where they 
tested Stuxnet). 
304. Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet virus targets and spread revealed, BBC (last 
updated Feb. 15, 2011, 8:51), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
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leakage from the affected sites, the NATO ambassador to Russia 
stated the virus "could lead to a new Chernobyl. "305 
The Stuxnet virus should not be considered an act of cyber-
terrorism because the prevailing opinion was that it was a covert 
CNA conducted by a nation state.306 Therefore, the appropriate 
categorization is as an armed attack in cyberspace. However, it is 
interesting from a cyber-terrorism perspective because it represents 
the potential for future cyber-terrorist attacks on SCADA software 
operating critical infrastructure systems. That no deaths or violence 
resulted from the Stuxnet virus is not a factor weighing against 
potential classification as cyber-terrorism. Knowing that a nuclear 
facility has been targeted would be enough to cause a state of fear for . 
those living near an affected facility. Were it to be revealed that this 
CNA was actually the result of a non-state actor, it should certainly 
be considered cyber-terrorism. 
Under almost any definition of terrorism, an attack on a nuclear 
facility for political purposes would rank as a terrorist attack.307 
Given the potentially severe consequences of CNA on nuclear 
facilities, or similar facilities such as chemical plants that produce 
dangerous gas, these types of attacks should receive particularly close 
attention. These sophisticated cyber-weapons that have the unique 
potential for cyber-terrorism, such as Stuxnet, should be classified as 
weapons as weapons of mass destruction.308 
E. Estonia 
In April of 2007, Estonia was one of the most wired nations in the 
world. 309 The Estonians had pioneered a system of "e-government," 
making many government services and functions available through 
the Internet.310 Estonia prided itself on both its Internet savvy and 
cyber-security. 311 
12465688 ("Once on a corporate network, the worm is designed to seek 
out a specific configuration of industrial control software made by 
Siemens."). 
305. Id. 
306. See Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 197. 
307. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (2012) (listing offenses against 
nuclear materials among the predicate offenses for the federal crime of 
terrorism). 
308. See infra Section V(D), for a discussion of this classification. 
309. Ian Traynor, Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2007 /may /17 /topstories3.russia [hereinafter Traynor]. 
310. Clark Boyd, Estonia opens politics to the web, BBC (May 7, 2004, 7:02 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology /3690661.stm (following 
independence from the Soviet Union, Estonia made a nationwide push 
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This was the backdrop on April 27, 2007, when the Estonian 
Government moved a Soviet-era Russian war memorial from a central 
square in the capital Tallinn to another location, prompting massive 
protests from the ethnic Russian minority population in Estonia and 
outrage from Russians abroad. 312 In conjunction with the physical 
protests, a three-week wave of CNA was launched against Estonia, 
primarily attacking the websites of Estonia's "e-government," 
dramatically reducing the government's ability to function. 313 
Perpetrators committed different types of cyber-attacks on the 
national Internet services, such as denial of service attacks shutting 
down much of the e-government services and hacking into government 
and media websites to alter content.314 Additionally, most of 
Estonia's media outlets were taken down by denial of service attacks, 
which prevented reporting on what was happening in Estonia. 315 
Estonia estimated the resulting damage to be in the tens of millions of 
Euros.316 
The CNA against Estonia may be the closest case of pure cyber-
terrorism seen yet. The attacks were politically-motivated and 
affected Estonia in a unique way. Estonian society is tied more 
deeply into the Internet than probably any other nation at the time.317 
Furthermore, Estonia was also prepared to defend a major CNA 
better than any country.318 
The three weeks CNA that Estonia endured was technologically 
difficult for its citizens, but the psychological effect on the citizenry is 
not as clear. Mikhel Tammet, the chair of Estonia's cyber-defense co-
to educate citizens in use of the Internet and place as many government 
functions online as possible). 
311. Traynor, supra note 309. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. (noting the main targets of the attacks included the "Estonian 
presidency and its parliament[,] almost all of the country's government 
ministries[,] political parties[,] three of the country's six big new 
organisations[,] two of the biggest banks; and firms specializing in 
communications[.]"). 
314. Id. 
315. Id. 
316. Ian Traynor, Web attackers used a million computers, says Estonia, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology / 
2007 /may /18/news.russia [hereinafter Traynor II]. 
317. See Traynor, supra note 309 (noting that Estonia is "highly dependent 
on computers"). 
318. See id. ("With their reputation for electronic prowess, the Estonians 
have been quick to marshal their defense[.]"). 
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317. See Traynor, supra note 309 (noting that Estonia is "highly dependent 
on computers"). 
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ordination committee, believed the attack to be an act of terrorism, 
and stated: 
This is a kind of terrorism, the act of terrorism is not to steal 
from a state, or even to conquer it. It is, as the word suggests, 
to sow terror itself. If a highly IT country cannot carry out its 
every day activities, like banking, it sows terror among the 
people.319 
Tammet's use of the word terrorism may have been intended to 
pressure Russia into investigating the attacks, but it may also have 
reflected the anxiety of the nation as a whole, given the unique 
connection, through the Internet, between the Government and 
people of Estonia.320 Thus, this attack meets the effects test, not 
necessarily due to the nature of the attacks, but because of the nature 
of Estonian society. 
The last question when examining the CNA against Estonia is 
determining the perpetrator. The identity of the attacker as either 
the Russian Government or a non-state actor was never completely 
resolved; this situation represents the difficulty of determining 
attribution even in large-scale attacks.321 Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonia's 
defense minister, stated, "There is not sufficient evidence of a 
[Russian] governmental role. "322 Moreover, Estonia estimated at least 
one million computers were used in the attack. 323 Hackers can easily 
control this many computers with a bot-net.324 Additionally, Estonian 
319. Adrian Blomfield, Estonia calls for Nato cyber-terrorism strategy, 
TELEGRAPH (May 18, 2007, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1551963/Estonia-calls-for-
Nato-cyber-terrorism-strategy.html. 
320. Estonia hit by "Moscow cyber war", BBC (last updated May 17, 2007, 
3:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm. 
321. See Traynor II, supra note 316; but see Robert Coalson, Behind The 
Estonia Cyberattacks, RADIO FREE EUR. (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyberattacks/1505 
613.html (describing a remark by a State Duma Deputy from the pro-
Kremlin Unified Russia party that his assistant was responsible for 
coordinating the attack, but clarifying that his assistant acted on his 
own accord). 
322. Traynor II, supra note 316. 
323. See Adrian Bloomfield, Estonia calls for Nato cyber-terrorism strategy, 
TELEGRAPH (May 18, 2007, 12:01 AM) (noting that "hackers used 
robots to infiltrate hundreds of thousands of computers around the 
world ... [which] then flooded Estonian websites"). 
324. See Cyrus Farivar, What the attacks on Estonia have taught us about 
online combat, SLATE (May 22, 2007), 
http://www.slate.com/ articles/technology /technology /2007 /05 / cyberwa 
r_i.html (defining botnet as "a network of computers that have been 
surreptitiously infected to run nefarious software"). 
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offici~ls discovered that many of the attacks had been routed through 
Russian government serverEl, but again, this was inconclusive.325 The 
ambiguity of who conducted the CNA against Estonia is an excellent 
example of the difficulty attribution creates in classifying a CN A. 
SECTION IV. THE CURRENT LAW AND PROBLEMS 
"The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the 
opportunity in every difficulty. "326 
In the previous Sections, this Article sought to define cyber-
terrorism and apply the definition in the context of some recent 
examples of CNA. Logically, the next issue to address is how to best 
fight cyber-terrorism. This Section first examines the main hindrance 
in combating CNA in general and cyber-terrorism specifically: 
attribution. It then examines current domestic cyber-crime and 
counter-terror laws to determine how these existing laws might be 
used to counter cyber-terrorism. 
A. The Dilemma of Attribution 
Perhaps the greatest ·challenge in confronting cyber-terrorism is 
the problem of attribution: identifying the party or parties responsible 
for a CNA.327 The problem of attribution in the context of the 
Internet is, in large part, inherent in the structure of the system.328 
Many hackers are now able to "spoof" Internet Protocol Addresses 
which allows them to make their CNA appear to originate fro~ 
another location.329 This is an issue common to all cyber-crimes and 
is recognized by the government and private industry alike. The DoD 
stated that "[t]he Internet was designed to be collaborative, rapidly 
expandable, and easily adaptable to technological innovation. 
Information flow took precedence over content integrity; identity 
authentication was less important than connectivity."330 The United 
325. Traynor, supra note 309. 
326. Winston Churchill. 
327. See GREGORY N. LARSEN & DAVID A. WHEELER, TECHNIQUES FOR 
CYBER ATTACK ATTRIBUTION 1-2 (2003) available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA468859 (describing 
technological barriers to correct attribution of cyber-attacks); see also 
Stephen Dycus, Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY 
L. & POL'Y 155, 163 (2010) (stating that the attribution problem 
effectively eliminates traditional deterrence and response options). 
328. See Larsen & Wheeler, supra note 327, at 2-4; see also Dycus, supra 
note 327. 
329. See Gable, supra note 176, at 102. 
330. DEPT. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN 
CYBERSPACE, 2 (2011). 
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ordination committee, believed the attack to be an act of terrorism, 
and stated: 
This is a kind of terrorism, the act of terrorism is not to steal 
from a state, or even to conquer it. It is, as the word suggests, 
to sow terror itself. If a highly IT country cannot carry out its 
every day activities, like banking, it sows terror among the 
people.319 
Tammet 's use of the word terrorism may have been intended to 
pressure Russia into investigating the attacks, but it may also have 
reflected the anxiety of the nation as a whole, given the unique 
connection, through the Internet, between the Government and 
people of Estonia.320 Thus, this attack meets the effects test, not 
necessarily due to the nature of the attacks, but because of the nature 
of Estonian society. 
The last question when examining the CNA against Estonia is 
determining the perpetrator. The identity of the attacker as either 
the Russian Government or a non-state actor was never completely 
resolved; this situation represents the difficulty of determining 
attribution even in large-scale attacks.321 Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonia's 
defense minister, stated, "There is not sufficient evidence of a 
[Russian] governmental role."322 Moreover, Estonia estimated at least 
one million computers were used in the attack.323 Hackers can easily 
control this many computers with a bot-net.324 Additionally, Estonian 
319. Adrian Blomfield, Estonia calls for Nata cyber-terrorism strategy, 
TELEGRAPH (May 18, 2007, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1551963/Estonia-calls-for-
N ato-cyber-terrorism-strategy .html. 
320. Estonia hit by "Moscow cyber war", BBC (last updated May 17, 2007, 
3:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm. 
321. See Traynor II, supra note 316; but see Robert Coalson, Behind The 
Estonia Cyberattacks, RADIO FREE EUR. (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyberattacks/1505 
613.html (describing a remark by a State Duma Deputy from the pro-
Kremlin Unified Russia party that his assistant was responsible for 
coordinating the attack, but clarifying that his assistant acted on his 
own accord). 
322. Traynor II, supra note 316. 
323. See Adrian Bloomfield, Estonia calls for Nata cyber-terrorism strategy, 
TELEGRAPH (May 18, 2007, 12:01 AM) (noting that "hackers used 
robots to infiltrate hundreds of thousands of computers around the 
world ... [which] then flooded Estonian websites"). 
324. See Cyrus Farivar, What the attacks on Estonia have taught us about 
online combat, SLATE (May 22, 2007), 
http:/ /www.slate.com/articles/technology /technology /2007 /05/cyberwa 
r_i.html (defining botnet as "a network of computers that have been 
surreptitiously infected to run nefarious software"). 
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offici~ls discovered that many of the attacks had been routed through 
Russian government server$, but again, this was inconclusive. 325 The 
ambiguity of who conducted the CNA against Estonia is an excellent 
example of the difficulty attribution creates in classifying a CN A. 
SECTION IV. THE CURRENT LAW AND PROBLEMS 
"The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the 
opportunity in every difficulty. "326 
I~ the previous Sections, this Article sought to define cyber-
terronsm and apply the definition in the context of some recent 
examples of CNA. Logically, the next issue to address is how to best 
fight cyber-terrorism. This Section first examines the main hindrance 
in ~om?ating CNA in general and cyber-terrorism specifically: 
attnbut10n. It then examines current domestic cyber-crime and 
counter-terror laws to determine how these existing laws might be 
used to counter cyber-terrorism. 
A. The Dilemma of Attribution 
Perhaps the greatest ·challenge in confronting cyber-terrorism is 
the problem of attribution: identifying the party or parties responsible 
for a CNA.327 The problem of attribution in the context of the 
Internet is, in large part, inherent in the structure of the system.32s 
Many hackers are now able to "spoof" Internet Protocol Addresses 
which allows them to make their CNA appear to originate fro~ 
another location.329 This is an issue common to all cyber-crimes and 
is recognized by the government and private industry alike. The DoD 
stated that "[t]he Internet was designed to be collaborative, rapidly 
expandable, and easily adaptable to technological innovation. 
Informa~io~ flow took precedence over content integrity; identity 
authentication was less important than connectivity."330 The United 
325. Traynor, supra note 309. 
326. Winston Churchill. 
327. See GREGORY N. LARSEN & DAVID A. WHEELER, TECHNIQUES FOR 
CYBER ATTACK ATTRIBUTION 1-2 (2003) available at 
http://~ .dtic.~il/ cgi-bin/ GetTRDoc? AD=ADA468859 (describing 
technological barners to correct attribution of cyber-attacks) · see also 
Stephen Dycus, Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY 
L. & POL'Y 155, 163 (2010) (stating that the attribution problem 
effectively eliminates traditional deterrence and response options). 
328. See Larsen & Wheeler, supra note 327, at 2-4; see also Dycus, supra 
note 327. 
329. See Gable, supra note 176, at 102. 
330. DEPT. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN 
CYBERSPACE, 2 (2011). 
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States Computer Emergency Readiness Team noted that the "[t]he 
speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among 
the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult[.]"331 
The Internet's anonymity has proved remarkaply adept at foiling law 
enforcement attempts at enforcing laws governing and deterring 
cyber-crime. 
Without the ability to catch and prosecute, there is little 
deterrence for would-be cyber-criminals.332 For this reason, many 
jurisdictions place harsh penalties on cyber-crimes, in relation to 
similar crimes conducted without the use of information systems.333 
The current head of U.S. Cyber Command, then-Lieutenant General. 
Keith Alexander, articulated, "The bottom line is, the only way to 
deter cyber attack is to work to catch perpetrators and take strong 
and public action when we do. "334 Attribution is a necessity to enable 
traditional deterrence as well as to distinguish between the categories 
of CNA.335 
Susan Brenner framed the issue of attribution elegantly, stating, 
"Cyberspace fractures the crime scene into shards[.] "336 One shard 
can be considered the place or places where the attack is felt. In 
widespread attacks such as the ILOVEYOU virus, there may be 
millions of shards.337 Additional shards include the information 
331. U.S COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 
TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, viii (2003). 
332. See Kathryn Stephens, A Review of the Cybersecurity Legislative 
Proposal, NAT'L SEC. CYBERSPACE INST., 1 (June 15, 2011), 
http://www.nsci-va.org/WhitePapers/2011-06-15-
Federal %20Cyber%20Legislative%20Proposal %20Whitepaper-
K%20Stephens. pdf (reviewing the proposed penalties for cyber-crime, 
but noting "these guidelines are much needed, and will at least send a 
message to criminals who engage in cyber crime, they are reactionary . 
and do little to help prevent cyber-attacks or ·address the frequently 
discussed challenge of attribution"). 
333. Id. (discussing the addition of harsher penalties for organized crime 
groups that engage in acts of cyber-crime). 
334. Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth Cong. 
209, 222 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, USA Nominee 
for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to question regarding 
the challenge of attribution). 
335. See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 598 (arguing that information, not 
systems, should be the focus of cyber-security); cf. Brenner, supra note 
19, at 438. 
336. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418. 
337. ORACLE THINKQUEST EDUC. FOUND., supra note 285 (noting that the 
attack was thought to have affected forty-five million computers world-
wide). 
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systems through which the attack was conducted.338 Expert cyber-
criminals tend to route their attack through a maze of servers across 
the world to maintain anonymity.339 Finally, there are the shards of 
the attackers, who may have planned and launched the attack from 
multiple information systems at multiple locations across the globe.340 
And, as is the case in some distributed denial of service attacks, the 
attacking computers may be operating without their owner having 
any knowledge of the attack. 341 
The shattering of the crime scene immensely complicates law 
enforcement efforts to track the perpetrators.342 Whereas most 
traditional crimes require some physical proximity between 
perpetrator and victim, the same is not true in cyberspace. Law 
enforcement agents are forced to navigate a web of state, federal, and 
international jurisdictions to trace an attack to its origin, and then 
must tie an individual or individuals to an information system from 
which the attack was launched. 343 A serious result of this fracturing 
occurs when investigators mistake an intermediary point of 
transmission for the attack's originating point.344 
The discussion on how to deal with the attribution dilemma has 
led to many interesting ideas, including using civilian enforcement to 
help deter cyber-criminals. 345 These ideas include how to deal with 
attribution in large-scale attacks. For greater-scale attacks, some 
338. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418-19 (noting that "[o]ther, variable crime 
scene shards . . . are the intermediary points of transmission used in the 
attack"). 
339. Id. (describing the various locations from which an attack can be 
launched). 
340. Id. 
341. See e.g., Franz-Stefan Grady, Africa's Cyber WMD, FOREIGN PoL'Y 
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 
2010/03/24/africas_cyber_wmd (describing how one could turn Africa's 
computer network into a host of "zombie computers"). 
342. See Brenner, supra note 19, at 418 ("Aside. from anything else, a 
fractured crime scene can result in false positives-in investigators 
assuming that an intermediary point of transmission of an attack is the 
originating point for the attack."). 
343. See generally Darrel Menthe, Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of 
International Spaces 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (1998) 
(examining jurisdictional laws and arguing Internet jurisdiction should 
be analogized to Antarctica, outer space, and the high seas, and treated 
as an "international space"). 
344. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418. 
345. See, e.g., id. at 465-74 (advocating a redistribution of responsibility for 
the identification of cyber criminals to civilians to improve cybercrime 
investigations). 
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States Computer Emergency Readiness Team n~te~ t~at. the "[t]he 
speed and anonymity of cyber attacks mak~s drntmgms~i11:g am~~~ 
the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult[.] 
The Internet's anonymity has proved remarkal;:>ly adept at foiling l_aw 
enforcement attempts at enforcing laws governing and deterrmg 
cyber-crime. 
Without the ability to catch and prosecute, there is little 
deterrence for would-be cyber-criminals.332 For this reason, many 
J·urisdictions place harsh penalties on cyber-crimes, in relation to f . £ t" t 333 similar crimes conducted without the use o m orma ion sys ems. . 
The current head of U.S. Cyber Command, then-Lieutenant General 
Keith Alexander, articulated, "The bottom line is, the only way to 
deter cyber attack is to work to catch perpetrators and_ take strong 
and public action when we do. "334 Attribution is a necessity to ena~le 
traditional deterrence as well as to distinguish between the categones 
of CNA.335 
Susan Brenner framed the issue of attribution elegantly, stating, 
"Cyberspace fractures the crime scene into shards[.]"336 One shard 
can be considered the place or places where the attack is felt. In 
widespread attacks such as the ILOVEYOU. virus, the:re may . be 
millions of shards.337 Additional shards include the mformation 
331. U.S COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY 
TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, viii (2003). 
332. 
333. 
334. 
See Kathryn Stephens, A Review of the Cybersecurity Legislative 
Proposal, NAT'L SEC. CYBERSPACE INST., 1 (June 15, 2011), 
http://www.nsci-va.org/WhitePapers/2011-06-15- . 
Federal 320Cyber320Legislative320Proposal 320Wh_itepaper- . 
K320Stephens.pdf (reviewing the proposed penalties_ for cyber-cnme, 
but noting "these guidelines are much needed, and will at least ~end a 
message to criminals who engage in cyber crime, they are reactionary . 
and do little to help prevent cyber-attacks or ·address the frequently 
discussed challenge of attribution"). 
Id. (discussing the addition of hars~er penalties for organized crime 
groups that engage in acts of cyber-cnme). 
Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, lllth C~ng. 
209, 222 (2010) (statement of Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, ~SA Nonn1:1ee 
for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command in response to question regardmg 
the challenge of attribution). 
335. See Bambauer, supra note 36, at 598 (arguing that information, not 
systems, should be the focus of cyber-security); cf. Brenner, supra note 
336. 
337. 
19, at 438. 
Brenner, supra note 19, at 418. 
ORACLE THINKQUEST EDUC. FOUND., supra note 285 (noting that the 
attack was thought to have affected forty-five million computers world-
wide). 
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sy~t~ms through which the attack was conducted.338 Expert cyber-
cnmmals tend to route their attack through a maze of servers across 
the world to maintain anonymity.339 Finally, there are the shards of 
the attackers, who may have planned and launched the attack from 
multiple _information systems at multiple locations across the globe.34o 
And, as is the case in some distributed denial of service attacks the 
attacking computers may be operating without their owner h~ving 
any knowledge of the attack.34 i 
The shattering of the crime scene immensely complicates law 
enforcement efforts to track the perpetrators. 342 Whereas most 
traditional crimes require some physical proximity between 
perpetrator and victim, the same is not true in cyberspace. Law 
enforcement agents are forced to navigate a web of state, federal and 
interna~ional jurisdictions to trace an attack to its origin, and 'then 
must tie an individual or individuals to an information system from 
which the attack was launched. 343 A serious result of this fracturing 
occurs when investigators mistake an intermediary point of 
transmission for the attack's originating point.344 
The di~cussion on how to deal with the attribution dilemma has 
led to many interesting ideas, including using civilian enforcement to 
help deter cyber-criminals. 345 These ideas include how to deal with 
attribution in large-scale attacks. For greater-scale attacks, some 
338. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418-19 (noting that "[o]ther, variable crime 
scene shards . . . are the intermediary points of transmission used in the 
attack"). 
339. Id. (describing the various locations from which an attack can be 
launched). 
340. Id. 
341. See e.g., Franz-Stefan Grady, Africa's Cyber WMD, FOREIGN POL'Y 
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 
2010/03/24/africas_cyber_wmd (describing how one could turn Africa's 
computer network into a host of "zombie computers"). 
342. See Brenner? supra note 19, at 418 ("Aside. from anything else, a 
fractured cnme scene can result in false positives-in investigators 
assuming that an intermediary point of transmission of an attack is the 
originating point for the attack."). 
343. See generally Darrel Menthe, Jurisdiction In Cyberspace: A Theory of 
Intern~t~ona_l ~pa_ce~ 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (1998) 
( exammmg JUnsdictional laws and arguing Internet jurisdiction should 
be analogized to Antarctica, outer space, and the high seas and treated 
as an "international space"). ' 
344. Brenner, supra note 19, at 418. 
345. See,. e.g.,. i_d. ~t 465-74 (advocating a redistribution of responsibility for 
the identification of cyber criminals to civilians to improve cybercrime 
investigations). 
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have favored imputing attribution directly to the state where the 
attack originated, under a strict liability theory. 346 Some have also 
suggested that this approach should apply to traditional acts of 
terrorism.347 This theory is difficult to apply to CNA because of the 
ease of launching a cyber-attack from any state in the world. Would 
it be unjust to hold Senegal responsible if an Iranian cyber-terrorist 
traveled to Dakar, connected to the Internet, and launched his attack 
that he had planned and developed in Tehran? This theory also 
assumes that governments have the financial or technical capabilities 
to adequately monitor their networks. . . 
The Chinese government has attempted to solve attnbut10n 
problems by enacting a series of laws that require Intern~t us~rs 
identify themselves. 348 These laws include mandatory reg1strat10n 
requirements, requirements on ISPs to track users' a~tivity, and 
regulation of cyber cafes.349 These steps have resulted m a general 
feeling a~ong the Chinese people that "every bit of [their] activity" 
can be attributed back to them. 350 Even if these legal attempts to 
eliminate anonymity on the Internet were successful, it is highly 
unlikely that such methods could be implemented in the western 
world for constitutional and human rights reasons.351 If governments 
cannot eliminate the problem of attribution entirely, for a variety of 
reasons governments will also not be able to rely upon attribution as 
a primary means of prevention. 
346. 
347. 
348. 
See David E. Graham Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L 
SEC. L. & PoL'Y 87, 92-93 (2010) (seeking to impute responsibility to 
states for attacks originating from that state's territory); see also 
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to 
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against 
States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 
(2009) (arguing that a state's use of cyber-defenses against CNA 
emanating from states that do not adequately prevent such attacks). 
Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly 
Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 B~R~LE~. J. 
INT'L L. 615, 643-53 (2005) (discussing applying the stnct hab1hty 
theory to terrorism). 
Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation of the H. Comm. on 
Science and Technology, lllth Cong. 111 (2010) (statement of. M~rc 
Rotenberg, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (reviewmg 
Chinese Internet laws relating to attribution and arguing they would be 
found unconstitutional if implemented in the United States). 
349. Id. at 111-112. 
350. Id. at 112. 
351. Id. at 110 ("It is not even clear that it would be constitutional to 
mandate such a requirement in the United States."). 
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B. Current Domestic Law Relating to Cyber-Crimes 
The question now becomes what strategies can be implemented to 
assist in the ultimate goal of preventing cyber-terrorist attacks? To 
help answer this question, this Section addresses current cyber and 
terrorism laws to determine their applicability in helping to deter 
cyber-terrorism. This Section reviews current laws drafted for, or 
commonly applied to, cyber-crimes. This collection of statutes is not 
an exhaustive list of cyber-related crimes, but rather the discussion 
includes those statutes that are most potentially applicable to cyber-
terrorism. 
1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")352 proscribes a 
number of cyber activities.353 Originally enacted pursuant to a federal 
interest in protecting computers, it established criminal liability for 
the use of computers to commit trespass, making threats to others, 
damaging computers, and committing espionage and fraud.354 The act 
was broadened significantly through several amendments,355 eventually 
protecting: 
[C]omputers in which there is a federal interest-federal 
computers, bank computers, and computers used in or effecting 
interstate and foreign commerce. It shields them from 
trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being 
corruptly used as instruments of fraud. 356 
Thus, the CF AA now covers every computer that is connected to 
the internet, a conduit to "interstate and foreign commerce." 
352. 18 u.s.c. § 1030 (2012). 
353. OFF. LEGAL EDUC.: EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES, 1 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that "[i]n the CF AA, 
Congress attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the 
Federal Government's interest in computer crime and the interests and 
abilities of States to proscribe and punish such offenses"). 
354. See generally Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use And The 
Computer Fraud And Abuse Act: Narrowing The Scope, DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. [i], No. 012 (2010) (discussing the CFAA in the 
employer/ employee context). 
355. Id. at iv. 
356. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND 
RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 5 (2010) (providing an overview of 
18 U.S.C. § 1030 and its federal statutory companions). 
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have favored imputing attribution directly to the state where the 
attack originated, under a strict liability theory.346 Some have also 
suggested that this approach should apply to traditional acts of 
terrorism.347 This theory is difficult to apply to CNA because of the 
ease of launching a cyber-attack from any state in the world. Would 
it be unjust to hold Senegal responsible if an Iranian cyber-terrorist 
traveled to Dakar, connected to the Internet, and launched his attack 
that he had planned and developed in Tehran? This theory also 
assumes that governments have the financial or technical capabilities 
to adequately monitor their networks. 
The Chinese government has attempted to solve attribution 
problems by enacting a series of laws that require Internet users 
identify themselves.348 These laws include mandatory registration 
requirements, requirements on ISPs to track users' activity, and 
regulatiop_ of cyber cafes.349 These steps have resulted in a general 
feeling among the Chinese people that "every bit of [their] activity" 
can be attributed back to them. 350 Even if these legal attempts to 
eliminate anonymity on the Internet were successful, it is highly 
unlikely that such methods could be implemented in the western 
world for constitutional and human rights reasons.351 If governments 
cannot eliminate the problem of attribution entirely, for a variety of 
reasons governments will also not be able to rely upon attribution as 
a primary means of prevention. 
346. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L 
SEC. L. & POL'Y 87, 92-93 (2010) (seeking to impute responsibility to 
states for attacks originating from that state's territory); see also 
Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to 
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against 
States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 
(2009) (arguing that a state's use of cyber-defenses against CNA 
emanating from states that do not adequately prevent such attacks). 
347. Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly 
Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. 
INT'L L. 615, 643-53 (2005) (discussing applying the strict liability 
theory to terrorism). 
348. Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Technology and Innovation of the H. Comm. on 
Science and Technology, lllth Cong. 111 (2010) (statement of Marc 
Rotenberg, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (reviewing 
Chinese Internet laws relating to attribution and arguing they would be 
found unconstitutional if implemented in the United States). 
349. Id. at 111-112. 
350. Id. at 112. 
351. Id. at 110 ("It is not even clear that it would be constitutional to 
mandate such a requirement in the United States."). 
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B. Current Domestic Law Relating to Cyber-Crimes 
. T~e questio~ now becomes what strategies can be implemented to 
assist m the ultimate goal of preventing cyber-terrorist attacks? To 
help ~nswer this question, this Section addresses current cyber and 
terrorism laws to determine their applicability in helping to deter 
cyber-terrorism. This Section reviews current laws drafted for or 
commonly applied to, cyber-crimes. This collection of statutes is' not 
~n exhaustive list of cyber-related crimes, but rather the discussion 
mclu~es those statutes that are most potentially applicable to cyber-
terronsm. 
1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CF AA")352 proscribes a 
number of cyber activities.353 Originally enacted pursuant to a federal 
interest in protecting computers, it established criminal liability for 
the us~ of computers to commit trespass, making threats to others, 
damagmg computers, and committing espionage and fraud. 354 The act 
was br~adened significantly through several amendments,355 eventually 
protectmg: 
[C]omputers in which there is a federal interest-federal 
?omputers, bank computers, and computers used in or effecting 
mterstate and foreign commerce. It shields them from 
trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being 
corruptly used as instruments of fraud. 356 
Thus, the CF AA now covers every computer that is connected to 
the internet, a conduit to "interstate and foreign commerce." 
352. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
353. OFF. LEGAL EDUC.: EXEC. OFF. FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES, 1 (2d _ed. 2010) (noting that "(i)n the CFAA, 
Congress attempted to strike an appropriate balance between the 
Fe~~~al Government's interest in computer crime and the iiiterests and 
ab1ht1es of States to proscribe and punish such offenses"). 
354. See generally Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use And The 
Computer Frau_d And Abuse Act: Narrowing The Scope, DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. [1], No. 012 (2010) (discussing the CFAA in the 
employer/ employee context). 
355. Id. at iv. 
356. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND 
RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 5 (2010) (providing an overview of 
18 U.S.C. § 1030 and its federal statutory companions). 
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There are seven distinct crimes outlawed by the CFAA.357 
Although not originally intended as an counter-terrorism statute, the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (commonly 
known as the "PA TRI OT ACT") added two provisions to the list of 
offenses that, if violated in conjunction with a political purpose and 
certain violent effects, meet the definition of a federal crime of 
terrorism. 358 This Section discusses those provisions and reviews the 
various uses of some CF AA provisions for combating cyber-terrorism. 
Section C(l) ·will discuss the implications of the federal crime of 
terrorism. · 
Section 1030(a)(l) prohibits unauthorized access of a computer to 
obtain national security related information, including restricted 
nuclear data, and using it to harm the United States or to aid an 
enemy of the United States.359 The provision essentially prohibits 
cyber-espionage. 360 The substantial penalty for a first time offense, up 
to ten years imprisonment, could make this subsection an effective 
prosecution tool, if an attack can be attributed.361 
Section 1030(a)(2) applies to almost any crime involving 
computers, as it prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without 
authorization or exceeding the user's authorized access to obtain 
information from any protected computer. 362 The statute requires a 
showing that the subject has obtained information, but this must be 
read while keeping in mind accompanying legislative history that 
states that "the Committee wishes to make clear that 'obtaining 
information' in this context includes mere observation of the data. "363 
The penalties under §1030(a)(2) are normally misdemeanors that can 
be charged as felonies with up to a five-year sentence if "the offense 
357. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006) (codifying the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act). 
358. 18 u.s.c. § 2332b. 
359. § 1030(a)(l). 
360. Cf. id. (defining "espionage" as "obtaining information that has been 
determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for 
reasons of national defense or foreign relations."). 
361. § 1030(c) (noting that punishment is discretionary; it can include a fine 
or term of imprisonment, or both). 
362. §1030(a)(2)(C) (noting that qualifying "information" includes: financial 
records from financial institutions, consumer reporting agencies, any 
department or agency of the United States, or any protected computer 
involved in interstate commerce or foreign communication). 
363. § 1030(a)(2); S. Rep No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2479, 2484 (recommending an amendment to title 18 of the U.S. code to 
provide additional penalties for fraud and related activities in 
connection with computer access). 
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was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act "364 
This statute could be used effectively against organizations with 
terrorist aspirations that conduct smaller scale CNA or engage in· 
preparatory CN A for a larger attack. 
Section 1030(a)(3) applies to the unauthorized access of U.S. 
Government computers. 365 This is a simple trespass statute and is 
limited in its applicability; the statute does not require that the 
defendant obtain any information in the commission of the crime.366 
Therefore, if a cyber-terrorist plot involved accessing a Government 
computer, and officials caught the cyber-terrorist while exploring that 
computer for vulnerabilities, this statute could apply. The downside 
to this law for prosecution of large-scale cyber attacks is that it is a 
misdemeanor, unless the defendant has a prior §1030 conviction.367 
Sections 1030(a)(2)-(3) could be used in a manner similar to "spitting 
on the sidewalk" offenses used to combat traditional terrorism.368 
Section 1030(a)(5) deals with using a computer to cause damage 
to a protected computer. 369 The Government is most likely to use this 
statute following an actual event of cyber-terrorism. It has the 
advantage of being very broad in scope and provides increasing 
penalties when the CNA causes certain harms. Depending on the 
effects of the attack, these penalties can reach up to twenty years 
imprisonment or life.370 Additionally, a violation of §1030(a)(5)(A), if 
one "knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, 
364. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (stating that an offense "committed for commercial 
advantage or private financial gain" results in a similar range of 
penalties). 
365. §1030(a)(3) (defining violating acts as intentional, unauthorized access 
to "any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United 
States that is exclusively for the use of the government of the United 
States or, in the case of a computer not· exclusively for such use, is used 
by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct effects 
that use by or for the Government of the United States"). 
366. Id. 
367. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (stating the punishment scheme for repeat offenders). 
368. Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov. 
4, 2001, at Al (discussing in part Attorney General John Ashcroft's use 
of minor crimes to prevent or investigate terrorist crimes. Ashcroft 
stated, "Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest 
mobsters spitting on the sidewalk if it would help in the battle against 
organized crime[.]"). 
369. § 1030(a)(5) (describing the various damaging effects that qualify under 
this provision). 
370. § 1030(c)(2)(E)-(F) (stipulating that if the attack causes serious bodily 
injury, then the penalty is a maximum of twenty years imprisonment, 
and if a death occurs as a result of the attack the penalties range up to 
life imprisonment). 
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There are seven distinct crimes outlawed by the CFAA.357 
Although not originally intended as an counter-terrorism statute, the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (commonly 
known as the "PA TRI OT ACT") added two provisions to the list of 
offenses that, if violated in conjunction with a political purpo_se and 
certain violent effects, meet the definition of a federal cnme of 
terrorism. 358 This Section discusses those provisions and reviews the 
various uses of some CF AA provisions for combating cyber-terrorism. 
Section C(l) · will discuss the implications of the federal crime of 
terrorism. 
Section 1030(a)(l) prohibits unauthorized access of a computer to 
obtain national security related information, including restricted 
nuclear data and using it to harm the United States or to aid an 
enemy of th~ United States. 359 The provision essentially prohibits 
cyber-espionage.360 The substantial penalty for a first time offense, up 
to ten years imprisonment, could make this subsection an effective 
prosecution tool, if an attack can be attributed.361 
Section 1030(a)(2) applies to almost any crime involving 
computers, as it prohibits intentionally accessing a computer witho~t 
authorization or exceeding the user's authorized access to obtam 
information from any protected computer.362 The statute requires a 
showing that the subject has obtained information, but this must be 
read while keeping in mind accompanying legislative history that 
states that "the Committee wishes to make clear that 'obtaining 
. b . f th d t "363 information' in this context mcludes mere o servat10n o e a a .. 
The penalties under §1030(a)(2) are normally misdemeanors that can 
be charged as felonies with up to a five-year sentence if "the offense 
357. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006) (codifying the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act). 
358. 18 u.s.c. § 2332b. 
359. § 1030(a)(l). 
360. 
361. 
362. 
363. 
Cf. id. (defining "espionage" as "obtaining informa~ion th.at has been 
determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for 
reasons of national defense or foreign relations."). 
§ 1030( c) (noting that punishment is discretionary; it can include a fine 
or term of imprisonment, or both). · 
§1030(a)(2)(C) (noting that qualifying "information" ~ncludes: ~inancial 
records from financial institutions, consumer reportmg agencies, any 
department or agency of the United States, or any protected computer 
involved in interstate commerce or foreign communication). 
§ 1030(a)(2); S. Rep No. 99-432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2479, 2484 (recommending an amendment to title 18 of the u.~ .. c_ode ~o 
provide additional penalties for fraud and related act1v1ties m 
connection with computer access). 
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was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act . "364 
This statute could be used effectively against organizations with 
terrorist aspirations that conduct smaller scale CNA or engage in· 
preparatory CN A for a larger attack. 
Section 1030(a)(3) applies to the unauthorized access of U.S. 
Government computers.365 This is a simple trespass statute and is 
limited in its applicability; the statute does not require that the 
defendant obtain any information in the commission of the crime.366 
Therefore, if a cyber-terrorist plot involved accessing a Government 
computer, and officials caught the cyber-terrorist while exploring that 
computer for vulnerabilities, this statute could apply. The downside 
to this law for prosecution of large-scale cyber attacks is that it is a 
misdemeanor, unless the defendant has a prior §1030 conviction.367 
Sections 1030(a)(2)-(3) could be used in a manner similar to "spitting 
on the sidewalk" offenses used to combat traditional terrorism. 368 
Section 1030(a)(5) deals with using a computer to cause damage 
to a protected computer. 369 The Government is most likely to use this 
statute following an actual event of cyber-terrorism. It has the 
advantage of being very broad in scope and provides increasing 
penalties when the CNA causes certain harms. Depending on the 
effects of the attack, these penalties can reach up to twenty years 
imprisonment or life.370 Additionally, a violation of §1030(a)(5)(A), if 
one "knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, 
364. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (stating that an offense "committed for commercial 
advantage or private financial gain" results in a similar range of 
penalties). 
365. §1030(a) (3) (defining violating acts as intentional, unauthorized access 
to "any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United 
States that is exclusively for the use of the government of the United 
States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used 
by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct effects 
that use by or for the Government of the United States"). 
366. Id. 
367. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (stating the punishment scheme for repeat offenders). 
368. Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov. 
4, 2001, at Al (discussing in part Attorney General John Ashcroft's use 
of minor crimes to prevent or investigate terrorist crimes. Ashcroft 
stated, "Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest 
mobsters spitting on the sidewalk if it would help in the battle against 
organized crime[.]"). 
369. § 1030(a)(5) (describing the various damaging effects that qualify under 
this provision). 
370. § 1030(c)(2)(E)-(F) (stipulating that if the attack causes serious bodily 
injury, then the penalty is a maximum of twenty years imprisonment 
and if a death occurs as a result of the attack the penalties range up t~ 
life imprisonment). 
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code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally 
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer," also 
falls under the § 2332b terrorism statute if one of the following 
eiements is met under § 1030 ( c) ( 4) (A) ( i) (II)-(VI). 371 These elements 
include: (II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification 
or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or 
care of one or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person; 
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage affecting a 
computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government in 
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or 
national security; or, (VI) damage affecting 10 or more protected 
computers during any one-year period.372 Of particular interest is 
subsection (V), which would make attacks on most government 
websites a terrorist act. Additionally, subsection (VI) virtually 
ensures that any active hacking group is now guilty of terrorism. 
Section 1030 (a) ( 7) deals with the use of computers for extortion 
and transmitting threats.373 This section is potentially useful in 
combating organizations that threaten cyber-terrorism acts when 
officials lack sufficient evidence to link them to a particular attacks. 
Overall, the CF AA provides a wide range of tools for law 
enforcement to charge organizations with crimes pertaining to acts of 
cyber-terrorism. When viewed through the lens of prevention, the 
CF AA's main use may be the prosecution of cyber-terrorists before 
the terrorists acquire the capabilities to conduct such an attack. The 
expansive penalties possible under § 1030(a)(5) may serve to 
effectively criminalize and punish any act of cyber-terrorism. 
However, the CFAA is still a very traditional criminal law statute 
because it is focused on after-the-fact prosecution for particular 
instances of misconduct in which each act can be attributed to an 
actor. The CF AA only prevents future misconduct through 
deterrence, which, as previously discussed, is inadequate in the cyber-
crime environment. Congress must enact additional laws that go to 
the heart of prevention to supplement after-the-fact prosecution. 
2. Access Device Fraud 
Section 1029, "Fraud and related activity in connection with 
access devices," outlaws the production, use, possession, and/ or 
trafficking of unauthorized or counterfeit access devices. 374 The DoJ 
manual, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, recommends using the statute 
371. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (2008). 
372. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii)-(v). 
373. § 1030(a)(7). 
374. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2012) (listing qualifying access devices, including 
telecommunications equipment, scanning receivers, software, hardware, 
and credit card systems). 
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to prosecute perpetrators who employ "phishing" emails to obtain 
passwords and financial information.375 This statute could be useful 
for prosecuting groups suspected of intending to commit acts of cyber-
terrorism, as gaining access to computer systems would likely be an 
initial step in the development of any cyber-terrorism scheme. 
C. Domestic Counter-Terrnrism Law That Relate to Cyber-Terrnrism 
In addition to laws that specifically pertain to cyber-crime, a 
number of laws that the Government uses to prosecute terrorism 
offenses may also be relevant to cyber-terrorism. This Section 
examines these laws to determine their applicability. 
1. The Federal Crime of Terrorism 
The federal crime of terrorism is defined as a violation of any 
offense listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), when that violation "is calculated 
to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. "376 The federal 
crime of terrorism has several implications including an increased 
statute of limitations,377 increased maximum term of supervised 
release,378 and a presumption against release on bail.379 
Section 2332b provides prosecutors with important tools for 
preventing cyber-terrorism. Prosecutors can request supervised 
release for life instead of the traditional five years, which could 
prevent a convicted terrorist from being able to strike in a more 
significant manner a second time. A court's denial of bail for a 
defendant suspected of trying to launch a cyber-terrorism attack may 
also help prevent an attack in its early stages. Additionally, the 
CF AA violations that are included as predicate offenses in § 
375. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. & EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES 102 (2d ed. 2010) (defining "phishing" as "where a 
defendant uses fraudulent emails to obtain bank account numbers and 
passwords"). 
376. § 2332b(g) (5) (defining the requisite intent and violations for 
culpability). 
377. § 3286(a) (noting an eight-year statute of limitations for certain offenses 
and no limitation for others). 
378. § 3583(j) (specifying the supervised release terms for convicted terrorists 
as "any term of years or life"). 
379. See § 3142(g)(l) (noting the judicial officer should take into account 
that the person had been charged with the federal crime of terrorism 
into account. when determining if bail is available); see also CHARLES 
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 38-39 (2010) (describing the presumption 
against bail). 
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code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally 
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer," also 
falls under the § 2332b terrorism statute if one of the following 
eiements is met under § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II)-(VI).371 These elements 
include: (II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification 
or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or 
care of one or more individuals; (III) physical injury to any person; 
(IV) a threat to public health or safety; (V) damage affecting . a 
computer used by or for an entity of the United States Government m 
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or 
national security; or, (VI) damage affecting 10 or more protected 
computers during any one-year period.372 Of particular interest is 
subsection (V), which would make attacks on most government 
websites a terrorist act. Additionally, subsection (VI) virtually 
ensures that any active hacking group is now guilty of terrorism. 
Section 1030(a)(7) deals with the use of computers for extortion 
and transmitting threats. 373 This section is potentially useful in 
combating organizations that threaten cyber-terrorism acts when 
officials lack sufficient evidence to link them to a particular attacks. 
Overall, the CF AA provides a wide range of tools for law 
enforcement to charge organizations with crimes pertaining to acts of 
cyber-terrorism. When viewed through the lens of prevention, the 
CF AA's main use may be the prosecution of cyber-terrorists before 
the terrorists acquire the capabilities to conduct such an attack. The 
expansive penalties possible under § 1030(a)(5) may serve to 
effectively criminalize and punish any act of cyber-terrorism. 
However, the CF AA is still a very traditional criminal law statute 
because it is focused on after-the-fact prosecution for particular 
instances of misconduct in which each act can be attributed to an 
actor. The CF AA only prevents future misconduct through 
deterrence, which, as previously discussed, is inadequate in the cyber-
crime environment. Congress must enact additional laws that go to 
the heart of prevention to supplement after-the-fact prosecution. 
2. Access Device Fraud 
Section 1029, "Fraud and related activity in connection with 
access devices," outlaws the production, use, possession, and/ or 
trafficking of unauthorized or counterfeit access devices. 374 The DoJ 
manual, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, recommends using the statute 
371. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (2008). 
372. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii)-(v). 
373. § 1030(a)(7). 
374. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2012) (listing qualifying access devices, including 
·telecommunications equipment, scanning receivers, software, hardware, 
and credit card systems). 
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to prosecute perpetrators who employ "phishing" emails to obtain 
passwords and financial information.375 This statute could be useful 
for prosecuting groups suspected of intending to commit acts of cyber-
terrorism, as gaining access to computer systems would likely be an 
initial step in the development of any cyber-terrorism scheme. 
C. Domestic Counter-Terrorism Law That Relate to Cyber-Terrorism 
In addition to laws that specifically pertain to cyber-crime, a 
number of laws that the Government uses to prosecute terrorism 
offenses may also be relevant to cyber-terrorism. This Section 
examines these laws to determine their applicability. 
1. The Federal Crime of Terrorism 
The federal crime of terrorism is defined as a violation of any 
offense listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), when that violation "is calculated 
to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. "376 The federal 
crime of terrorism has several implications including an increased 
statute of limitations,377 increased maximum term of supervised 
release,378 and a presumption against release on bail.379 
Section 2332b provides prosecutors with important tools for 
preventing cyber-terrorism. Prosecutors can request supervised 
release for life instead of the traditional five years, which could 
prevent a convicted terrorist from being able to strike in a more 
significant manner a second time. A court's denial of bail for a 
defendant suspected of trying to launch a cyber-terrorism attack may 
also help prevent an attack in its early stages. Additionally, the 
CF AA violations that are included as predicate offenses in § 
375. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. & EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES 102 (2d ed. 2010) (defining "phishing" as "where a 
defendant uses fraudulent emails to obtain bank account numbers and 
passwords"). 
376. § 2332b(g) (5) (defining the requisite intent and violations for 
culpability). 
377. § 3286(a) (noting an eight-year statute of limitations for certain offenses 
and no limitation for others). 
378. § 3583(j) (specifying the supervised release terms for convicted terrorists 
as "any term of years or life"). 
379. See § 3142(g)(l) (noting the judicial officer should take into account 
that the person had been charged with the federal crime of terrorism 
into account, when determining if bail is available); see also CHARLES 
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL971025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 38-39 (2010) (describing the presumption 
against bail). 
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2332b(g)(5)(B), are also included as predicate offenses in the 
3
!aterial 
support to terrorism statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B. 
2. Material Support to Terrorism Statutes 
One of the most successful prosecutorial methods in combating 
terrorism is the use of the material-support statutes.381 These laws 
work well as a prevention method because they inhibit the flow of 
resources to a terrorist group, 382 which hampers the ability to carry 
out attacks. Outlawing material support to terrorists is comprised 
primarily of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.383 Section 
2339A outlaws providing material support or resources, when the 
provider knows that the support will be used to carry out of a 
violation of certain offenses deemed to rise to the level of terrorism.384 
Section 2339B outlaws the provision of any support or resources to 
designated terrorist organizations.385 
Section 2339A is applicable to cyber-terrorism in two situations. 
First use of a computer to aid a terrorist is technically a qualifying 
violation of the statute.386 Thus, one who provides computer training 
or support to a terrorist organization, knowing that the organization 
intends to use that training to prepare for or perform an act of 
terrorism, would violate § 2339A, which poses a punishment of up to 
380. 
381. 
Compare the predicate offenses listed in §2332b(g)(5)(B), with the 
predicate offenses listed in§ 2339A, and § 2339B. 
Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 -
September 11, 2011, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 13 (2011) 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/O/Documents/TTRC320Ten3 
20Year%20Issue.pdf (listing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B as the 
second and third most prosecuted terrorism related offenses, after 18 
U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy. Since 2009, §§2339A and 2339B have been 
the first and second most prosecuted offenses). 
382. §§ 2339A, 2339B (proscribing acts of providing resources to terrorists). 
383. 
384. 
385. 
386. 
Id. 
§ 2339A (codifying the offense of providing material support to 
terrorists). 
§ 2339B (barring providing material support to foreign terrorist 
organizations). 
§ 2339A (noting the qualifying provisions, including: §§ 32, 37, 81, 175, 
229, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930 (c), 956, 1091, 1114, 
1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 
2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, or 2442 of title 18, § 236 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2284), § 46502 or 60123 (b) of 
title 49 or any offense listed in § 2332b (g) ( 5) (B) (except for sections 
2339A 'and 2339B) or in preparation for, or in carryin~ ou~, the 
concealment of an escape from the commission of any such v10lat10n, or 
attempts or conspires to do such an act.). 
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fifteen years in prison. 387 More directly relevant is the second 
situation. Section 2339A incorporates two CF AA provisions as 
predicate offenses.388 The statute includes "any offense listed in § 
2332b(g)(5)(B)," which, as seen above, incorporates§ 1030(a)(l), and 
§ 1030(a)(5)(A).389 Under § 2339A, providing any kind of material 
support includes: 
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who 
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine 
or religious materials. 390 
Section 2339B prohibits providing material support to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations ("FT0").391 This statute prohibits 
knowingly providing material support and resources to a FT0.392 
Additionally, financial institutions that become aware that they have 
control over accounts of a FTO must freeze those funds and report to 
the Secretary of State. 393 The Secretary of State may designate an 
FTO if he finds that: first, the organization is foreign based; second, 
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and, third, this activity 
threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 394 The 
U.S. Code primarily defines terrorist activity as premeditated, 
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.395 
387. § 2339A(a) (allowing for a life sentence if the death of a person results 
from the prohibited act). 
388. Id. 
389. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (listing predicate offenses). 
390. § 2339A(b)(l) (defining "support"). 
391. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
392. § 2339B(a)(l) (describing prohibited conduct). 
393. § 2339B(a)(2) (stating the conditions under which financial institutions 
must report possession of funds). 
394. 8 U~S.C. § 1189(a)(l) (2006); see also Foreign Terrorist Organizations, . 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 28, 2012) 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (noting the 
current list of FTOs and the procedure that the Secretary of State 
follows to designate them as such). 
395. 22 u.s.c. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006). 
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2332b(g)(5)(B), are also included as predicate offenses in the 3~aterial 
support to terrorism statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B. 
2. Material Support to Terrorism Statutes 
One of the most successful prosecutorial methods in combating 
terrorism is the use of the material-support statutes.381 These laws 
work well as a prevention method because they inhibit the flow of 
resources to a terrorist group, 382 which hampers the ability to carry 
out attacks. Outlawing material support to terrorists is comprised 
primarily of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.383 Section 
2339A outlaws providing material support or resources, when the 
provider knows that the support will be used to carry out of a 
violation of certain offenses deemed to rise to the level of terrorism.334 
Section 2339B outlaws the provision of any support or resources to 
designated terrorist organizations.385 • . . . 
Section 2339A is applicable to cyber-terronsm m two s1tuat10ns. 
First use of a computer to aid a terrorist is technically a qualifying 
violation of the statute.386 Thus, one who provides computer training 
or support to a terrorist organization, knowing that the organization 
intends to use that training to prepare for or perform an act of 
terrorism, would violate § 2339A, which poses a punishment of up to 
380. 
381. 
Compare the predicate offenses listed in §2332b(g)(5)(B), with the 
predicate offenses listed in§ 2339A, and § 2339B. 
Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001 -
September 11, 2011, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 13 (2011) 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/O/Documents/TTRC320Ten3 
20Year320Issue.pdf (listing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B as the 
second and third most prosecuted terrorism related offenses, after 18 
U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy. Since 2009, §§2339A and 2339B have been 
the first and second most prosecuted offenses). 
382. §§ 2339A, 2339B (proscribing acts of providing resources to terrorists). 
383. 
384. 
385. 
386. 
Id. 
§ 2339A (codifying the offense of providing material support to 
terrorists). 
§ 2339B (barring providing material support to foreign terrorist 
organizations). 
§ 2339A (noting the qualifying provisions, including: §§ 32, 37, 81, 175, 
229, 351, 831, 842 (m) or (n), 844 (f) or (i), 930 (c), 956, 1091, 1114, 
1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 
2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, or 2442 of title 18, § 236 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2284), § 46502 or 60123 (b) of 
title 49 or any offense listed in § 2332b (g) ( 5) (B) (except for sections 
2339A 'and 2339B) or in preparation for, or in carryin~ ou~, the 
concealment of an escape from the commission of any such v1olat10n, or 
attempts or conspires to do such an act.). 
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fifteen years in prison. 387 More directly relevant is the second 
situation. Section 2339A incorporates two CF AA provisions as 
predicate offenses.388 The statute includes "any offense listed in § 
2332b(g)(5)(B)," which, as seen above, incorporates§ 1030(a)(l), and 
§ 1030(a)(5)(A).389 Under § 2339A, providing any kind of material 
support includes: 
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who 
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine 
or religious materials. 390 
Section 2339B prohibits providing material support to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations ("FT0").391 This statute prohibits 
knowingly providing material support and resources to a FT0.392 
Additionally, financial institutions that become aware that they have 
control over accounts of a FTO must freeze those funds and report to 
the Secretary of State.393 The Secretary of State may designate an 
FTO if he finds that: first, the organization is foreign based; second, 
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and, third, this activity 
threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 394 The 
U.S. Code primarily defines terrorist activity as premeditated, 
politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.395 
387. § 2339A(a) (allowing for a life sentence if the death of a person results 
from the prohibited act). 
388. Id. 
389. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (listing predicate offenses). 
390. § 2339A(b)(l) (defining "support"). 
391. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
392. § 2339B(a)(l) (describing prohibited conduct). 
393. § 2339B(a)(2) (stating the conditions under which financial institutions 
must report possession of funds). 
394. 8 U:S.C. § 1189(a)(l) (2006); see also Foreign Terrorist Organizations, · 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 28, 2012) 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (noting the 
current list of FTOs and the procedure that the Secretary of State 
follows to designate them as such). 
395. 22 u.s.c. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006). 
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When looking to prevent cyber-terrorism, the downside of this 
statute is twofold. First, the statute requires that the organization 
be foreign-based. 396 It can be difficult to define whether a cyber-
terrorist organization is foreign or domestic, given the lack of physical 
infrastructure required to maintain the organization. Theoretically, 
no training camps are required and the members do not even need. to 
reside in the same place. However, this could cut both ways, as 
almost every hacking organization is, at least in part, foreign. 
Second, it is unclear whether this definition of terrorist activity 
could include cyber-terrorism. The statute does not explicitly 
mention CNA, and the statute's definition of terrorism requires 
violence. 397 As previously discussed, CN A may result in fear and 
anxiety among the populace without producing violent effects. 
It remains uncertain how much utility the material support 
statutes· would have in combating cyber-terrorism. CNA is clearly 
included in § 2339A, but the applicability of § 2339B to cyber-
terrorism is much less clear. This Article will discuss in Section V(A) 
how the material-support statutes can be amended to make them a 
more valuable tool in preventing cyber-terrorism. 
3. Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 
Under Executive Order 13224 and related regulations, the 
Executive branch can attach the label of Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist ("SDGT") to terrorist groups, individuals acting as part of a 
terrorist organization, and other entities providing financial support 
or assistance. 398 The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, may designate 
foreign individuals or entities that have been determined to have 
committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism 
tha~ threa~en the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, 
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.399 Additionally, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State 
and the Attorney General, may designate as "Specially Designated 
Nationals" ("SDN") individuals or entities that are determined "to be 
owned or controlled by, or act for or on behalf of" an individual or 
396. § 2339B(a)(l) (noting the "foreign" requirement of the statute). 
397. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A (2006) (noting a list of predicate outcomes which 
include violence). ' 
398. Office of the Spokesman, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ ' 
prs/ps/2010/09/146554.htm (describing the procedure for designation as 
a SDGT). 
399. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
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entity so designated.40° Further, the Secretary of State may deem it 
appropriate to add those, with the approval of the Secretary of 
Treasury, who "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or 
technological support for ... acts of terrorism" or individuals or 
entities so designated; or who are found "to be otherwise associated 
with" certain individuals or entities designated in or under the 
Order.401 Most SDGTs and SDNs are foreign persons, but the late 
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, was mistakenly designated as an 
SDGT.402 
Executive Order 13224 defines terrorism as an activity that 
involves "a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure." 403 The act must "appearD to be intended - (A) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ( C) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
kidnapping, or hostage-taking. "404 
Here the applicability of Executive Order 13224 to cyber-
terrorism depends upon the interpretation of its provision that that 
the attack be "an act dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure. "405 If the Government considers data to be property 
and information systems to be infrastructure, then the Executive 
Order could certainly apply to cyber-terrorism. 
4. Conspiracy 
There are two conspiracy statutes that are directly applicable to 
cyber-terrorism: 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit an offense or 
to defraud the United States;406 and 18 U.S.C. § 956, conspiracy to 
kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign 
400. Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP'T OF 
THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/ 
Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#l 7 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2013) 
(answering the question "[w]hat is an SDN?" as "a list of individuals 
and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, 
targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as 
terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are 
not country-specific"). 
401. Id. 
402. Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons List, OFF. OF 
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
ofac/downloads/tllsdn.pdf. 
403. See Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note 399, at§ 3(d). 
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (2012). 
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When looking to prevent cyber-terrorism, the downside of this 
statute is twofold. First, the statute requires that the organization 
be foreign-based. 396 It can be difficult to define whether a cyber-
terrorist organization is foreign or domestic, given the lack of physical 
infrastructure required to maintain the organization. Theoretically, 
no training camps are required and the members do not even need. to 
reside in the same place. However, this could cut both ways, as 
almost every hacking organization is, at least in part, foreign. 
Second, it is unclear whether this definition of terrorist activity 
could include cyber-terrorism. The statute does not explicitly 
mention CNA, and the statute's definition of terrorism requires 
violence.397 As previously discussed, CNA may result in fear and 
anxiety among the populace without producing violent effects. 
It remains uncertain how much utility the material support 
statutes· would have in combating cyber-terrorism. CNA is clearly 
included in § 2339A, but the applicability of § 2339B to cyber-
terrorism is much less clear. This Article will discuss in Section V(A) 
how the material-support statutes can be amended to make them a 
more valuable tool in preventing cyber-terrorism. 
3. Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 
Under Executive Order. 13224 and related regulations, the 
Executive branch can attach the label of Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist ("SDGT") to terrorist groups, individuals acting as part of a 
terrorist organization, and other entities providing financial support 
or assistance. 398 The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, may designate 
foreign individuals or entities that have been determined to have 
committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism 
that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, 
foreign policy, or economy of the United States.399 Additionally, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State 
and the Attorney General, may designate as "Specially Designated 
Nationals" ("SDN") individuals or entities that are determined "to be 
owned or controlled by, or act for or on behalf of" an individual or 
396. § 2339B(a)(l) (noting the "foreign" requirement of the statute). 
397. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A (2006) (noting a list of predicate outcomes which 
include violence). ' 
398. Office of the Spokesman, Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ ' 
prs/ps/2010/09/146554.htm (describing the procedure for designation as 
a SDGT). 
399. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
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entity so designated.40° Further, the Secretary of State may deem it 
appropriate to add those, with the approval of the Secretary of 
Treasury, who "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or 
technological support for ... acts of terrorism" or individuals or 
entities so designated; or who are found "to be otherwise associated 
with" certain individuals or entities designated in or under the 
Order.401 Most SDGTs and SDNs are foreign persons, but the late 
Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, was mistakenly designated as an 
SDGT.402 
Executive Order 13224 defines terrorism as an activity that 
involves "a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure." 403 The act must "appearO to be intended - (A) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ( C) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
kidnapping, or hostage-taking. "404 
Here the applicability of Executive Order 13224 to cyber-
terrorism depends upon the interpretation of its provision that that 
the attack be "an act dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure. "405 If the Government considers data to be property 
and information systems to be infrastructure, then the Executive 
Order could certainly apply to cyber-terrorism. 
4. Conspiracy 
There are two conspiracy statutes that are directly applicable to 
cyber-terrorism: 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit an offense or 
to defraud the United States;406 and 18 U.S.C. § 956, conspiracy to 
kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage property in a foreign 
400. Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP'T OF 
THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/ 
Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#l 7 (last accessed Feb. 25, 2013) 
(answering the question "[w]hat is an SDN?" as "a list of individuals 
and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, 
targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as 
terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are 
not country-specific"). 
401. Id. 
402. Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons List, OFF. OF 
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
ofac/downloads/tllsdn.pdf. 
403. See Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note 399, at§ 3(d). 
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (2012). 
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country. 407 Although it does not apply directly to terrorism, the 
Government prosecuted most terrorist crimes under § 371 in the ten 
years following 9 /11.408 Given that any act of cyber-terrorism is 
covered, at a minimum under the CFAA, there are no obstacles in 
using§ 371 to combat cyber-terrorism. 
However, it is less apparent how the DoJ may use § 956 to charge 
a group conspiring to commit an act of cyber-terrorism in a foreign 
cov.ntry. Section 956(b) criminalizes any conspiracy: 
[T]o damage or destroy specific property situated within a 
foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to any 
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at 
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, or other 
public utility, public conveyance, or public structure, or any 
religious, educational, or cultural property so situated[.]409 
This statute focuses on property belonging to foreign governments 
and certain segments of infrastructure.410 It is unclear whether this 
statute would apply to damage to the data contained on information 
systems. 
SECTION V. INCORPORATING CYBER-TERRORISM INTO 
CURRENT LAW 
"Better to be ·despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too 
confident security. "411 
Section V examined the applicability of current cyber-crime and 
counter-terror laws to counter cyber-terrorism. This examination 
revealed several important gaps in those laws that might prevent the 
Government from using them in the fight against cyber-terrorism. 
The previous Section also found that these laws do not provide an 
adequate focus on the prevention of cyber-terrorism. To help remedy 
this, Section V proposes that this Article's definition of cyber-
terrorism be incorporated into some of the most frequently-used 
counter-terrorism laws, thereby filling those gaps and providing tools 
to law enforcement officials for the prevention of cyber-terrorism. 
407. 18 u.s.c. § 956 (2012). 
408. Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 381, at 13, 
http://www.la wandsecurity .org/Portals / 0 /Documents /TTRC%20Ten 3 
20Year%20Issue.pdf. 
409. § 956(b). 
410. Id. 
411. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 11 
(1890). 
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A. Material Support to Terrorism Statutes 
As previously discussed, the material support statutes have 
proven to be some of the Government's most effective tools in the 
counter-terrorism toolkit. The DoJ has referred to the material 
support to terrorism statutes412 as "[o]ne of the cornerstones of our 
prosecution efforts" in the battle against terrorism.413 As a 
demonstration of the statute's effectiveness in combating terrorism, 
the DoJ quoted a defendant charged under the material support 
statutes, who made the following statement in conversation with an 
informant: 
[T]he reason it was not organized is, couldn't be organized as it 
should've been, is because we don't have support. Everybody's 
scared to give up any money to help us. . . . Because of the law 
that Bush wrote about, you know, supporting terrorism ... 
Everybody's scared . . . . [Bush] made a law that say, for 
instance, I left out of the country and I fought, right, but I 
wasn't able to afford a ticket but you bought my plane ticket, 
you gave me the money to do it . . . . By me going and me 
fighting and doing that they can, by this new law, they can 
come and take you and put you in jail for supporting what they 
call terrorism. 414 
Given the success of these statutes the Government should be use 
it in countering cyber-terrorism.415 The gaps previously identified in§ 
2339B416 should be remedied to allow the proper authority to 
designate cyber-terrorist organizations. The two main problems 
preventing this are the definitions of terrorism,417 and the requirement 
that designated organizations be foreign. 418 
412. See text and accompanying notes supra Section IV(C)(2). 
413. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 14 (2006). 
414. Id. at 15. 
415. As discussed supra Section IV(C)(2), cyber-terrorism is covered under § 
2339A by incorporating provisions of the CF AA as predicate offenses. 
416. It is less certain is whether a cyber-terrorist organization could be 
designated as a FTO by the Secretary of State as applied under § 
2339B. See supra Section IV(C)(2). 
417. 22 u.s.c. § 2656f(d)(l)-(2) (2006). 
418. To be designated as a FTO, the organization in question must meet the 
following requirements: 1) the organization is a foreign organization; 2) 
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and 3) the terrorist 
activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United 
States nationals or the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 
1189(a) (2006). 
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country.407 Although it does not apply directly to terrorism, the 
Government prosecuted most terrorist crimes under § 371 in the ten 
years following 9 /11.408 Given that any act of cyber-terrorism is 
covered, at a minimum under the CFAA, there are no obstacles in 
using§ 371 to combat cyber-terrorism. 
However, it is less apparent how the DoJ may use § 956 to charge 
a group conspiring to commit an act of cyber-terrorism in a foreign 
col).ntry. Section 956(b) criminalizes any conspiracy: 
[T]o damage or destroy specific property situated within a 
foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to any 
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at 
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, or other 
public utility, public conveyance, or public structure, or any 
religious, educational, or cultural property so situated[.]409 
This statute focuses on property belonging to foreign governments 
and certain segments of infrastructure.410 It is unclear whether this 
statute would apply to damage to the data contained on information 
systems. 
SECTION V. INCORPORATING CYB ER-TERRORISM INTO 
CURRENT LAW 
"Better to be ·despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too 
confident security. "411 
Section V examined the applicability of current cyber-crime and 
counter-terror laws to counter cyber-terrorism. This examination 
revealed several important gaps in those laws that might prevent the 
Government from using them in the fight against cyber-terrorism. 
The previous Section also found that these laws do not provide an 
adequate focus on the prevention of cyber-terrorism. To help remedy 
this, Section V proposes that this Article's definition of cyber-
terrorism be incorporated into some of the most frequently-used 
counter-terrorism laws, thereby filling those gaps and providing tools 
to law enforcement officials for the prevention of cyber-terrorism. 
407. 18 u.s.c. § 956 (2012). 
408. Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 381, at 13, 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC320Ten3 
20Y ear320Issue. pdf. 
409. § 956(b). 
410. Id. 
411. EDMUND Burum, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 11 
(1890). 
344 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Cyber-Terrorism: Finding a Common Starting Point 
A. Material Support to Terrorism Statutes 
As previously discussed, the material support statutes have 
proven to be some of the Government's most effective tools in the 
counter-terrorism toolkit. The DoJ has referred to the material 
support to terrorism statutes412 as "[o]ne of the cornerstones of our 
prosecution efforts" in the battle against terrorism.413 As a 
demonstration of the statute's effectiveness in combating terrorism, 
the DoJ quoted a defendant charged under the material support 
statutes, who made the following statement in conversation with an 
informant: 
[T]he reason it was not organized is, couldn't be organized as it 
should've been, is because we don't have support. Everybody's 
scared to give up any money to help us .... Because of the law 
that Bush wrote about, you know, supporting terrorism ... 
Everybody's scared . . . . [Bush] made a law that say, for 
instance, I left out of the country and I fought, right, but I 
wasn't able to afford a ticket but you bought my plane ticket, 
you gave me the money to do it . . . . By me going and me 
fighting and doing that they can, by this new law, they can 
come and take you and put you in jail for supporting what they 
call terrorism. 414 
Given the success of these statutes the Government should be use 
it in countering cyber-terrorism.415 The gaps previously identified in§ 
2339B416 should be remedied to allow the proper authority to 
designate cyber-terrorist organizations. The two main problems 
preventing this are the definitions of terrorism,417 and the requirement 
that designated organizations be foreign. 418 
412. See text and accompanying notes supra Section IV(C)(2). 
413. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 14 (2006). 
414. Id. at 15. 
415. As discussed supra Section IV(C)(2), cyber-terrorism is covered under § 
2339A by incorporating provisions of the CF AA as predicate offenses. 
416. It is less certain is whether a cyber-terrorist organization could be 
designated as a FTO by the Secretary of State as applied under § 
2339B. See supra Section IV(C)(2). 
417. 22 u.s.c. § 2656f(d)(l)-(2) (2006). 
418. To be designated as a FTO, the organization in question must meet the 
following requirements: 1) the organization is a foreign organization; 2) 
the organization engages in terrorist activity; and 3) the terrorist 
activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United 
States nationals or the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 
1189(a) (2006). 
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The first step is incorporating cyber-terrorism into the definition 
of terrorism used in the statute regarding designation of a FTO: 
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. "419 
As previously discussed, the violence requirement effectively precludes 
many potential acts of cyber-terrorism. If the proposed definition of 
cyber-terrorism were included along with the definition of terrorism, 
the Secretary of State could then designate foreign organizations that 
engage in cyber-terrorist activity as terrorist groups. However, 
identifying cyber-terrorist organizations as foreign is difficult due to 
the attribution dilemma-hacker organizations such as Anonymous 
and LulzSec are distributed worldwide with no specific locus. 420 
Given the issue of identifying the precise locus of cyber-terrorist 
organizations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 should also be amended with respect to 
cyber-terrorist organizations and the definition of "foreign 
organizations. "421 If Congress updated the phrase to "the organization 
is a foreign organization or conducts operations primarily through 
cyberspace," it would resolve the difficult question of whether a cyber-
terrorist group is foreign. However, the inevitable question resulting 
from this revision would be: Why include domestic cyber-terrorist 
groups, but not other types of domestic terrorist organizations? One 
answer is that cyber-terrorist groups operate from different locations 
around the world with no specific physical center and may include 
both domestic and foreign members. 
In addition to an exception for domestic cyber-terrorist groups, 
another counter-argument to the proposed change is that outlawing 
material support would have little effect in stopping a cyber-terrorist 
organ:ization. Preventing the flow of money and training to a group 
of advanced computer hackers will not hinder operations the way it 
does to a traditional terrorist group, which needs travel funds, 
weapons, and a base of operations. However, one counter to this 
theory is an advanced cyber-weapon. Stuxnet, the malware that 
damaged the Iranian nuclear centrifuges, was estimated to have cost 
one million dollars to produce, and likely needed the backing of nation 
states.
422 If the definition of cyber-terrorism is limited to only those 
419. § 2656f(d)(2). 
420. See Keating, supra note 100. 
421. See § 1189. 
422. Ben Flanagan, Former CIA Chief speaks out on Iran Stuxnet attack, 
THE NATIONAL (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/ 
thenationalconversation/industry-insights/technology /former-cia-chief-
speaks-out-on-iran-stuxnet-attack (referring to statements by General· 
Michael Hayden, former head of the National Security Agency, in which 
he stated that "the precision with which Stuxnet targeted Iran mean 
that "responsible nations" could not be excluded"). 
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major attacks with serious effects, then it is false to believe that a 
portion of these attacks would not require large amounts of financial 
and logistical support. Preventing the flow of resources to 
organizations capable of mounting large-scale attacks should be a 
priority. 
B. Amend FISA 's definition of international terrorism 
The Government did not pass the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act ("FISA") 423 as a counter-terrorism tool, but rather as 
a means to collect intelligence on foreign powers. However, with the 
rise of international terrorist organizations in the last two decades, 
and amendments such as "lone wolf" provision,424 FISA has become an 
important counter-terrorism tool. 
FISA allows for the electronic surveillance of a foreign power, 
within the United States, for the purpose of collecting intelligence 
information without a Title III warrant.425 The definition of a foreign 
power under the statute includes groups that are "engaged in 
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. "426 Also 
included are "agent[s] of a foreign power," which, under the statute 
so-called lone-wolf provision, includes "any person other than a 
United States person, who ... engages in international terrorism or 
activities in preparation therefore. "427 FISA's definition of 
international terrorism contains the following phrase: "activities that 
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, "428 which makes 
this definition ambiguous as to whether it applies to cyber-terrorism. 
The definition could exclude a non-violent cyber-terrorist attack, such 
as the destruction of financial or national security data. 
FISA's increased importance over the last decade is evident from 
the rising number of FISA warrants granted.429 In 1998, the courts 
423. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2012). 
424. § 1801(b)(l)(C); ELIZABETH BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22011, 
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004: 
"LONE WOLF" AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2004). 
425. § 1802(a)(l). 
426. § 1801(a)(4). 
427. § 1801(b)(l)(C). 
428. § 1801(c)(l). 
429. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Count Orders 1979-2011, 
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (last .updated May 4, 2012) 
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (charting the 
number of FISA warrants applied for each year). 
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The first step is incorporating cyber-terrorism into the definition 
of terrorism used in the statute regarding designation of a FTO: 
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. "419 
As previously discussed, the violence requirement effectively precludes 
many potential acts of cyber-terrorism. If the proposed definition of 
cyber-terrorism were included along with the definition of terrorism, 
the Secretary of State could then designate foreign organizations that 
engage in cyber-terrorist activity as terrorist groups. However, 
identifying cyber-terrorist organizations as foreign is difficult due to 
the attribution dilemma-hacker organizations such as Anonymous 
and LulzSec are distributed worldwide with no specific locus.420 
Given the issue of identifying the precise locus of cyber-terrorist 
organizations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 should also be amended with respect to 
cyber-terrorist organizations and the definition of "foreign 
organizations. "421 If Congress updated the phrase to "the organization 
is a foreign organization or conducts operations primarily through 
cyberspace," it would resolve the difficult question of whether a cyber-
terrorist group is foreign. However, the inevitable question resulting 
from this revision would be: Why include domestic cyber-terrorist 
groups, but not other types of domestic terrorist organizations? One 
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damaged the Iranian nuclear centrifuges, was estimated to have cost 
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422 If the definition of cyber-terrorism is limited to only those 
419. § 2656f(d)(2). 
420. See Keating, supra note 100. 
421. See § 1189. 
422. Ben Flanagan, Former CIA Chief speaks out on Iran Stuxnet attack, 
THE NATIONAL (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/ 
thenationalcon versation/ industry-insights/ technology/ former-cia-chief-
speaks-out-on-iran-stuxnet-attack (referring to statements by General· 
Michael Hayden, former head of the National Security Agency, in which 
he stated that "the precision with which Stuxnet targeted Iran mean 
that "responsible nations" could not be excluded"). 
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major attacks with serious effects, then it is false to believe that a 
portion of these attacks would not require large amounts of financial 
and logistical support. Preventing the flow of resources to 
organizations capable of mounting large-scale attacks should be a 
priority. 
B. Amend FISA 's definition of international terrorism 
The Government did not pass the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act ("FISA") 423 as a counter-terrorism tool, but rather as 
a means to collect intelligence on foreign powers. However, with the 
rise of international terrorist organizations in the last two decades, 
and amendments such as "lone wolf" provision,424 FISA has become an 
important counter-terrorism tool. 
FISA allows for the electronic surveillance of a foreign power, 
within the United States, for the purpose of collecting intelligence 
information without a Title III warrant.425 The definition of a foreign 
power under the statute includes groups that are "engaged in 
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. "426 Also 
included are "agent[s] of a foreign power," which, under the statute 
so-called lone-wolf provision, includes "any person other than a 
United States person, who ... engages in international terrorism or 
activities in preparation therefore. "427 FISA's definition of 
international terrorism contains the following phrase: "activities that 
involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, "428 which makes 
this definition ambiguous as to whether it applies to cyber-terrorism. 
The definition could exclude a non-violent cyber-terrorist attack, such 
as the destruction of financial or national security data. 
FISA's increased importance over the last decade is evident from 
the rising number of FISA warrants granted.429 In 1998, the courts 
423. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2012). 
424. § 180l(b)(l)(C); ELIZABETH BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R822011, 
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004: 
"LONE WOLF" AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2004). 
425. § 1802(a)(l). 
426. § 1801(a)(4). 
427. § 1801(b)(l)(C). 
428. § 1801(c)(l). 
429. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Count Orders 1979-2011, 
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (last .updated May 4, 2012) 
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (charting the 
number of FISA warrants applied for each year). 
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granted 800 FISA warrants.430 By 2008, that number was over 
2000.431 The ability to conduct electronic surveillance on those 
suspected of terrorism is invaluable to both prevent terrorist activities 
and lead law enforcement officials to those who support terrorists. 
FISA would be particularly useful against organizations that operate· 
primarily in the electronic realm, and therefore should be expanded to 
cover cyber-terrorism. 
Congress should amend FISA to include as a foreign power groups 
"engaged in international terrorism, cyber-terrorism, or activities in 
preparation thereof." The lone-wolf provision should similarly be 
amended to include cyber-terrorism. Adding cyber-terrorism to 
FISA's definition of international terrorism would be an important 
step in making FISA an effective tool to prevent cyber-terrorism. 
C. Conspiracy 
Using 18 U.S.C. § 956, "conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or 
injure persons or damage property in a foreign country,"432 against 
cyber-terrorism is problematic because it is unclear if the phrase "to 
damage or destroy specific property" or "other public utility" would 
include damage to data contained in information systems. This 
statute could be amended to more clearly cover cyber-terrorism in two 
different ways, one broad and one narrow. The broad solution would 
be to include "information systems related both to foreign 
governments and operation of the included infrastructure 
components" in the litany of included targets. This inclusion, 
however, would include minor CNA, such as denial of service attacks. 
This would undermine the intent of this particular statute. The 
narrow solution would be to add a clause to § 956 that amends it to 
read: 
To damage or destroy specific property through any physical 
means or act of cyber-terrorism, situated within a foreign 
country and belonging to a foreign government or to any 
political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at 
peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, economic 
data system, or other public utility, utility control system, 
public conveyance, or public structure, or any religious, 
educational, or cultural property so situated. 
430. Report from Janet Reno, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to Hon. 
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency /doj/fisa/ 
1998rept.html. 
431. Report from Ronald Weich, Ass't. Att'y Gen. of the United States, to 
Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate (May 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency /doj/fisa/2008rept.pdf. 
432. See supra Section V(C)(4), for a discussion of conspiracy statutes. 
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This clause would criminalize an act of cyber-terrorism, as defined 
by this Article, that is directed against a foreign state's economic 
system or infrastructure control system, such as its SCADA control. 
However, this significantly narrows the qualifying types of CNA that 
can rise to the level of cyber-terrorism. 
D. Weapons of Mass Destruction 
As seen with the Stuxnet virus, the effects of cyber-weapons may 
equal. those of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"). Although 
WMD are often thought of as chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons ("CBRN"), the definition under 18 U.S.C. § 2332A 
of a WMD433 is much broader. Along with the CBRN type weapons, 
the statute includes a wide variety of destructive devices as defined 
under 18 U.S.C. § 921, including bombs and grenades.434 Thus, WMD 
is not as narrow a category as the public believes. However, CNA is 
not included in§ 2332A, or in the WMD definition under the FISA,435 
unless these statutes encompass a CNA that causes the release of 
chemical, biological, or radiological substance. 
Despite the lack of statutory inclusion, there are indications that 
cyber-weapons could be another form of WMD. As recently as 
January 2009, former Director of National Intelligence, Mike 
McConnell, equated cyber-weapons with WMD when he expr~sse,d 
concern about terrorists' use of technology to degrade the nations 
infrastructure. 436 Director McConnell noted that terrorists aim to 
damage infrastructure and "when the level of sophistication reaches a 
point that there could be strategic damage to the United States, and 
that time is not too far off. "437 
Congress could easily remedy this exclusion by adding cyber-
weapons designed to cause cyber-terrorism to the statutes that 
include WMD in the U.S. Code. Again, however, the added definition 
should exclude all but the most serious CNA from its scope. 
Incorporating these types of weapons into the definition of WMD 
criminalizes the use of any cyber-weapon by or against a national of 
the United States. This amendment would also bring an extra-
territorial statute into the legal arsenal of law enforcement and help 
address the jurisdictional dilemma posed by CNA. Incorporating this 
433. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A(c)(2) (2012). 
434. § 2332A(c)(2)(A). 
435. § 1801(p). 
436. Interview by Charlie Rose with Mike McConnell, Director of National 
Intelligence, on The Charlie Rose Show - PBS (Jan. 8, 2009) (including 
cyber-weapons with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons as the 
four things with the highest ability to degrade the infrastructure). 
437. Id. 
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of a WMD433 is much broader. Along with the CBRN type weapons, 
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is not as narrow a category as the public believes. However, CNA is 
not included in§ 2332A, or in the WMD definition under the FISA,435 
unless these statutes encompass a CNA that causes the release of 
chemical, biological, or radiological substance. 
Despite the lack of statutory inclusion, there are indications that 
cyber-weapons could be another form of WMD. As recently as 
January 2009, former Director of National Intelligence, Mike 
McConnell, equated cyber-weapons with WMD when he expressed 
concern about terrorists' use of technology to degrade the nation's 
infrastructure.436 Director McConnell noted that terrorists aim to 
damage infrastructure and "when the level of sophistication reaches a 
point that there could be strategic damage to the United States, and 
that time is not too far off. "437 
Congress could easily remedy this exclusion by adding cyber-
weapons designed to cause cyber-terrorism to the statutes that 
include WMD in the U.S. Code. Again, however, the added definition 
should exclude all but the most serious CNA from its scope. 
Incorporating these types of weapons into the definition of WMD 
criminalizes the use of any cyber-weapon by or against a national of 
the United States. This amendment would also bring an extra-
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address the jurisdictional dilemma posed by CNA. Incorporating this 
433. 18 U.S.C. § 2332A(c)(2) (2012). 
434. § 2332A(c)(2)(A). 
435. § 1801(p). 
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definition into the FISA would bring those who develop or proliferate 
in cyber-terrorism weapons under the jurisdiction of the FISA. 
CONCLUSION 
From hacktivists who wish to make a political point by 
temporarily altering websites,438 to foreign governments and 
corporations wishing to steal valuable intellectual property,439 to 
common criminals wishing to steal credit card information for 
financial gain,440 the motivations behind CNA are almost as broad as 
the various uses of the Internet. Given the broad range of CNA, the 
tendency has been to seek legal responses that cover these crimes as a 
whole. Just as non-Internet related activities such as espionage, theft 
of intellectual property, financial crimes, and terrorism have each 
developed unique legal regimes to deal with the particularities of each 
crime, so have different types of cyber-crimes. However, a notable 
exception is cyber-terrorism, which has yet to be defined in the U.S. 
Code. 
Despite certain sections of the CF AA being listed as predicate 
offenses in the federal crime of terrorism, the resulting applicability is 
narrow and does little to address the prevention of cyber-terrorism. 
As terrorist organizations become more sophisticated in the field of 
information technology, it will only be a matter of time before they 
attempt to use information systems to conduct terrorist activities. 
These attacks could be broad-based denial of service attacks such as 
the attacks on Estonia,441 or they could be narrow malware attacks on 
SCADA systems, such as the Stuxnet virus in Iran.442 
438. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 12 (discussing Anonymous' takedown of 
several U.S. Government websites, including the FBI and DoJ, following 
the arrest of several executives associated with megaupload.com, a file-
sharing site). 
439. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Hacked Chamber of Commerce Opposed 
Cybersecurity Law, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Dec. 21, 2011, 6:10 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/hacked-chamber-of-
commerce-opposed-cybersecurity-law / (reporting on the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce's claims that sensitive economic data was accessed during 
a CNA originating in China). 
440. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Credit Card Theft is Thriving Online as Global 
Market, N.Y. TIMES (May. 13, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/13/business/credit-card-theft-is-
thriving-online-as-glo bal-
mar ket .html? scp= 2&sq =online+credi t +card+ theft&st =n yt (noting that 
tens of thousands of credit card numbers are offered for sale every week 
on the Internet). 
441. See supra Section III(E). 
442. See supra Section III(D). 
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As of yet, there has not been a cyber-terrorist event in the United 
States, but this should not stop Congress from enacting legislation to 
help prevent cyber-terrorism. The first step in any such legislation 
must be a careful definition of cyber-terrorism. This Article proposes 
a definition that is broad enough to cover the potentially unique 
effects of a weapon of cyber-terrorism, while narrow enough to 
exclude CNAs that are relatively minor in nature; a definition that is 
either too broad or too narrow risks being either irrelevant or useless. 
Once a proper definition is agreed upon, it can be incorporated 
into existing counter-terrorism legislation. Material-support statutes, 
the FISA, conspiracy, and WMD statutes all hold the potential to 
prevent cyber-terrorism, but must first incorporate cyber-terrorism 
into their definitions and coverage. A formal legal definition will also 
allow government agencies to operate from a common standard in 
developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for countering cyber-
terrorism. 
These steps will obviously not provide all the tools needed to stop 
cyber-terrorists. Increased cyber-security aimed at government and 
critical infrastructure information systems and greater information 
sharing are important requirements in stopping cyber-terrorists. 
Potential laws aimed at requiring widespread use of data encryption 
also hold potential for stopping would-be cyber-terrorists. But just as 
the fight against terrorism has left no stone unturned in finding ways 
to defeat terrorists, so should the fight against cyber-terrorists. The 
fact that there has not yet been a "cyber 9/11" should not deter 
government taking the extremely important steps of defining the 
problem and using the definition to amend existing counter-terrorism 
statutes. 
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